Essays on Macroeconomic Consequences of Financial Frictions by Zhang, Haiping
Essays on Macroeconomic Consequences
of Financial Frictions
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors
der Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftswissenschaften
durch die
Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakulta¨t
der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universita¨t
Bonn
Vorgelegt von Haiping Zhang
aus Nanjing, Volksrepublik China
Ma¨rz 2006, Bonn
.Dekan: Prof. Dr. Matthias Kra¨kel
Erstreferent: Prof. Dr. Ju¨rgen von Hagen
Zweitreferent: Prof. Dr. Ludger Linnemann
Tag der mu¨ndlichen Pru¨fung: 03 Ma¨rz 2006
Diese Dissertation ist auf dem Hochschulschriftenserver der ULB Bonn
http://hss.ulb.uni-bonn.de/diss online elektronisch publiziert.
To ZHANG JINGUO and SHI XIULIAN

Acknowledgements
This dissertation collects the main results of my doctoral study at Bonn Graduate
School of Economics (BGSE) and Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI),
University of Bonn. Many people have contributed to it in various ways.
The most prominent is my supervisor, Professor Ju¨rgen von Hagen. As the
director of ZEI, he has created an active and efficient environment for our research.
During the past five years, I have not only benefited from his excellent academic
guidance but also been influenced by his seriousness and passion for research. Mean-
while, his strong recommendation is crucial for the success of my application for
financial support. I am very much indebted to him.
Professor Manfred J. M. Neumann has taught me four major courses and aroused
my interest in macroeconomics. Professor Ludger Linnemann has read this disser-
tation carefully and given me valuable comments. Under the great management of
Professor Urs Schweizer and Professor Georg No¨ldeke, BGSE and Graduiertenkol-
leg “Quantitative O¨konomie” have become the efficient platform for the exchange of
ideas. The four-year scholarship from German Research Foundation (DFG) enables
me to conduct full-time research. I express my sincere gratitude to all these people
and organizations.
Many friends at ZEI and BGSE also deserve my heartfelt thanks. Particularly, I
would like to thank Jizhong Zhou and Matthias Paustian for their insightful discus-
sion and suggestions. Meanwhile, Jizhong Zhou has spent much time in reading my
dissertation and helped me improve writing skills. I would like to thank Tai-Kuang
Ho, Philipp Kircher, Birgit Schmitz, Ling Shen for their helps on various issues.
Finally, and most importantly, I am grateful to my parents and my brother for
their endless love and great moral support during all these years. My gratitude to
them is beyond any words. I dedicate this dissertation to them.
Haiping Zhang
March 2006, Bonn
v

Contents
Acknowledgements v
1 General Introduction 1
1.1 Origins and Consequences of Financial Frictions . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Information Problems and Financial Contracting . . . . . . . 2
1.1.2 Financial Frictions and Business Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Structure of the Dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.1 Financial Frictions and Macroeconomic Fluctuations . . . . . 7
1.2.2 Dual Financial Frictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.2.3 Domestic and Foreign Financial Frictions . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Financial Frictions and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 11
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2.3 Entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2.4 Financial Intermediaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.5 Costly Capital Adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2.6 Final Goods Production and Market Equilibrium . . . . . . . 22
2.3 Financial Contracting in the Frictionless Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.4 Dynamic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.2 Impulse Responses to Productivity Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3 Dual Financial Frictions and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 37
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
vii
viii CONTENTS
3.2.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.2.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.3 Unobservable Project Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
3.2.4 Entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2.5 Capital Goods Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.2.6 Financial Intermediaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.2.7 Final Goods Production and Market Equilibrium . . . . . . . 51
3.3 Financial Contracting in Other Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.3.1 Model SFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.2 Model SFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.3.3 Model RBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.4 Dynamic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.2 Impulse Responses to Productivity Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.5 Final Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4 Domestic and Foreign Borrowing in a Small Open Economy 67
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.2 The Basic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2.2 Efficiency Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2.3 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.2.4 The Degree of Moral Hazard and the Frictionless Model . . . 80
4.2.5 Dynamic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3 The Full Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3.1 Financial Frictions on Foreign Borrowing . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3.2 Balance of Payment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.3.3 Market Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.3.4 The Benchmark: Foreign Financial Frictions Only . . . . . . . 94
4.3.5 Long-Run Effects of Foreign Financial Frictions . . . . . . . . 94
4.3.6 Dynamic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.4 Final Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5 Concluding Remarks 115
5.1 Main Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.2 Directions for Further Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Appendix 119
CONTENTS ix
A Financial Frictions and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 119
A.1 Heterogenous Entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
A.2 Decentralizing the Capital Goods Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
A.3 Market Equilibrium in the Frictionless Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
B Dual Financial Frictions and Macroeconomic Fluctuations 123
B.1 Heterogenous Entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B.2 Heterogenous Capital Good Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
C Domestic and Foreign Borrowing in a Small Open Economy 125
C.1 Price Index of Composite Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
C.2 Heterogenous Entrepreneurs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
C.3 Market Equilibrium in Model RBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
Bibliography 129
Curriculum Vitae 135
List of Figures
2.1 Time Sequence of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.2 The Role of Capital Reallocation: (φ = 0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.3 Capital Adjustment Costs in the Frictionless Models: φ = 0 vs. φ = 3 30
2.4 The Role of Capital Gains: φ = 0 vs. φ = 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.5 The Models with and without Moral Hazard: (φ = 3) . . . . . . . . . 34
2.6 The Models with and without Moral Hazard: (φ = 10) . . . . . . . . 35
3.1 Time Sequence of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.2 Model SFC vs. Model RBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.3 Model SFE vs. Model RBC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
3.4 Model DF vs. Model SFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5 Model DF vs. Model SFC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
4.1 Time Sequence of Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.2 The Steady State Effect of Moral Hazard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.3 Impulse Responses to a TFP Shock: Model MH vs Model RBC . . . 84
4.4 Impulse Responses to a ToT Shock: Model MH vs Model RBC . . . 87
4.5 Long-Run Effects of the Degree of Collateralization to Model MH . . 95
4.6 Long-Run Effects of the Degree of Collateralization to Model RBC . 97
4.7 Impulse Responses to a TFP shock: Model RBC . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.8 Foreign Borrowing and Macroeconomic Volatility: TFP shocks . . . . 101
4.9 Impulse Responses to a TFP shock: Model MH . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.10 Impulse Responses to a ToT shock: Model RBC . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.11 Foreign Borrowing and Macroeconomic Volatility: ToT shocks . . . . 106
4.12 Impulse Responses to a ToT shock: Model MH . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
4.13 Impulse Responses to a FIR Shock: Model MH vs Model RBC . . . 111
4.14 Foreign Borrowing and Macroeconomic Volatility: FIR shocks . . . . 112
xi
Chapter 1
General Introduction
Considerable empirical evidence has demonstrated strong linkages between the fi-
nancial sector and the real production sector of an economy. Mishkin (1978) and
Bernanke (1983) provide empirical evidence showing that financial factors (e.g., the
decline in bank credit) played a more dominant role in the Great Depression than
monetary factors (e.g., changes in the monetary aggregates). Using a data set for
28 manufacturing industries in over 100 countries from 1963 to 1999, Braun and
Larrain (2005) show that industries with more external financing suffer more during
the economic recession than those with less external financing. At the same time,
industries with significant external financing are more strongly affected in recessions
when they are located in countries with poorer financial contractibility, and when
their assets are softer or less protective of financiers than similar industries in other
countries. By summarizing the existing empirical literature on the role of financial
factors in investment decisions, Hubbard (1998) finds that capital market imper-
fections have significant effects on firm decisions. Levine (forthcoming) surveys the
relationship between financial development and economic growth.
A huge theoretical literature has emerged since 1970s for the understanding of
the microeconomic origins and macroeconomic consequences of financial frictions.
This dissertation presents three theoretical essays on financial frictions and macroe-
conomic fluctuations in a closed economy and in a small open economy. In this
chapter, the relevant literature is reviewed in section 1.1. More comprehensive sur-
veys of related issues can be found in Freixas and Rochet (1997); Reichlin (2004);
Tirole (2006). The structure of this dissertation is briefly described in section 1.2.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1 Origins and Consequences of Financial Fric-
tions
Today’s literature derives financial constraints endogenously from optimal finan-
cial contracting and a variety of information problems in corporate finance. En-
trepreneurs finance their investment using own funds and external funds. Due to
endogenous financial frictions, entrepreneurs are constrained in obtaining external
funds and financial constraints may vary along the business cycle. This has pro-
found effects on macroeconomic aggregates, e.g., output, consumption, labor, etc,
and their dynamics. Financial frictions can also result in endogenous business cycles
in the sense that the economy fluctuates even without exogenous shocks.
1.1.1 Information Problems and Financial Contracting
Subsection 1.1.1.1 summarizes models in which the form of credit contracts is taken
as given and the borrowers will repay their liabilities if they are able to do so.
Subsection 1.1.1.2 summarizes models in which agents are allowed to select the best
contractual arrangement and borrowers are unwilling to repay even if they can.
1.1.1.1 Information Asymmetries at the Time of Contracting
Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) are among the first contri-
butions to a theory of financial frictions based on first principles. In their models,
there are two types of borrowers with different probabilities of default or the projects
of borrowers have different probabilities of success. Compared to outside financiers,
borrowers have superior information regarding their own characteristics or their
choices of projects. It could be very costly or even impossible for outside financiers
to collect such information. In models with heterogenous borrowers, a rise in the
interest rate may attract borrowers with high probability of default and drive away
those with low probability of default; in models with heterogenous projects, a rise
in the interest rate may induce borrowers to choose more risky projects. Thus, the
ex post repayment might be even less than in the case of the low interest rate. As a
result, the lenders have to set the interest rate at a low level and reject some iden-
tical loan applications entirely, given that the investment has a fixed size. While,
as shown in Bester (1985, 1987), if lenders can actively use screening devices, e.g.,
collateral requirements, together with the interest rate to sort out heterogenous
borrowers, credit rationing may not be a robust equilibrium.
In the model with competitive credit market, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997,
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1998) consider the case in which borrowers can choose among projects with different
riskiness and lenders cannot observe project choices of the borrowers. In order to
induce the borrowers to choose the less risky project, the optimal financial contract
must provide the borrowers with a fraction of the project outcomes as incentive. As
the borrowers cannot fully pledge their project outcomes for external funds, they
must put down own funds as net worth to fill in the gap between total investment
and loans. In other words, loans might be proportional to entrepreneurial net worth.
Thus, credit rationing in the form of denying credit to some borrowers entirely
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) does not occur here. The size of the loan is rationed.
1.1.1.2 Information Asymmetries at the Time of Repayment
Townsend (1979) considers a two-agent model in which the borrower’s project has
exogenously random output and the verification of the project is costly for the
lender but costless for the borrower. The borrower has the incentive to misreport
the project output. The optimal contract resembles the debt contract: the borrower
repays a fixed amount in the good situations and announces bankrupt in the bad
situations. Gale and Hellwig (1985) analyze the impact of costly state verification in
a one-period model with competitive capital market and claim that debt contracts
are optimal and incentive compatible.
Hart and Moore (1994) consider the case in which the entrepreneur cannot
commit not to withdraw his human capital from the project. The possibility of a
default or runaway puts an upper bound on his total future indebtedness at any date.
The durability and specificity of project assets serve to mitigate the entrepreneur’s
incentive for renegotiation during the long-term debt relationship. Lacker (2001)
provides the necessary and sufficient conditions under which collateralized debt is
the optimal contract: the borrower values the collateral good more than the lender
does; otherwise the optimal contract does not resemble debt. Using a large sample
of manufacturing firms drawn from COMPUSTAT between 1985 to 2000, Almeida
and Campello (2005) show that asset tangibility increases investment-cash flow sen-
sitivities for financially constrained firms, while no such effects are observed for un-
constrained firms. This empirical result supports to some extent the role of tangible
assets as collateral for mitigating enforcement problems.
1.1.2 Financial Frictions and Business Cycles
Fisher’s debt-deflation theory (Fisher 1933) is among the first classic contributions
showing the consequences of borrowing constraints in the Great Depression. The
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idea that credit market imperfections played a key role in the transmission of cycli-
cal shocks to the economy was an important part of the monetarist approach in
the 1970s (Brunner and Meltzer 1976; Meltzer 1995). Parallel to the literature on
microeconomic origins of financial frictions, a booming literature has analyzed the
impact of endogenous financial frictions on business cycles since the end of 1980s.
1.1.2.1 Balance-Sheet Channel vs. Lending Channel
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) develops an overlapping generations model in which fi-
nancial frictions arise from costly state verification a` la Townsend (1979). They show
that financial frictions can enhance the propagation of productivity shocks. More
specifically, shocks that affect entrepreneurial net worth (as in a debt-deflation) can
initiate fluctuations. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) embed the core model of Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) into a computable general equilibrium framework and analyze
the quantitative effects of financial frictions on business fluctuations. A principal
conclusion is that their model with financial frictions replicates the empirical fact
that output growth displays positive autocorrelation at short horizons (Cogley and
Nason 1995), because it takes time for entrepreneurs to accumulate net worth be-
fore they can expand their production scale. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
incorporate the dynamic structure of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) into a new Key-
nesian framework with sticky prices and study the effects of monetary shocks on
business cycles. They find that financial frictions help explain both the strength of
the economy’s response to monetary policy and the tendency for policy effects to
persist even after interest rates have returned to normal, as commonly observed in
the VAR analysis. However, they allow for investment delays in order to replicate
a hump-shaped output response to monetary shocks. In contrast, Linnemann and
Schabert (2003) show that the interactions between financial frictions and the nom-
inal wage rigidity can help generate a smoothed hump-shaped output response to
monetary shocks.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Kiyotaki (1998) incorporate Fisher’s debt de-
flation theory into a dynamic general equilibrium framework. Due to inalienability
of human capital a` la Hart and Moore (1994), borrowers cannot precommit to re-
pay their debts and lenders are unable to appropriate the product of the borrowers’
labor. Thus, physical assets are not only factors of production but also serve as
collateral for loans. The dynamic interaction between asset prices and credit limits
helps explain the large persistent fluctuations in output and asset prices. However,
Cordoba and Ripoll (2004) use more conventional functional form (concave pref-
erence and production function) and show that collateral constraints in Kiyotaki
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and Moore (1997) by themselves are not enough to account for the large output
fluctuations observed in the data.
Iacoviello (2005) introduces nominal debt contracts with collateral constraints
for both entrepreneurs and a subset of the households into the new-Keynesian frame-
work (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999). On the one hand, nominal debt allows
the model to replicate the hump-shaped dynamics of spending to an inflation shock;
on the other hand, collateral effects on entrepreneurs and some households allow
matching the positive response of spending to a housing price shock. Given that
Gali (2004) and Ireland (2004) have stressed the role of nontechnological and non-
monetary disturbances in understanding business fluctuations, the improvements in
the model’s ability to reflect short-run dynamic properties are important.
In a two-country general equilibrium model, Iacoviello and Minetti (forthcom-
ing) focus on the difference between domestic and foreign lenders. As foreign lenders
are less informed of domestic legal system and market structure than domestic
lenders, their debt enforcement technologies are inferior to those of domestic lenders.
Changes in the composition of foreign and domestic credit help explain one of the
important empirical facts in the international business cycles: the comovement of
output across countries, which standard open-economy real business cycles models
(Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland 1992) fail to predict. Paasche (2001) shows in a three-
country model that a crisis in a country can spread to another seemingly unrelated
country via the terms-of-trade channel. A temporary negative shock to the terms of
trade reduces the net worth of domestic entrepreneurs. Due to financial constraints,
the foreign lending to domestic entrepreneurs declines. Then, capital flow out of the
economy and the current account deteriorates. His model helps explain the adverse
effect of the Asian and Russian crises on Latin America in the late 1990s, given that
the direct linkages (e.g., foreign trade) between these regions are minimal.
Building on the principal-agent setting of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Chen
(2001) analyzes the dynamic interactions among bank capital, asset prices and eco-
nomic activity. In his model, entrepreneurs can choose among projects with differ-
ent riskiness and finance their projects using bank loans. At the same time, banks
can monitor only some of the entrepreneurs’ project choices. Thus, entrepreneurial
net worth is essential for loans and total investment. As the monitoring activi-
ties of banks are costly and unobservable, banks must keep a minimum amount
of own capital in order to ensure their depositors that they will monitor the en-
trepreneurs’ projects. In the event of a negative productivity shock, a fall in asset
prices affects both bank capital and entrepreneurial net worth. Thus, bank loans
and entrepreneurs’ investment are squeezed by a higher bank capital − asset ratio
for lending and a stricter collateral requirement for borrowing. The model helps
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explain why banking crises often coincide with depression in the asset markets.
Kato (forthcoming) embeds the moral hazard problem a` la Holmstrom and
Tirole (1998) into a computable dynamic general equilibrium model. Corporate
demand for liquidity from a financial intermediary, e.g., credit line, is endogenously
determined and procyclical, while the degree of liquidity dependence (the ratio of
liquidity demand over corporate investment) is counter-cyclical. These patterns are
consistent with the empirical evidence in the “lending view” literature.
In contrast to the common wisdom that financial frictions help amplify the ef-
fects of small shocks on macroeconomic aggregates, Bacchetta and Caminal (2000)
show that credit constraints might also serve to dampen the effects of shocks. Un-
observable project choices result in credit constraints. Exogenous shocks can affect
the allocation of funds between constrained and unconstrained firms. However, the
composition effect can either amplify or dampen the shock effects, depending on the
types of shocks. This helps explain the lack of systematic evidence on aggregate
impacts of financial frictions.
1.1.2.2 Endogenous Credit Cycles
Models mentioned above show that financial frictions have profound effects on the
dynamic responses of aggregate variables to exogenous shocks. As a complement,
Suarez and Sussman (1997) present a two-period endogenous reversion mechanism
in a dynamic extension of the moral hazard model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
Even without exogenous shocks, high quantities in boom depress prices and create
the liquidity shortage that increase the propensity to default. Thus, the boom ends
in a bust; vice verse.
Matsuyama (2005) analyzes how changes in the composition of the credit to het-
erogenous investment projects can generate endogenous credit cycles. The projects
differ in productivity, in the investment requirement (the setup costs), and in the
severity of agency problem. Borrowers are able to pledge only up to a fraction of
their project revenues for external financing. A current movement in borrower net
worth causes the composition of the credit to shift between heterogenous investment
projects, which affect borrower net worth in the next period. Thus, the endogenous
dynamic interaction between aggregate investment and borrower net worth can help
replicate a variety of nonlinear phenomena, such as credit traps, credit collapse,
leapfrogging, credit cycles, etc. Matsuyama (2004) uses the nonlinear dynamics in
the aggregate investment and borrower net worth to study the causes and nature
of endogenous credit cycles. The model with heterogenous investment projects can
generate asymmetric fluctuations. After a long and slow recovery from a recession,
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the economy enters into a rapid expansion, followed by possibly a period of high
volatility. Afterwards, the economy plunges into a recession again.
1.2 Structure of the Dissertation
The main part of this dissertation consists of three chapters, each dealing with one
aspect of macroeconomic consequences of financial frictions. We start in chapter two
with the analysis of the dynamic interactions between financial frictions and capi-
tal reallocation in the production of intermediate goods in a closed real economy.
In chapter three, we introduces financial frictions in the production of both inter-
mediate and capital goods and show that dual financial frictions become a robust
mechanism through which aggregate output responds to productivity shocks in an
amplified and hump-shaped fashion. Finally, we shift our attention to a small open
economy in chapter four and study how foreign borrowing can affect production ef-
ficiency and macroeconomic volatility in countries with domestic financial frictions
and different degrees of foreign investor protection. We collect the main results and
point out the directions for future research in chapter five.
1.2.1 Financial Frictions and Macroeconomic Fluctuations
Chapter two lays out the basic structure of the model with financial frictions which
is then used in the following chapters. This chapter is motivated by the current lit-
erature on explaining empirical evidence using RBC models. Although the standard
RBC models match some characteristics of the empirical data successfully, one of
the well-known deficiencies of the canonical RBC model is the lack of a sufficient
propagation and amplification mechanism,1 i.e., it fails to reproduce the persistent
and hump-shaped output responses to a transitory shock to total factor productivity
(TFP, hereafter) commonly found in the data (Cogley and Nason 1993, 1995).
In order to enhance the internal propagation and amplification mechanism, re-
searchers have included additional endogenous state variables by incorporating var-
ious frictions into the canonical RBC framework. However, the internal mechanism
in these models is still too weak to match the empirical evidence quantitatively. In
contrast, our model introduces financial frictions between agents with different pro-
duction technologies and achieves a balance between propagation and amplification.
1“Propagation” refers to the mechanism through which a transitory productivity shock gener-
ates positive autocorrelation in aggregate output, while “amplification” refers to the mechanism
through which relatively small shocks result in large output fluctuations.
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In our model, some agents are more productive than other agents and so they
borrow from others. Due to moral hazard, agent with high productivity are subject
to financial frictions and their net worth is essential for their borrowing capacity. In
the event of a positive productivity shock, their projects become more profitable.
However, it takes time for them to accumulate net worth before they can fully exploit
the profit opportunity. As one kind of non-trivial real imperfections, financial fric-
tions help explain the delayed responses of aggregate output to shocks. Meanwhile,
as agents with high productivity accumulate net worth over time and borrow more
to purchase capital goods, their excess demand for loans pushes up the interest rate
so that agents with low productivity prefer to lend more and invest less in capital
goods themselves. The additional channel of capital reallocation has profound com-
position effect on aggregate output and the responses of aggregate output to shocks
are more amplified than in models without this additional channel. Altogether, fi-
nancial frictions in our model result in a delayed and amplified output responses,
which are consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Andolfatto (1996) and
Cogley and Nason (1995).
The approach of quadratic capital adjustment costs is commonly adopted in the
literature to capture the empirical evidence of slow adjustment of durable capital
goods. However this modeling approach has an “unrealistic” feature that the price
of capital goods stays persistently away from its steady state value as long as the
demand for capital goods exceeds its steady state value. If we adopt this approach to
model the upward-sloping capital supply curve and time-varying price of capital in
our basic setting, the price of capital stays away from its steady state value for many
periods in the event of productivity shocks, and the resulting capital gains speed
up the capital reallocation process. Thus, output responses are more amplified but
less delayed than in the case of time-constant prices of capital. More specifically,
the approach of costly capital adjustment serves to exaggerate the responses of the
price of capital goods. As a result, it strengthens the amplification mechanism at
the expense of weakening the propagation mechanism related to financial frictions.
In this sense, we should be aware of the side effect of the approach of costly capital
adjustment and this approach might not be appropriate in some circumstances.
1.2.2 Dual Financial Frictions
After pointing out the side effect of the approach of costly capital adjustment,
we propose financial frictions in the production of capital goods as an alternative
approach to the modeling of time-varying prices of capital. Our approach helps
capture the empirical feature that the supply of capital goods is quite inelastic in
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the short run but becomes elastic and adapts to the demand for capital goods in the
medium run. Thus, in the event of exogenous shocks, the price of capital goods stays
away from its steady state value only for a few periods after the shock and converges
to its steady state value faster than in the case of costly capital adjustment.
We allow financial frictions in the production of both intermediate and capital
goods. In the production of intermediate goods, some agents are more productive
than others. Due to moral hazard, the net worth of the more productive agents
is essential for their borrowing capacity and thus their demand for capital goods.
Similarly, in the production sector of capital goods, the projects of capital goods
producers are profitable in the sense that their expected rate of return exceeds the
interest rate. Due to moral hazard, the net worth of producers of capital goods is
essential for their borrowing capacity and then the aggregate supply of capital goods.
Thus, both the demand for and the supply of capital goods respond to exogenous
shocks less efficiently than in the frictionless case. A rise in the price of capital goods
has positive effects on the net worth of both capital goods producers and the more
productive agents in the production sector of intermediate goods. In this sense, the
price of capital goods responds to exogenous shocks in a non-trivial way.
In the event of a positive productivity shock, capital goods producers are subject
to credit constraints and the supply of capital goods cannot meet the demand. Thus,
the price of capital goods rises to clear the market. As producers of capital goods
actively accumulate their net worth in order to exploit the profit opportunity, it takes
only a few period that the supply of capital goods adapts to the excess demand.
Therefore, the positive responses of the price of capital goods to shocks are less
persistent than in the case of costly capital adjustment. Meanwhile, capital gains
are small and have limited effects on the net worth of agents with high productivity
in the production sector of intermediate goods and aggregate output responds to
shocks in a more amplified and hump-shaped fashion. In this sense, the approach of
modeling time-varying prices of capital goods via financial frictions helps reinforce
the amplification mechanism without weakening the propagation mechanism.
1.2.3 Domestic and Foreign Financial Frictions
According to neoclassical models, both domestic and foreign agents can benefit from
financial opening. Investors can share idiosyncratic risk globally and capital can
flow to the countries with the highest productivity (Stulz 2005). However, financial
opening could have uneven welfare effects on different types of domestic agents and
this feature cannot be analyzed in the conventional representative-agent model.
We extend our basic model with heterogenous agents into a small-open-economy
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framework. Domestic agents with high productivity borrow from domestic agents
with low productivity. Meanwhile, domestic agents would like to borrow abroad,
given that the foreign interest rate is smaller than the domestic interest rate. As
foreign lenders are less informed of the economic activities of domestic borrowers
than domestic lenders are, domestic agents have to pledge their physical assets as
collateral to foreign lenders. Additionally, foreign lenders are normally less familiar
with the domestic asset market than domestic lenders are. Thus, foreign lenders
have to pay additional premium in liquidating the collateral assets handed over by
bankrupt borrowers. Ex ante, foreign borrowing is overcollateralized in the sense
that domestic borrowers pledge their physical assets to foreign investors but only
get foreign funds at the amount of a fraction of the collateral value.
The degree of overcollateralization depends mainly on the efficiency of the do-
mestic legal system and market structure. In countries with better protection of for-
eign investors or more efficient legal system and market structure, domestic agents
can pledge their physical assets for more foreign borrowing. Cheap foreign funds
facilitate the reallocation of productive assets from domestic agents with low pro-
ductivity to those with high productivity. As a result, asset prices are higher, domes-
tic production is more efficient, and aggregate output is higher in such countries.
Domestic agents with high productivity benefit strictly from asset-backed foreign
borrowing. While, due to substitution effect, domestic agents with low productiv-
ity, who are domestic lenders, have fewer financial assets (domestic loans) as well
as fewer physical assets in the long run. In other words, their wealth is smaller in
such countries and their welfare is strictly lower. In this sense, aggregate output
might not be an appropriate measure for social welfare in models with heterogenous
agents.
This chapter also analyzes how better protection of foreign investors can affect
macroeconomic volatility via more foreign borrowing. Theory predicts that finan-
cial opening should lower consumption volatility while raise investment volatility, if
most shocks are country-specific and transitory. However, the empirical literature
cannot provide statistically significant evidence on the relationship between financial
openness and macroeconomic volatility (Razin and Rose 1994). According to the
dynamic analysis of our model, the volatilities of major macroeconomic aggregates,
e.g., output, labor, consumption, and foreign trade, are non-monotonic (U-shaped)
in the degree of asset-backed foreign borrowing, given exogenous shocks to produc-
tivity, the terms of trade, and the foreign interest rate. Furthermore, the volatility
patterns of major macroeconomic aggregates in the degree of asset-backed foreign
borrowing are more stable in the economy with domestic financial frictions than
without.
Chapter 2
Financial Frictions and
Macroeconomic Fluctuations
2.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes the dynamic responses of macroeconomic aggregates to exoge-
nous productivity shocks in a real business cycles model with financial frictions. It
makes two contributions to the literature. First, the accumulation of entrepreneurial
net worth and the reallocation of capital between agents with different production
technologies constitute a mechanism through which aggregate output responds to
exogenous productivity shocks in a hump-shaped and amplified fashion. It quan-
titatively replicates an important empirical fact that a standard RBC model fails
to do. Second, if we model time-varying prices of capital in the approach of costly
capital adjustment, the capital gains in the event of a positive productivity shock
can significantly change the dynamic patterns of macroeconomic aggregates via the
mechanism mentioned above. Thus, we should be aware of the side effect of this
approach.
RBC models have been standing at the center of the business cycle analysis since
Kydland and Prescott (1982). Although these models match some characteristics of
the empirical data successfully, one of the well-known deficiencies of the canonical
RBC model is the lack of a sufficient propagation and amplification mechanism,
i.e., its failure to reproduce the persistent and hump-shaped output responses to a
transitory TFP shock commonly found in the data (Cogley and Nason 1993, 1995).
As capital is the only endogenous state variable in the standard RBC model, the
dynamic structure is essentially ARMA(1, 1), which is responsible for this deficiency
(Wen 2005). Furthermore, the standard RBC model underestimates the output
11
12 CHAPTER 2. FINANCIAL FRICTIONS AND MACRO FLUCTUATIONS
volatility around its trend in the actual U.S. economy (Andolfatto 1996).
In order to enhance the propagation and amplification mechanism, researchers
have included additional endogenous state variables by introducing various frictions
into the canonical RBC framework, e.g., labor adjustment costs (Cogley and Nason
1995), labor market search (Andolfatto 1996; Hashimzade and Ortigueira 2005), fi-
nancial frictions (Carlstrom and Fuerst 1997, 1998; Kato forthcoming), factor hoard-
ing (Burnside and Eichenbaum 1996), habit formation (Lettau and Uhlig 2000), and
learning-by-doing (Chang, Gomes, and Schorfheide 2002). In these models, aggre-
gate output peaks one or two periods after the shock. However, according to the
empirical evidence provided by Cogley and Nason (1995), aggregate output peaks
four quarters after the shock in the United States. As these models are lack of non-
trivial amplification mechanism, the maximum response of aggregate output is even
less than that in the frictionless RBC model. Thus, although frictions emphasized
in these models account for the hump-shaped output dynamics qualitatively, more
quantitative research needs to be done.
This chapter is related to the literature on the business cycle implications of
financial frictions. See Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) for a comprehensive
survey. Compared to outside financiers, entrepreneurs have superior information
regarding their own choices of projects, the effort put into these projects, or the
project outcomes. As it could be very costly or even impossible for outside financiers
to collect such information, they have to provide entrepreneurs with a reasonable
share of the project outcomes so as to induce them to choose “good” projects, exert
sufficient effort, or tell the truth. This implies that entrepreneurs can credibly pledge
only part of the project outcomes for external funding. Thus, entrepreneurial net
worth is required to fill in the gap between total investment and external funds. Any
shock to entrepreneurial net worth affects the borrowing capacity of entrepreneurs
and aggregate output along the business cycle.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) and Kato (forthcoming) analyze the case of moral
hazard and financial frictions in the production of capital goods. Producers of cap-
ital goods are credit-constrained and their net worth becomes another endogenous
state variable in addition to the aggregate capital stock. A positive productivity
shock raises the marginal product of capital goods and the boom in the aggregate
demand for capital goods pushes up the price of capital. As the borrowing capac-
ity of capital goods producers depends on their net worth, which is predetermined,
the aggregate production of capital goods cannot accommodate the excess demand
immediately. As it takes time for capital goods producers to accumulate net worth
and expand production, aggregate investment peaks two periods after the shock.
Given that capital is one of the two inputs needed for the production of final goods,
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aggregate output peaks two periods after the shock. Due to the delayed and damp-
ened responses of the aggregate capital stock, the maximum response of aggregate
output is less than that in the frictionless RBC model.
We analyze instead the case of moral hazard and financial frictions in the pro-
duction of intermediate goods. In contrast to other multi-sector models in the
literature, e.g., Long and Plosser (1983) and Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (2001),
we assume that households and entrepreneurs have different technologies to pro-
duce intermediate goods using capital. In the basic model, there is no friction in
the production of capital goods and the price of capital is constant at unity. In-
termediate goods and labor are the two factors needed for the production of final
goods. Entrepreneurs are expected to be more productive than households. Due
to moral hazard, entrepreneurs are subject to credit constraints. A positive TFP
shock to the production of final goods raises the aggregate demand for intermediate
goods. As the aggregate supply of intermediate goods depends on the investment
of households and entrepreneurs made in the previous period, the price of interme-
diate goods rises to clear the market. Extra sales revenues improve entrepreneurial
net worth so that the entrepreneurs can borrow more to expand their investments
in capital goods. The rise in the entrepreneurs’ demand for loans pushes up the
loan rate so that the households increase their deposits and reduce their invest-
ments in capital goods. The resulting capital reallocation towards the entrepreneurs
becomes an important channel through which aggregate output responds to TFP
shocks more strongly than in the frictionless RBC model. However, it takes time
for entrepreneurs to accumulate net worth before they can fully exploit the profit
opportunity. The speed of capital reallocation determines the dynamic patterns of
macroeconomic aggregates. According to our calibration, aggregate output peaks
four periods after the shock and the maximum output response is larger than that
in the frictionless RBC model. Thus, it reproduces the empirical evidence in the
literature quantitatively.
This chapter is also related to the literature on the implications of time-varying
prices of capital on macroeconomic fluctuations. The approach of costly capital
adjustment is widely adopted to model time-varying prices of capital, e.g., Ireland
(2003) and Linnemann and Schabert (2003). The alternative is to assume a fixed
supply of durable assets, e.g., land, and analyze the amplification effects of time-
varying asset prices on aggregate output (Chen 2001; Kiyotaki 1998; Kiyotaki and
Moore 1997, 2005). In these models, the more productive agents borrow from the
less productive agents up to endogenous credit limits. A positive productivity shock
boosts the demand for productive assets and pushes up asset prices. Capital gains
improve the net worth of credit-constrained agents and enables them to expand
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production. As a result, output responds more strongly to the TFP shocks than in
the case without credit constraints. These models emphasize the amplification and
persistence mechanism but fail to generate a hump-shaped output response.
Our full model allows time-varying prices of capital in a setting with quadratic
capital adjustment costs. The price of capital responds positively and persistently
to a transitory TFP shock. It strengthens the amplifying effects but weakens the
hump-shaped output dynamics. This also explains why models with a fixed supply
of assets cannot generate hump-shaped output responses to shocks. The intuition
is as follows. In the event of a positive TFP shock, extra sales revenues improve
entrepreneurial net worth and entrepreneurs can borrow more to expand investment.
Due to capital adjustment costs, the supply of capital can not fully accommodate the
excess demand. The price of capital rises to clear the market, with two effects. First,
the demand of households for capital is depressed; second, capital gains improve
entrepreneurial net worth further and entrepreneurs can increase their investments
more than in the case without adjustment costs. The enhanced reallocation of
capital from households to entrepreneurs makes output peaks earlier than in our
basic model.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 starts with an
overview of the model economy. The optimization conditions and the relevant mar-
ket clearing conditions jointly describe the market equilibrium. Section 2.3 discusses
the financial contracting problems in the model without financial frictions. Section
2.4 calibrates the model economy and analyzes the impulse responses of macroeco-
nomic aggregates to productivity shocks. Section 2.5 summarizes the main findings.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Overview
Consider a discrete-time, closed, real economy with three goods: a capital good, an
intermediate good, and a final good. The final good is chosen as the numeraire. Cap-
ital goods are durable, while intermediate goods and final goods are perishable.There
are two types of agents: households and entrepreneurs. The population of each type
is normalized to unity.1 Households and entrepreneurs can invest capital goods into
their respective projects at the end of each period and the projects produce inter-
mediate goods at the beginning of the next period. Intermediate goods and labor
are then employed to produce final goods contemporaneously. Final goods can be
1The relative population size of agents does not matter for the results.
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consumed. The aggregate capital stock depreciates at a constant rate. A continuum
of competitive firms, owned by households, can transform final goods into capital
goods contemporaneously. Newly-produced and existing capital goods are perfect
substitutes and are traded at the same price. A continuum of competitive financial
intermediaries collect deposits and provide loans.
Households are risk averse and infinitely lived. They have a safe production
project for intermediate goods. They are endowed with a unit of labor each period
and they supply their labor to the final goods production. At the end of the period,
they invest capital goods in their projects, deposit at the financial intermediaries,
and consume.
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral. As shown in subsection 2.2.3, entrepreneurs
finance their project investments using own funds and loans from financial interme-
diaries at the end of each period, subject to credit constraints. Entrepreneurial net
worth is defined as the amount of own funds they invest in their projects. Debt
repayment is contingent on project outcomes. Entrepreneurs whose projects fail are
released from their debt obligations and exit from the economy without consum-
ing anything; entrepreneurs whose projects succeed repay their debts. Successful
entrepreneurs have a constant probability of death.2 In equilibrium, entrepreneurs
of mass (1 − pi) exit from the economy each period and new entrepreneurs of the
same mass are born with a tiny endowment,3 e, keeping the population size of en-
trepreneurs constant. Our calibration guarantees that the expected rate of return
on entrepreneurial net worth exceeds the cost of external funds. Thus, surviving
and newly-born entrepreneurs put all own funds into their projects and borrow to
the limit. Entrepreneurs with successful projects who die sell off their capital stock,
consume all proceeds.
There is no moral hazard in the financial sector. Financial intermediaries can
perfectly diversify their portfolios and pool the idiosyncratic project risk of the
entrepreneurs.4 According to the financial contracts specified in subsection 2.2.3,
2Entrepreneurs prefer to accumulate net worth and to postpone consumption until no exter-
nal funding is needed. There are two alternative ways to handle this problem in the literature.
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1996) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) assign a constant death
probability to entrepreneurs, where dying means selling off the capital stock, consuming the pro-
ceeds, and exiting from the economy. Alternatively, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998), Gomes,
Yaron, and Zhang (2003) and Kato (forthcoming) assume that entrepreneurs are infinitely lived
but less patient than households. In equilibrium, entrepreneurs always consume something and
are never sufficiently wealthy to overcome credit constraints.
3Each entrepreneur must put a positive amount of own funds in the projects in order to acquire
loans. Chen (2001) adopts the same approach.
4Chen (2001) studies the role of bank capital by making an extreme assumption that there is
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they guarantee a safe rate of return on deposits in equilibrium. Due to perfect
competition, the financial intermediaries break even and make no profit.
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Figure 2.1: Time Sequence of Events
Figure 2.1 summarizes the time sequence of events in equilibrium. Note that an
exogenous productivity shock5 is realized at the beginning of period t. There are
four endogenous factor prices: the price of capital goods, qt, the price of intermediate
goods, vt, the wage rate, wt, and the gross rate of return on deposits, rt.
2.2.2 Households
Households have identical preferences over consumption and leisure. Their expected
utility function takes the following form,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(cht )
1−σ
1− σ + χ
(1− lt)1+ψ
1 + ψ
]
,
where Et is the expectation operator based on information available in period t. β ∈
(0, 1) denotes the time discount factor and cht and lt denote, respectively, household
consumption and hours worked, as a fraction of the total labor endowment. Given
that kht−1 units of capital goods were invested in the household project at the end of
period t− 1, G(kht−1) units of intermediate goods are produced at the beginning of
period t. Household sales revenues amount to vtG(k
h
t−1) and their wage income is
wtlt. In addition, they receive rt−1dt−1 from the financial intermediaries, where dt−1
is the deposit made at the end of period t − 1 and rt−1 is the gross rate of return
on deposit. The profits of the production sector of capital goods, Πt, are lump-sum
transferred to households. At the end of period t, they invest kht units of capital
perfect correlation within the portfolio of each bank. If any one of the projects in a bank’s portfolio
fails, all projects financed by the bank fail together.
5Subsection 2.2.6 specifies the distribution of the shocks.
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goods in their projects, deposit dt units of final goods at the financial intermediaries,
and consume cht units of final goods. Accordingly, the flow-budget constraint is,
qt[k
h
t − (1− δ)kht−1] + dt + cht = vtG(kht−1) + wtlt + rt−1dt−1 +Πt,
where δ ∈ (0, 1] is the depreciation rate of the capital invested in the household
project. The optimization over {cht , lt, dt, kht } gives the equilibrium conditions,
wt = χ(1− lt)ψ(cht )σ, (2.1)
βrt = Et
(
cht+1
cht
)σ
, (2.2)
rtqt = Et
[
(1− δ)qt+1 + vt+1G′(kht )
]
. (2.3)
2.2.3 Entrepreneurs
Each entrepreneur can invest capital goods in one of the two projects: “Good” or
“Bad”, at the end of each period. At the beginning of the next period, the project
generates R units of intermediate goods per unit of capital invested and the invested
capital depreciates at a rate δ′ ∈ (0, 1], if the project succeeds. If the project fails,
there is no output and the invested capital is fully lost. Project choices are irre-
versible and project outcomes are perfectly verifiable at no costs. Entrepreneurs also
enjoy safe, nonpecuniary private benefits during the project process.6 For conve-
nience of aggregation, we assume that the private benefits are proportional to project
investments in terms of the capital good. The projects differ in the probability of
success and unit private benefits. See Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Projects with Idiosyncratic Risk
Project Good Bad
Probability of Success pG pB
Unit Private Benefits bG bB
6Our set-up resembles the principal-agent setting in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997, 1998). Ac-
cording to Hart (1995), private benefits may refer to any nonpecuniary benefits from running a
project, e.g., large offices or luxury business cars. Private benefits are good for the project owners
but may reduce the success probability of projects. The trade-off between the success probability
and private benefits is a short-cut to capture divergent objectives between project owners and
outside financiers.
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where 0 < pB < pG < 1 and bB > bG > 0 imply that project “Good” is safer than
projects “Bad”, but project “Bad” yields larger unit private benefits.
An entrepreneur7 i who stays in the economy to the next period has linear
preferences over consumption and private benefits. His expected utility function is,
E0
T˜∑
t=0
βt
[
cei,t + Bkei,t−1
]
, (2.4)
where T˜ is the stochastic time of death and B ∈ {bG, bB} denotes unit private
benefits of capital invested in project “Good” or project “Bad”. cei,t denotes his
consumption in period t and kei,t−1 denotes his project investment in terms of the
capital good made at the end of period t− 1. Our calibration guarantees that only
project “Good” has a positive expected net present value around the steady state,
pGEt[Rvt+1 + (1− δ′)qt+1] + bG
rt
− qt > 0 > p
BEt[Rvt+1 + (1− δ′)qt+1] + bB
rt
− qt,
Therefore, other projects should not be financed in equilibrium. Project “Good”
also has a larger expected marginal product than the household project.
At the end of period t, entrepreneur i invest kei,t units of capital goods in either
project “Good” or project “Bad”, using his own funds ni,t and inter-period loans
zi,t, i.e., qtk
e
i,t = ni,t+zi,t. Thus, ni,t is entrepreneurial net worth in the project. The
loan contract specifies a promise to repay Rbtk
e
i,t units of final goods in period t+ 1
if the project succeeds. If the project fails, both parties get zero pecuniary return.
There is no enforcement problem and entrepreneurs always repay their liabilities if
they are able to do so. In order to motivate entrepreneur i to choose project “Good”,
financial intermediaries must provide him with enough incentives,
{pGEt[Rvt+1 + (1− δ′)qt+1 −Rbt ] + bG}kei,t ≥ {pBe Et[Rvt+1 + (1− δ′)qt+1 −Rbt ] + bB}kei,t.
The left (right) hand side denotes the expected utility of the entrepreneur if he
chooses project “Good” (“Bad”). As the entrepreneur prefers to borrow to the
limit, the incentive constraint is binding around the steady state and is simplified
to be
Rbt = Et[Rvt+1 + (1− δ′)qt+1]− b, where b ≡
bB − bG
pG − pB > 0. (2.5)
Any promise to repay more than Rbt is not credible, because the entrepreneur would
choose project “Bad”. The expected external unit value and full unit value of
7Entrepreneurs differ in the end-of-period wealth and are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].
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the capital invested in project “Good” are pGRbt and p
GEt[Rvt+1 + (1 − δ′)qt+1],
respectively. The difference between the two values, pGb, is used to motivate the
entrepreneur to choose project “Good” despite lower private benefits it promises,
bG < bB.
Financial intermediaries are expected to break even in lending to the en-
trepreneur in period t, rtzi,t = p
GRbtk
e
i,t. This implies a credit constraint,
zi,t = Γtni,t, where Γt ≡ p
GRbt
rtqt − pGRbt
is the credit multiplier. As Γt is independent of ni,t, loans are proportional to
entrepreneurial net worth. Our calibration guarantees rtqt > p
GRbt around the
steady state and so Γt > 0. Note that the credit multiplier varies with qt, rt,
Etqt+1, and Etvt+1. Ceteris paribus, a rise in the current price of capital qt makes
capital investment more expensive; similarly, a rise in the gross rate of return on
deposits rt makes external funds more expensive for entrepreneurs. In both cases,
the credit multiplier falls so that less capital is allocated to entrepreneurs. Ceteris
paribus, a rise in the expected prices of capital or intermediate goods in period t+1,
Etqt+1 or Etvt+1, raises the expected external unit value of capital invested in their
projects, pGRbt . Thus, the credit multiplier is larger and entrepreneurs can expand
investments.
In equilibrium, entrepreneurs of mass (1−pG) have failed projects and exit from
the economy. The entrepreneurs whose projects succeed have a constant probability
p˜i of surviving to the next period. In the aggregate, entrepreneurs of mass pG(1− p˜i)
have successful projects and exit from the economy, and entrepreneurs of mass pGp˜i
have successful projects and live on to the next period. New entrepreneurs of mass
(1− pi) are born. We assume pi = pGp˜i to keep the population size of entrepreneurs
constant at unity in equilibrium.
Entrepreneur imaximizes his expected utility (2.4), subject to his period budget
constraints and credit constraints,
qtk
e
i,t − zi,t = ni,t, where ni,t ≡ Ni,t − cei,t, (2.6)
zi,t = Γtni,t (2.7)
where Ni,t denotes his end-of-period wealth. Entrepreneurs differ in their end-of-
period wealth, an issue discussed in appendix A.1. Due to the linear nature of the
project technologies and the preferences of entrepreneurs, the loans and the project
investment of entrepreneur i is proportional to his net worth. As a result, only
the first moment of the distribution of entrepreneurial net worth matters for the
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aggregate capital stock in the entrepreneurial sector. See appendix A.1. Let lower-
case letters without the index i denote per capita variables of the entrepreneurial
sector. Per capita consumption, per capita net worth, per capita inter-period loans,
and per capita capital holding are,
cet = (1− p˜i)pG[Rvt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbt−1]ket−1, (2.8)
nt = p˜ip
G[Rvt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbt−1]ket−1 + (1− pi)e, (2.9)
zt =
pGRbt
rtqt − pGRbt
nt, (2.10)
ket =
nt + zt
qt
. (2.11)
For a better understanding of the model dynamics, we introduce three auxiliary
variables. The first is the leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total investment over
entrepreneurial net worth, Ωt ≡ qtk
e
i,t
ni,t
= 1 + Γt. The second is the entrepreneur’s
unit down payment of capital, defined as the amount of own funds the entrepreneur
pays for each unit of capital, ut ≡ qt− zi,tkei,t =
qt
Ωt
. The third is the expected profitabil-
ity of the entrepreneurial project, defined as the discounted expected gross rate of
return on entrepreneurial net worth, ξt ≡ βp
GEt[Rvt+1+(1−δ′)qt+1−Rbt ]kei,t
ni,t
= βp
Gb
ut
. Our
calibration guarantees that the expected profitability of the entrepreneurial project
exceeds the discounted cost of external funds around the steady state, ξt > βrt.
Thus, entrepreneurs postpone consumption and borrow to the limit in equilibrium.
For convenience of aggregation, we assume that capital depreciates faster in
the household projects than in the entrepreneurial projects that turn out to be
successful, δ = 1 − pG + pGδ′ > δ′. In equilibrium, the aggregate capital stock
depreciates at the same rate in both household and entrepreneurial sectors, 1− δ =
pG(1− δ′).
2.2.4 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries accept deposits from households and make loans to en-
trepreneurs in equilibrium. A deposit contract is a claim on the financial position of
the intermediary. As financial intermediaries are perfectly competitive, they transfer
all the loan repayments to their depositors; hence they make zero profit.
Suppose, first, that the project choice of entrepreneurs is perfectly observable so
that they can pledge all the project outcomes to financial intermediaries for external
funds. Due to the aggregate risk related to TFP shocks, the period-t prices of capital
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and intermediate goods may differ from their expected values, i.e., qt 6= Et−1qt
and vt 6= Et−1vt, and so may the values of the project outcomes of entrepreneurs,
pG[Rvt + (1− δ′)qt]ket−1 6= pG[REt−1vt + (1− δ′)Et−1qt]ket−1. As a result, the rate of
return on deposits is contingent on productivity shocks.
In contrast, in the case of unobservable project choices of the entrepreneurs, the
loan contract described in subsection 2.2.3 implicitly provides entrepreneurs with a
net unit return on capital, with a positive expected value in period t− 1, pGb > 0.
The ex post net unit return on capital to the successful entrepreneurs in period t is
Rvt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbt−1 = b+R(vt − Et−1vt) + (1− δ′)(qt − Et−1qt).
As long as the aggregate productivity shocks are larger than some negative
threshold value, the ex post values of the project outcomes of successful en-
trepreneurs are larger than the promised repayments, [Rvt + (1 − δ′)qt]ket−1 >
Rbt−1k
e
t−1, and the successful entrepreneurs repay their liabilities, R
b
t−1k
e
t−1, to the
financial intermediaries. Let Ket−1 and Zt−1 denote the aggregate capital stock
held by entrepreneurs and the aggregate lending to entrepreneurs at the end of
period t − 1, respectively. The aggregate break-even condition of the financial
sector is rt−1Zt−1 = pGRbt−1K
e
t−1. At the beginning of period t, entrepreneurs of
mass pG have successful projects and their total repayments, pGRbt−1K
e
t−1, coincides
with the expected value. Thus, the positive expected net return to entrepreneurs,
pGbKet−1, absorbs the aggregate risk and the financial intermediaries pay a safe
rate of return on deposits. For aggregate productivity shocks below this threshold,
the prices of capital and intermediate goods are so low that the ex post values of
the project outcomes of successful entrepreneurs are less than their debt obliga-
tions, [Rvt+(1− δ′)qt]ket−1 < Rbt−1ket−1. Even the successful entrepreneurs announce
bankruptcy and transfer all the project outcomes to the intermediaries. Thus, given
moral hazard in the entrepreneurial sector, the ex post rate of return on deposits is
contingent on the productivity shock only for very large, negative shocks.
As a consequence, if productivity shocks are unbounded, the ex post rate of
return on deposits as a function of productivity shocks could have a kink at the
point where Rvt + (1− δ′)qt = Rbt−1.
The first-order approximations used below to analyze the dynamics of our model
requires that the endogenous variables are continuous and differentiable functions of
the state variables. For the purpose of the approximations, therefore, we assume that
TFP shocks are distributed with mean zero and a negative lower bound guaranteeing
that successful entrepreneurs are always able to repay the promised amounts.
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2.2.5 Costly Capital Adjustment
Let Kt and Jt denote the aggregate capital stock at the end of period t and the
existing capital stock at the beginning of period t,
Kt ≡ kht + ket , (2.12)
Jt ≡ (1− δ)kht−1 + pG(1− δ′)ket−1 = (1− δ)Kt−1. (2.13)
In every period, the production sector of capital goods transforms It units of final
goods into Φ(It; Jt) units of new capital goods, where Φ(It; Jt) ≡ It − φI
2
t
2Jt
and
φ ≥ 0. Appendix A.2 describes the decentralized equilibrium of the capital goods
production sector. The aggregate stock of capital evolves according to
Kt − Jt = It − φI
2
t
2Jt
. (2.14)
In the basic model, we assume φ = 0 so that final goods are one-to-one trans-
formed into capital goods. The price of capital is constant at unity over time, qt = 1.
The capital goods production sector makes no profit, Πt ≡ qtΦ(It; Jt)− It = 0.
In the full model, we assume φ > 0 so that the capital goods production function
includes quadratic adjustment costs. It permits a variable price of capital. The
existing capital stock at the beginning of period t has positive externality on the
capital goods production. In equilibrium, the price of capital is given by
qt =
1
1− φIt
Jt
. (2.15)
According to our calibration, φIt
Jt
< 1 around the steady state. The capital goods
production sector transfers all profits, Πt = qt
φ
2
I2t
Jt
≥ 0, lump-sum to households.
Appendix A.2 shows that the aggregate supply curve of capital goods has a positive
slope, dΦ[It(qt);Jt]
dqt
= Jt
φq3t
> 0. A rise in the price of capital makes the production of
capital goods more profitable so that firms increase their investment expenditure
and more capital goods are produced. More costly the capital adjustment is, i.e., a
higher φ, more strongly the price of capital responds to excess demand.
2.2.6 Final Goods Production and Market Equilibrium
Final goods are produced from intermediate goods and labor,
Yt = AtM
α
t L
(1−α)
t , (2.16)
At = ρ logAt−1 + t, (2.17)
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whereMt and Lt denote the aggregate inputs of intermediate goods and labor.
8 Total
factor productivity, At, is positively autocorrelated in logarithms, where ρ ∈ (0, 1).
The productivity shock has mean zero, Ett+1 = 0, and is distributed above a lower
bound, (−τ,∞), where τ > 0 is small enough that successful entrepreneurs are
always able to repay their liabilities. Final goods are produced efficiently,
vtMt = αYt, (2.18)
wtLt = (1− α)Yt. (2.19)
Markets for intermediate goods, final goods, capital, labor, and loans clear,
Mt = G(k
h
t−1) + p
GRket−1, (2.20)
Yt + (1− pi)e = cht + cet + It, (2.21)
Kt = k
h
t + k
e
t , (2.22)
zt = dt, (2.23)
Lt = lt. (2.24)
Definition 2.1. Market equilibrium is a set of allocations of households,
{kht , lt, cht }, and entrepreneurs, {ket , nt, cet , zt}, together with aggregate variables
{Mt, Yt, Kt, It, Jt} given a set of prices {vt, qt, wt, rt, Rbt} and the exogenous process
{At} satisfying equations (2.1)-(2.3), (2.5), (2.8)-(2.21).
2.3 Financial Contracting in the Frictionless
Model
In this section, we assume that the project choice of entrepreneurs is perfectly observ-
able at the date of contracting. Entrepreneurs can credibly choose project “Good”
and pledge all of the project outcomes for external funding. Therefore, they do not
have to put down own funds in the project, nt = 0. As the expected rate of return on
project “Good” is higher than that on the household project, all capital is allocated
into the entrepreneurs’ projects, ket = Kt, and intermediate goods are produced only
by entrepreneurs, Mt = p
GRket−1. As project “Good” has a linear technology, the
capital held by an individual entrepreneur cannot be uniquely pinned down. For
simplicity, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all entrepreneurs invest
the same amount of capital, ket , in their projects. In period t, the entrepreneurs
8As households and entrepreneurs are each of unit mass, aggregate variables coincide with per
capita variables.
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who invest in project “Good” in period t− 1 enjoy the private benefits, bGket−1, and
transfer all the project outcomes to financial intermediaries. Newcomers consume
the endowment, cet = (1−pi)e. The entrepreneurs who stay in the economy to period
t+ 1 invest ket units of capital goods using external funds, i.e., zt = qtk
e
t .
The rates of return on deposits are different in the cases with and without
financial frictions. As shown in subsection 2.2.4, the entrepreneurs’ expected stake
in the project outcomes, pGbket > 0, absorbs aggregate risk in the case of financial
frictions. This enables the intermediaries to guarantee a safe rate of return on
deposits. In this sense, the financial intermediaries take the form of banks. Without
moral hazard, no incentive is required for entrepreneurs to engage in project “Good”.
The intermediaries can only diversify the idiosyncratic project risk of entrepreneurs
but not the aggregate risk. Given that financial intermediaries do not accumulate
reserves in our model, depositors have to bear this aggregate risk. In this sense,
the financial intermediaries take the form of mutual funds and the rate of return on
deposits is contingent on the productivity shock.
Households put dt−1 units of final goods at the intermediaries at the end of
period t−1 for a claim on the financial position of the intermediaries in period t. The
intermediaries fully finance the project investments of entrepreneurs, zt−1 = qt−1ket−1.
After the project completion in period t, the intermediaries collect all the project
outcomes, pG[Rvt + (1 − δ′)qt]ket−1, and transfer to depositors. The ex post rate
of return on deposit is r˜t =
pG[(1−δ′)qt+Rvt]ket−1
dt−1
= p
G[(1−δ′)qt+Rvt]
qt−1
, differing from its
expected value by the amount of r˜t − Et−1r˜t = pG[(1−δ′)(qt−Et−1qt)+R(vt−Et−1vt)]qt−1 . For
uniformity, we use rt to denote the expected rate of return on deposit, rt = Etr˜t+1.
Aggregate output of intermediate goods in the current period is proportional
to the aggregate capital stock at the end of the previous period. Thus, it is capital
accumulation that matters for aggregate output of final goods along the business
cycle. In essence, the model without moral hazard is equivalent to the RBC model
with a representative agent who has three production technologies: the linear tech-
nology to produce intermediate goods using capital, the Cobb-Douglas technology to
produce final goods using intermediate goods and labor, and the concave technology
to transform final goods into capital goods. Therefore, we call the model without
moral hazard model RBC and the model with moral hazard model MH. Appendix
A.3 shows the equations describing the market equilibrium of model RBC.
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2.4 Dynamic Analysis
2.4.1 Calibration
For convenience of aggregation, we assume that the household project is linear,
G(kht ) =
1
2
(
1 +
ket
Kt
)
kht , (2.25)
and the marginal product is G′(kht ) =
1
2
(
1 +
ket
Kt
)
. This functional form implies
that the entrepreneurial sector has positive production externality on the household
project. The quarterly discount factor is set at β = 0.99, corresponding to an annual
interest rate of 4%. By convention, the preferences of households are logarithmic
in consumption (σ = 1) and in leisure (ψ = −1). χ is set to guarantee l = 1
3
, i.e.,
households work eight hours a day in the final goods production sector in the steady
state. We set α = 0.36 so that the household wage income accounts for 64% of
aggregate output of final goods.
Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998), we choose ρ = 0.95 for the auto-
correlation coefficient of TFP. Capital invested in the household project depreciates
at a quarterly rate of δ = 2.5% and capital invested in the entrepreneurs’ projects
that succeed depreciates at the rate of δ′ = 1.52%. As in Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997), a quarterly rate of business failure at 1% implies pG = 0.99. Therefore, the
aggregate capital stock depreciates at the rate of δ = 2.5% in equilibrium.
The surviving probability of the entrepreneurs with successful projects is set at
p˜i = 2
3
, implying that around 34% of entrepreneurs have to exit from the economy
each period, pi = pGp˜i = 0.66. We set R = 6.04 so that the expected marginal prod-
uct of the entrepreneurial project in terms of the intermediate good always exceeds
that of the household project, pGR > G′(0). It guarantees that capital is allocated
to the entrepreneurial sector if their project choice is observable. Subsection 2.4.2
analyzes the impulse responses of macroeconomic aggregates under various scenar-
ios. Together with the calibration of pi and R, b is calibrated to satisfy the following
conditions in the steady state: entrepreneurs hold half of the aggregate capital stock,
ke
K
= 0.5; the leverage ratio, Ω = 2, implies that entrepreneurs finance half of the
their project investments using external funds, as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999); the entrepreneurs with successful projects keep 60% of the project outcomes
for themselves, R
b
(1−δ′)q+vR = 40%.
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2.4.2 Impulse Responses to Productivity Shocks
We log-linearize the equations describing the market equilibria under various scenar-
ios around their respective steady states and adopt the approach to the first-order
approximations provided by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). The endogenous vari-
ables are represented as the linear functions of the state variables. We analyze the
impulse responses of endogenous variables with respect to a transitory TFP shock in
period 0, given that relevant models are in the steady state before period 0. Subsec-
tion 2.4.2.1 compares the impulse responses of model MH and model RBC in the
setting without adjustment costs. The accumulation of entrepreneurial net worth
and the reallocation of capital constitute a mechanism generating the amplified and
hump-shaped output dynamics. Subsection 2.4.2.2 compares the impulse responses
of model MH in the settings with and without adjustment costs. The price of
capital varies over time and the resulting capital gains speed up the capital reallo-
cation process. Thus, aggregate output peaks earlier in the setting with adjustment
costs than in the setting without adjustment costs. Subsection 2.4.2.3 compares
the impulse responses of model MH and model RBC, in the setting with different
degrees of adjustment costs. The reallocation of capital between households and
entrepreneurs makes aggregate output respond more strongly in model MH than in
model RBC.
2.4.2.1 The Dynamics of the Basic Model: Capital Reallocation
Figure 2.2 shows the impulse responses of model MH (solid line) and model RBC
(dash-dot line) to a TFP shock in the setting without adjustment costs, φ = 0. EN
and HH denote entrepreneurs and households, respectively.
Consider model RBC. As capital is the only endogenous state variable, the
dynamic structures is essentially ARMA(1, 1) and fails to generate the hump-shaped
output dynamics. The supply of capital is perfectly elastic and the price of capital
is constant at unity, qt = 1. A 1% TFP shock raises the marginal products of labor
and intermediate goods in period 0. On the one hand, the wage rate rises by 0.73%.
Given the autocorrelation in TFP, as households prefer to smooth consumption over
time and optimize between consumption and leisure, they increase labor supply and
consumption by 0.75% and 0.40%, respectively. Given that aggregate output of
intermediate goods, M0 = p
GRK−1, is determined by the aggregate capital stock
at the end of the previous period, aggregate output of final goods rises by 1.48%.
Meanwhile, the price of intermediate goods rises by 1.48% to clear the market in
period 0.
Due to the autocorrelation in TFP, the marginal product of intermediate goods
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stays above its steady state value in period 1, so does the price of intermediate
goods. It raises the expected unit value of capital in the entrepreneurs’ projects in
period 0, pGRb0 = p
G[RE0v1 + (1 − δ′)], by 0.05%. Entrepreneurs can then raise
more external funds and expand their project investments. On the one hand, their
excess demand for external funds pushes up the expected rate of return on deposits
by 0.046% and households increase their deposits by 0.12%. On the other hand,
producers of capital goods increase their investment expenditure by 4.63% and fully
accommodate the rise in the aggregate demand for capital by 0.16%.
From period 1 on, as the accumulation of aggregate capital stock gradually
raises aggregate output of intermediate goods and TFP converges to its steady state
value, the marginal product of intermediate goods falls. Meanwhile, the decline in
the household labor supply and the rise in aggregate supply of intermediate goods
jointly increase the marginal product of household labor, despite the convergence in
TFP. As a result, the price of intermediate goods converges to its steady state value,
while the wage rate has a hump-shaped pattern with the peak in period 6. In this
sense, the hump-shaped dynamic pattern of household consumption results from the
accumulation of aggregate capital stock, as in the standard RBC model. However,
aggregate output of final goods peaks in period 0 and converges to its steady state
value. Thus, model RBC cannot generate hump-shaped output responses to TFP
shocks.
Consider model MH. There are three endogenous state variables {ket , kht , Rbt}
and the dynamic structure can replicate the amplified and hump-shaped output
behavior. The period-0 aggregate supply of intermediate goods, M0 = p
GRke−1 +
G(kh−1), is determined by the investments of households and entrepreneurs made in
period −1. A 1% TFP shock results in a rise in the price of intermediate goods
(v0 > E−1v0). Given that the price of capital is constant at unity, q0 = E−1q0 = 1,
extra sales revenues improve the post-repayment wealth of entrepreneurs
N0 = pG[Rv0 + (1− δ′)−Rb−1]ke−1 = pG [b+R(v0 − E−1v0)] ke−1 > E−1N0. (2.26)
Entrepreneurial net wealth rises by 0.42%. Meanwhile, given that the price of inter-
mediate goods is 1.11% above the the steady state value in period 1, the expected
external unit value of capital invested in the projects of entrepreneurs in period 0,
pGRb0 = p
GE0[(1 − δ′) + Rv1 − b], rises by 0.42%, which enables entrepreneurs to
acquire more loans. The entrepreneurs’ excess demand for loans pushes up the gross
loan rate by 0.033%. Altogether, the entrepreneur’s unit down payment of capital,
u0 = 1 − p
GRb0
r0
, falls by 0.38%. Thus, entrepreneurs increase their capital stock,
ke0 =
n0
u0
, by 0.8%.
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The rise in the deposit rate induces households to increase deposits by 1.2%,
much larger than the 0.06% in model RBC. It induces households to increase their
deposits to such an extent that they even reduce their capital stock by 0.42%. Extra
sales revenues have the wealth effect on household consumption-leisure decision.
Although the wage rate rises by 0.94% in period 0, households increase labor supply
only by 0.18%, much less than the 0.75% in model RBC. Aggregate output of final
goods increases only by 1.11% in period 0, much less than the 1.48% in model RBC.
The initial rise in the profitability of entrepreneurs’ project by 0.44% means
that entrepreneurial net worth is expected to yield higher expected return in period
1 than in the steady state. However, it takes time for entrepreneurs to accumulate
net worth before they can fully exploit the profit opportunity. Given that the price
of intermediate goods stays above the steady state value for six periods after the
shock, the entrepreneur’s unit down payment of capital, uet = 1− p
G
e [(1−δ′)+ReEtvt+1]
rt
,
stays below the steady state value for five periods after the shock, and entrepreneurs
can invest more capital in their projects than in the steady state. Meanwhile, en-
trepreneurial net worth is positively correlated with their capital investment in the
previous period, net = p˜ip
G
e bek
e
t−1, where t = 1, 2, 3, .... As a result, the entrepreneurs’
capital investment peaks in period 5. As intermediate goods produced by the en-
trepreneurs’ projects account for 88% of aggregate output, the dynamics of the
aggregate supply of intermediate goods in the current period follow the dynamics of
the entrepreneurs’ capital stock in the previous period. This justifies the fact that
the aggregate supply of intermediate goods peaks in period 6 and the price falls
below the steady state value since period 7. Although the wage rate peaks in period
4, the household labor supply peaks in period 3. As a result, aggregate output of
final goods peaks in period 4 by 1.55% above the steady state value, more than the
maximum value of the output responses, 1.48%, in period 0 in model RBC.
Altogether, the accumulation of entrepreneurial net worth and the reallocation
of capital among agents with different production technologies explain the amplified
propagation mechanism here. The extra channel of capital reallocation is absent in
the various models with financial frictions in the literature.
2.4.2.2 The Dynamics of the Full Model: Capital Gains
Before analyzing the dynamics of the full model, we first look at how costly capital
adjustment affects the internal mechanism of model RBC. Figure 2.3 shows the
impulse responses of model RBC to a TFP shock in the settings with moderate
adjustment costs (solid line, φ = 3) and without adjustment costs (dash-dot line,
φ = 0). The dynamics of model RBC without adjustment costs are discussed in
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subsection 2.4.2.1.
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Figure 2.3: Capital Adjustment Costs in the Frictionless Models: φ = 0 vs. φ = 3
Consider model RBC with moderate adjustment costs. As the assumption on
costly capital adjustment does not add additional endogenous state variable into the
baseline model, the dynamic structures is essentially ARMA(1, 1), too. Similar as in
the case without adjustment costs, a 1% positive TFP shock results in a rise in the
price of intermediate goods in period 0. Given the price of intermediate goods stays
above its steady state value in period 1, the expected unit value of capital invested
in the entrepreneurs’ projects rises and entrepreneurs can borrow more to expand
their project investments. Due to adjustment costs, the supply of capital cannot
fully accommodate the excess demand and the price of capital rises by 0.29% in
period 0. Given that the financial intermediaries transfer all the project outcomes
to households, extra sales revenues and capital gains, pG[(1 − δ′)(q0 − E−1q0) +
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R(v0 − E−1v0)]K−1, have a stronger wealth effect on household consumption and
deposit than in the setting without adjustment costs. Thus, households increase
consumption and deposits by 0.63% and 0.37%, respectively.
Entrepreneurs finance their project investments using external funds, Kt =
zt
qt
.
The rise in the price of capital partially erodes the positive effect of the rise in the
external funds. As a result, entrepreneurs increase their capital stock only by 0.08%
in period 0, smaller than the 0.12% in the setting without adjustment costs. In
order to meet the excess demand for capital, firms producing capital goods increase
their investment expenditures by 3.4%, less than the 4.63% in the setting without
adjustment costs. As mentioned in section 2.3, model RBC is equivalent to a RBC
model, in which households prefer to economize adjustment costs over time. So, the
output dynamics are less amplified but more persistent than in the setting without
adjustment costs.
Figure 2.4 compares the impulse responses of modelMH to a TFP shock in the
settings with moderate adjustment costs (solid lines, φ = 3) and without adjustment
costs (dash-dot lines, φ = 0). The dynamics of modelMH without adjustment costs
are discussed in subsection 2.4.2.1.
Consider modelMH with moderate adjustment costs. A 1% positive TFP shock
leads to the rise in the prices of capital and intermediate goods, similar as in model
RBC with adjustment costs. Extra sales revenues and capital gains have wealth
effects on household consumption and deposit decisions. Although the wage rate
rises by 0.99%, households increase their labor supply only by 0.04% in period 0,
smaller than the 0.18% in the setting without adjustment costs. Given the prede-
termined aggregate supply of intermediate goods, aggregate output of final goods
rises by 1.02%, less than the 1.11% in the setting without adjustment costs.
Meanwhile, extra sales revenues and capital gains also improve entrepreneurial
net worth by the amount of p˜ipG[R(v0 − E−1v0) + (1 − δ′)(q0 − E−1q0) in period
0. Compared to the setting without adjustment costs, capital gains further enable
entrepreneurs to borrow more and expand their project investments. Thus, the price
of capital rises by 0.28% and entrepreneurial net worth rises by 0.74% in period 0.
Given that the prices of capital and intermediate goods stay above their steady
state values in period 1, the expected external unit value of capital in the en-
trepreneurial sector, pGRb0 = p
GE0[(1 − δ′)q1 + Rv1 − b], rises by 1.14% in period
0, much more than the 0.30% in the setting without adjustment costs. Thus, en-
trepreneurs can borrow more and their excess demand for loans pushes up the gross
loan rate by 0.20%, much larger than the 0.033% in the setting without adjust-
ment costs. It induces households to increase deposits by 2.07% in period 0, much
more than the 0.37% in the setting without adjustment costs. Meanwhile, the rise
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in the price of capital further reduces the capital holding of households by 0.99%,
more dramatically than the 0.42% in the setting without adjustment costs. Despite
the rise in the price of capital, the entrepreneur’s unit down payment of capital
falls by 0.39% in period 0. The rise in entrepreneurial net worth and the fall in
the entrepreneur’s unit down payment jointly enable entrepreneurs to increase their
capital holding by 1.13%, more than the 0.80% in the setting without adjustment
costs. In this sense, capital gains speed up the process of capital reallocation among
heterogenous agents.
The aggregate capital stock responds to shocks in a smaller magnitude than
in the setting without adjustment costs. Altogether, there are two effects at work.
First, the enhanced reallocation of capital towards entrepreneurs further increases
aggregate output of intermediate goods; second, the weakened response of the ag-
gregate capital stock due to adjustment costs undermines the increase in aggregate
output of intermediate goods. Altogether, aggregate output of intermediate goods
rises by 0.94% in period 1, more than the 0.69% in the setting without adjustment
costs.
As long as the entrepreneur’s unit down payment of capital stays below its
steady state value, it is cheaper for entrepreneurs to make leveraged investment
than in the steady state. However, the dramatic convergence of the entrepreneur’s
unit down payment of capital to its steady state value in period 1 weakens their
ability to expand investment in the following periods. Their capital holding peaks
by 1.36% above the steady state value in period 4, earlier than in the case without
adjustment costs. In this sense, time-varying prices of capital change the dynamic
pattern of the entrepreneurs’ capital holding. Thus, aggregate output peaks by
1.39% in period 2, earlier than in the setting without adjustment costs.
2.4.2.3 Amplification versus Propagation
Figure 2.5 compares the impulse responses of model MH (solid line) and model
RBC (dash-dot line), given moderate adjustment costs, φ = 3. Consider model
MH. Due to capital gains, capital is reallocated faster towards entrepreneurs than
in model RBC. Although the TFP in period 2 is lower than in period 0, A2 =
1.009 < 1.01 = A0, the effects of capital reallocation overcompensate the decline in
TFP. As a result, aggregate output of final goods peaks by 1.39% in period 2; while,
aggregate output of final goods peaks by 1.30% in period 0 in model RBC.
For a better understanding of the tradeoff between amplification and propaga-
tion, we compare the impulse responses of the two models in the setting with large
adjustment costs (φ = 10) in figure 2.6. Consider model MH with large adjustment
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costs. The supply of capital is even less elastic than in the setting with moderate
adjustment costs (φ = 3). The price of capital rises by 0.48% in period 0, larger than
the 0.28% in the setting with moderate adjustment costs. Due to larger capital gains,
entrepreneurial net worth improves by 1% in period 0 in comparison with 0.74% in
the setting with moderate adjustment costs, φ = 3. The stronger improvement in
net worth enables entrepreneurs to increase capital holding by nearly 1.43%, larger
than the 1.13% in the setting with moderate adjustment costs. The huge increase
in the supply of intermediate goods from entrepreneurs in period t+1 depresses the
price of the intermediate good. The entrepreneur’s unit down payment of capital
falls by 0.43% in period 0 but converges very closely to its steady state value in
period 1. As a result, the entrepreneurs’ capital holding peaks by 1.43% in period 1.
Aggregate output of final goods peaks by 1.39 in period 1, larger than the 1.06% in
period 0 in model RBC. In this sense, time-varying prices of capital in the current
setting affect the tradeoff between amplification and propagation. This result holds
under various calibrations of structural parameters.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes how financial frictions affect macroeconomic fluctuations in a
real dynamic general equilibrium model. The accumulation of entrepreneurial net
worth and the reallocation of capital among agents with different production tech-
nologies explain an important empirical fact, i.e., aggregate output peaks around
four quarters after the shock and in an amplified magnitude to exogenous produc-
tivity shocks.
Furthermore, we adopt the approach of quadratic capital adjustment costs to
model time-varying prices of capital. For a positive productivity shock, the boom
in the demand for capital pushes up the price of capital. The capital gains further
improve entrepreneurial net worth and capital is reallocated to entrepreneurs faster
than in the case of constant prices of capital. As entrepreneurs are more productive
than other agents, aggregate output responds to productivity shocks in a more
amplified but less delayed fashion than in the setting without adjustment costs.
Thus, time-varying prices of capital affect the tradeoff between amplification and
propagation mechanisms.
Chapter 3
Dual Financial Frictions and
Macroeconomic Fluctuations
3.1 Introduction
We have shown the side effect of the approach of costly capital adjustment on
the modeling of time-varying prices of capital in chapter two. Now, we propose
an alternative modeling approach in which the price of capital responds to shocks
in a non-trivial way. We develop a model with financial frictions on the demand
for and the supply of capital goods and analyze how the price of capital, lending,
investment, and output respond to a transitory TFP shock. Two contributions are
made to the literature on real business cycles (RBC, hereafter). First, the dynamic
interactions between the price of capital and dual financial frictions constitute a
robust mechanism thought which output responds to exogenous productivity shocks
in an amplified and hump-shaped fashion. Second, it addresses a methodological
question: What is the proper modeling approach to the production of capital goods
in a dynamic general equilibrium framework?
One of the well-known deficiencies of the canonical RBC models is the lack
of a sufficient propagation and amplification mechanism, as pointed out by Cogley
and Nason (1993, 1995) and Andolfatto (1996). Because the capital stock is the
only endogenous state variable in these models, the dynamic structure is essentially
ARMA(1, 1) and this fails to replicate an important empirical fact, i.e., the am-
plified and hump-shaped output responses to productivity shocks. Many studies in
the literature introduce various frictions into the RBC framework. Additional en-
dogenous state variables help reinforce the internal propagation mechanism. Credit
market imperfections are one of these variations.
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Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) and Kato (forthcoming) analyze the case of
moral hazard and financial frictions in the production of capital goods. In addition
to the aggregate capital stock, the net worth of capital goods producers becomes
another endogenous state variables and is essential for their borrowing capacity. A
positive productivity shock raises the aggregate demand for capital, which pushes up
the price of capital. Although the projects of capital goods producers become more
profitable than before, they are subject to credit constraints and cannot expand their
investments to fully exploit this opportunity. They accumulate net worth over time
so that the supply of capital adapts to the demand in a few periods after the shock.
Given that capital is one of the two inputs needed for the aggregate production of
final goods, the delayed and dampened response of capital investment results in the
hump-shaped and depressed output dynamics, in comparison with the frictionless
RBC model. Although financial frictions in the production of capital goods in these
models help generate the positive autocorrelation of aggregate output qualitatively,
aggregate output peaks only two periods after the shock and in a much dampened
magnitude. However, Cogley and Nason (1995) show that aggregate output peaks
four quarters after the shock in the United States; Andolfatto (1996) shows that the
volatility of aggregate output around its trend in the actual U.S. economy is even
more than what the frictionless RBC model can predict.
In our basic model, moral hazard and financial frictions exist in the production
of intermediate goods. As there is no friction in the production of capital goods,
the price of capital is constant at unity. Entrepreneurs are more productive in pro-
ducing intermediate goods using capital than households are. Due to moral hazard,
entrepreneurs can credibly pledge only a fraction of their project outcomes for loans
and they must put down own funds in their projects to fill in the gap between to-
tal investment and loans. Entrepreneurial net worth is essential for their project
investments. A positive productivity shock raises aggregate demand and pushes up
the price of intermediate goods. Extra sales revenues improve entrepreneurial net
worth and enable them to demand for more loans and capital goods. The excess
demand for loans pushes up the loan rate and induces households to lend more to
the entrepreneurial sector and reduce their capital holding. As it takes time for
entrepreneurs to accumulate net worth, they cannot acquire enough loans to ex-
pand their investments efficiently in the shock period. Capital reallocation from
households to entrepreneurs is delayed, and the aggregate supply of intermediate
goods responds to shocks in a delayed fashion, too. In contrast to Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997, 1998) and Kato (forthcoming), we show that the gradual reallocation
of capital goods among agents with different production technologies amplifies the
effects of shocks and aggregate output peaks four periods after the shock, in line
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with the empirical evidence.
There are some alternative approaches to model the supply of capital in the
literature on asset prices and business cycles. In the standard RBC model, the
aggregate capital stock depreciates at a constant rate each period. Consumption
goods can be transformed one-to-one to capital goods without frictions so that the
price of capital is constant at unity over time. In this sense, the standard RBC
models can be regarded essentially as a one-good economy. In order to analyze the
role of asset prices along the business cycle, some researchers, such as Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Aoki, Proudman, and Vlieghe (2004), derive an
upward-sloping capital supply curve from convex adjustment costs. For analytical
convenience, other researchers, such as Kiyotaki and Moore (1997, 2005), Kiyotaki
(1998), Chen (2001), Iacoviello (2005), assume that durable assets (land) do not
depreciate and have a fixed supply.
These two approaches have a common feature that an excess demand for capital
leads to a large and persistent rise in the price of capital. As shown in chapter two,
the persistent rise in the price of capital after the shock can exaggerate the effect
of capital gains on the entrepreneurial net worth. As a result, aggregate output
responds in a more amplified magnitude and peaks earlier than in our basic model.
In our full model, moral hazard and financial frictions exist in the production
of both capital and intermediate goods. The assumption on credit-constrained pro-
duction of capital goods captures the empirical fact that the aggregate supply of
durable capital goods is rather inelastic in the short run but becomes elastic in
the medium run. A positive productivity shock results in a boom in the aggregate
demand for capital goods. Since producers of capital goods are subject to credit
constraints, the supply of capital can not adapt to the excess demand immediately.
Producers of capital goods accumulate net worth and exploit the profit opportunity
over time. Thus, the supply of capital adapts to the demand in a few periods af-
ter the shock. As a consequence, the price of capital stays away from the steady
state value for only a few periods after the shock and the magnitude of capital
gains is rather limited. In this sense, the propagation mechanism discussed in our
basic model is preserved. The dynamic interactions between the price of capital
and dual financial frictions constitute a robust mechanism through which aggregate
output responds to productivity shocks in an amplified and hump-shaped fashion,
quantitatively consistent with the empirical evidence.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 starts with an
overview of the model economy. Section 3.3 discusses the financial contracting under
other scenarios. Section 3.4 calibrates the model and analyzes the impulse responses
of macroeconomic aggregates to productivity shocks. Section 3.5 summarizes.
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3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Overview
Consider a discrete-time, closed, real economy with three goods: a capital good, an
intermediate good, and a final good. The final good is chosen as the numeraire.
Capital goods are durable, while intermediate goods and final goods are perishable.
There are three types of agents: households, entrepreneurs, and producers of capital
goods. The population of each type is normalized to unity. Households and en-
trepreneurs can invest capital goods into their respective projects at the end of each
period and the projects produce intermediate goods at the beginning of the next
period. Intermediate goods and labor are employed to produce final goods contem-
poraneously. Final goods can be consumed. The aggregate capital stock depreciates
at a constant rate. Producers of capital goods can transform final goods into capital
goods contemporaneously. Newly-produced and existing capital goods are perfect
substitutes and are traded at the same price. Competitive financial intermediaries
collect deposits and provide loans.
Households are risk averse and infinitely lived. They have a safe production
project for intermediate goods. They are endowed with a unit of labor each period,
which can be supplied to the final goods production. At the end of the period, they
invest capital goods in their projects, make inter-period deposits, and consume.
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral. As shown in subsection 3.2.4, entrepreneurs
finance their project investments using own funds and inter-period loans from fi-
nancial intermediaries at the end of each period, subject to credit constraints.
Entrepreneurial net worth is defined as the amount of own funds entrepreneurs
invest in their projects. Debt repayment is contingent on project outcomes. En-
trepreneurs whose projects fail are released from debt obligations and exit from the
economy without consuming anything; entrepreneurs whose projects succeed repay
their debts. Successful entrepreneurs have a constant probability of death. In equi-
librium, entrepreneurs of mass (1 − pi) exit from the economy in every period and
new entrepreneurs of the same mass are born with a tiny endowment, e, keeping
the population size of entrepreneurs constant. Our calibration guarantees that the
expected rate of return on entrepreneurial net worth exceeds the cost of external
funds. Thus, the surviving and newly-born entrepreneurs put all own funds into
their projects and borrow to the limit. Entrepreneurs with successful projects who
die sell off their capital stock, consume the proceeds, and exit from the economy.
Producers of capital goods are risk neutral and infinitely lived. They are less
patient than households and entrepreneurs. At the beginning of each period, they
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supply their labor endowment to the production of final goods. As shown in sub-
section 3.2.5, producers of capital goods finance their projects using own funds and
intra-period loans from financial intermediaries, subject to credit constraints. Their
net worth is defined as the amount of own funds they invest in their projects. Ac-
cording to our calibration, the expected rate of return on their projects exceeds the
cost of intra-period loans. As a result, they put all own funds in their projects and
borrow to the limit. Debt repayment is contingent on their project outcomes. Those
whose projects fail are released from debt obligations; those whose projects succeed
repay the debts. At the end of the period, they make inter-period deposits at the
financial intermediaries and consume the rest.
There is no moral hazard in the financial sector. Financial intermediaries have
the expertise in screening loan applications, diversifying portfolios, and enforcing
debt repayments, etc. In equilibrium, loans must be intermediated through the fi-
nancial sector and there is no direct lending among individual agents in our model
economy. By perfectly diversifying the portfolios, the financial sector pools the id-
iosyncratic project risk of entrepreneurs and capital goods producers. According to
the financial contracts specified in subsections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5, financial intermedi-
aries, in equilibrium, guarantee a safe rate of return on inter-period and intra-period
deposits. Due to perfect competition, financial intermediaries break even and make
no profit.
T+1
The Intermediate 
Goods Production
Shock to TFP of 
the Final Goods 
Production
The Final Goods 
Production
Entrepreneurs‘
Contingent 
Repayment
The Capital 
Goods 
Production
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Borrowing and 
Investment
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Figure 3.1: Time Sequence of Events
Figure 3.1 summarizes the time sequence of events in equilibrium, where CGP
denotes capital goods producers. Note that an exogenous TFP shock1 to the produc-
tion of final goods is realized at the beginning of period t. There are five endogenous
factor prices in the economy: the price of capital goods, qt, the price of intermediate
goods, vt, the wage rate for households, w
h
t , the wage rate for capital goods produc-
1Subsection 3.2.7 specifies the distribution of the shocks.
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ers, wct , and the gross rate of return on inter-period deposits, rt. As shown later,
the gross rate of return on intra-period deposits is simply unity.
3.2.2 Households
Households have identical preferences over consumption and leisure. Their expected
utility function takes the following form,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(cht )
1−σ
1− σ + χ
(1− lht )1+ψ
1 + ψ
]
,
where Et is the expectation operator based on information available in period t. β ∈
(0, 1) denotes the time discount factor and cht and l
h
t denote, respectively, household
consumption and hours worked, as a fraction of the total labor endowment. Given
that kht−1 units of capital goods were invested in the household project at the end of
period t− 1, G(kht−1) units of intermediate goods are produced at the beginning of
period t. The household sales revenues amount to vtG(k
h
t−1) and their wage income
is wht l
h
t . In addition, they receive rt−1d
h
t−1 from the financial intermediaries, where
dht−1 is the inter-period deposit made at the end of period t− 1 and rt−1 is the gross
rate of return on deposit. At the end of period t, they invest kht units of capital
goods in their projects, deposit dht units of final goods at the financial intermediaries,
and consume cht units of final goods. Accordingly, the flow-budget constraint is,
qt[k
h
t − (1− δ)kht−1] + dht + cht = vtG(kht−1) + wht lht + rt−1dht−1,
where δ ∈ (0, 1] is the depreciation rate of the capital invested in the household
project. The optimization over {cht , lht , kht , dht } gives the equilibrium conditions,
wht = χ(1− lht )ψ(cht )σ, (3.1)
βrt = Et
(
cht+1
cht
)σ
, (3.2)
rtqt = Et
[
(1− δ)qt+1 + vt+1G′(kht )
]
. (3.3)
3.2.3 Unobservable Project Choices
Each entrepreneur can invest capital goods in one of the three projects: “Good”,
“Bad”, or “Rotten” at the end of each period. At the beginning of the next period,
the project generates Re units of intermediate goods per unit of capital invested and
the invested capital depreciates at a rate δ′ ∈ (0, 1], if the project succeeds; if the
project fails, there is no output and the invested capital is fully lost.
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Producers of capital goods can invest final goods in one of the three projects:
“Good”, “Bad”, or “Rotten”. The project can transform one unit of final goods into
Rc units of capital goods contemporaneously, if the project succeed; if the project
fails, there is no output of capital goods and the invested final goods are wasted.
Project choices are irreversible and project outcomes are perfectly verifiable at
no costs. Entrepreneurs and capital goods producers also enjoy safe, nonpecuniary
private benefits during the project process. For convenience of aggregation, we
assume that the private benefits of the entrepreneurial projects are proportional to
their project investments in terms of capital goods and the private benefits of the
projects of capital goods producers are proportional to their project investments
in terms of final goods. The projects differ in the probability of success and unit
private benefits. See table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Projects with Idiosyncratic Risk
Project Good Bad Rotten
Probability of Success pGm p
B
m p
R
m
Unit Private Benefits bGm b
B
m b
R
m
where m ∈ {e, c} denotes the project attributes of entrepreneurs and capital goods
producers, respectively. Here, 0 < pRm = p
B
m < p
G
m < 1 and b
R
m > b
B
m > b
G
m > 0 im-
ply that projects “Rotten” and “Bad” are riskier than project “Good” but project
“Rotten” yields highest private benefits and project “Good” yields lowest private
benefits to project owners. Individual agents cannot observe the project choices of
entrepreneurs and capital goods producers, while the financial intermediaries have
expertise in screening out project “Rotten” at no costs but cannot distinguish be-
tween project “Good” and project “Bad”. The advantage of financial intermediaries
over individual agents justifies the fact that loans must be intermediated through
the financial sector and there is no direct lending at the credit market.
3.2.4 Entrepreneurs
An entrepreneur2 i who stays in the economy to the next period has linear preferences
over consumption and private benefits. His expected utility function is,
E0
T˜∑
t=0
βs
[
cei,t + Bekei,t−1
]
, (3.4)
2Entrepreneurs differ in the end-of-period wealth and are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].
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where T˜ is the stochastic time of death and Be ∈ {bGe , bBe } denotes unit private
benefits of capital invested in project “Good” or project “Bad”. cei,t denotes his
consumption in period t and kei,t−1 denotes his project investment in terms of capital
goods made at the end of period t− 1. Our calibration guarantees that only project
“Good” has a positive expected net present value around the steady state,
pGe Et[Revt+1 + (1− δ′)qt+1] + bGe
rt
− qt > 0 > p
B
e Et[Revt+1 + (1− δ′)qt+1] + bBe
rt
− qt,
Therefore, other projects should not be financed in equilibrium. Project “Good”
also has a larger expected marginal product than the household project.
At the end of period t, entrepreneur i invest kei,t units of capital goods in either
project “Good” or project “Bad”, using his own funds nei,t and inter-period loans
zei,t, i.e., qtk
e
i,t = n
e
i,t+z
e
i,t. Thus, n
e
i,t is entrepreneurial net worth in the project. The
loan contract specifies a promise to repay Rbe,tk
e
i,t units of final goods in period t+1 if
the project succeeds. If the project fails, both parties get zero pecuniary return. In
order to motivate entrepreneur i to choose project “Good”, financial intermediaries
must provide him with enough incentives,
{pGe Et[Revt+1 + (1− δ′)qt+1 −Rbe,t] + bGe }kei,t ≥ {pBe Et[Revt+1 + (1− δ′)qt+1 −Rbe,t] + bBe }kei,t.
The left (right) hand side denotes the expected utility of the entrepreneur if he
chooses project “Good” (“Bad”). As he prefers to borrow to the limit, the incentive
constraint is binding around the steady state and is simplified to be
Rbe,t = Et[Revt+1 + (1− δ′)qt+1]− be, where be ≡
bBe − bGe
pGe − pBe
> 0. (3.5)
Any promise to repay more than Rbe,t is not credible, because he would deliberately
choose project “Bad”. The expected external unit value and full unit value of
the capital invested in project “Good” are pGe R
b
e,t and p
G
e Et[Revt+1 + (1 − δ′)qt+1],
respectively. The difference between the two values, pGe be, is used to motivate him
to choose project “Good” despite lower private benefits it promises, bGe < b
B
e .
Financial intermediaries are expected to break even in lending to the en-
trepreneur in period t, rtz
e
i,t = p
G
e R
b
e,tk
e
i,t. This implies a credit constraint for him,
zei,t = Γ
e
tn
e
i,t, where Γ
e
t ≡
pGe R
b
e,t
rtqt − pGe Rbe,t
is the credit multiplier. As Γet is independent of n
e
i,t, loans are proportional to
entrepreneurial net worth. Our calibration guarantees rtqt > p
G
e R
b
e,t around the
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steady state and so Γet > 0. Note that the credit multiplier varies with qt, rt, Etqt+1,
and Etvt+1. Ceteris paribus, a rise in the current price of capital qt makes capital
investment more expensive; similarly, a rise in the gross rate of return on inter-period
deposits rt makes external funds more expensive for entrepreneurs. In both cases, the
credit multiplier falls so that less capital is allocated to the entrepreneurial sector.
Ceteris paribus, a rise in the expected prices of capital or intermediate goods in
period t + 1, Etqt+1 or Etvt+1, improves the expected external unit value of capital
invested in their projects, pGe R
b
e,t. As a result, the credit multiplier is larger and
entrepreneurs can expand their leveraged investments.
In equilibrium, entrepreneurs of mass (1− pGe ) have the failed projects and exit
from the economy. Each of those entrepreneurs whose projects succeed have a con-
stant probability p˜i of surviving to the next period. In the aggregate, entrepreneurs
of mass pGe (1 − p˜i) have successful projects and exit from the economy, and en-
trepreneurs of mass pGe p˜i have successful projects and live on to the next period.
New entrepreneurs of mass (1 − pi) are born. We assume pi = pGe p˜i to keep the
population size of entrepreneurs constant at unity.
Entrepreneur imaximizes his expected utility (3.4), subject to his period budget
constraints and credit constraints,
qtk
e
i,t − zei,t = nei,t, where nei,t = N ei,t − cei,t (3.6)
zei,t = Γ
e
tn
e
i,t. (3.7)
where N ei,t denotes his end-of-period wealth. Entrepreneurs differ in end-of-period
wealth, an issue discussed in appendix B.1. Due to the linear nature of the project
technologies and the preferences of entrepreneurs, the loan zei,t and the project in-
vestment kei,t of entrepreneur i is proportional to his net worth n
e
i,t. As a result, only
the first moment of the distribution of entrepreneurial net worth matters for the
aggregate capital stock in the entrepreneurial sector. See appendix B.1. Let lower-
case letters without the index i denote per capita variables of the entrepreneurial
sector. Per capita consumption cet , per capita net worth nt, per capita inter-period
loans zet , and per capita capital holding k
e
t are,
cet = (1− p˜i)pGe [Revt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbe,t−1]ket−1, (3.8)
net = p˜ip
G
e [Revt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbe,t−1]ket−1 + (1− pi)e, (3.9)
zet =
pGe R
b
e,t
rtqt − pGe Rbe,t
net , (3.10)
ket =
net + z
e
t
qt
. (3.11)
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For a better understanding of the model dynamics, we introduce three auxiliary
variables. The first is the leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total investment over
entrepreneurial net worth, Ωet ≡
qtkei,t
nei,t
= 1 + Γet . The second is the entrepreneur’s
unit down payment of capital, defined as the amount of own funds the entrepreneur
pays for each unit of capital, uet ≡ qt−
zei,t
kei,t
= qt
Ωet
. The third is the expected profitabil-
ity of the entrepreneurial project, defined as the discounted expected gross rate of
return on entrepreneurial net worth, ξet ≡
βpGe Et[Revt+1+(1−δ′)qt+1−Rbe,t]kei,t
nei,t
= βp
G
e be
uet
. Our
calibration guarantees that the expected profitability of the entrepreneurial project
exceeds the discounted cost of external funds around the steady state, ξet > βrt. As
a result, entrepreneurs prefer to postpone consumption and borrow to the limit.
For convenience of aggregation, we assume that capital depreciates faster in
the household projects than in the entrepreneurial projects that turn out to be
successful, δ = 1− pG + pGδ′ > δ′. Thus, the aggregate capital stock depreciates at
the same rate in both household and entrepreneurial sectors, 1− δ = pG(1− δ′).
3.2.5 Capital Goods Producers
A capital goods producer3 j has linear preferences over consumption and and private
benefits. His expected utility function is,
E0
∞∑
t=0
(γβ)s
[
ccj,t + Bcicj,t
]
, (3.12)
where ccj,t and i
c
j,t denote, respectively, his consumption and project investment.
γ ∈ (0, 1) implies that capital goods producers are less patient than households and
entrepreneurs. It guarantees that capital goods producers have positive consumption
in equilibrium so that credit constraints are always binding around the steady state.
Bc ∈ {bGc , bBc } denotes unit private benefits of final goods invested in project “Good”
or project “Bad”. As he does not care about leisure, he supplies labor endowment
inelastically to the production of final goods, lct = 1, at the wage rate, w
c
t . Our
calibration guarantees that only project “Good” has a positive expected net present
value around the steady state,
pGc Rcqt + b
G
c − 1 > 0 > pBc Rcqt + bBc − 1,
given that the gross rate of return on intra-period loan is unity. Therefore, only
project “Good” should be financed. For simplicity, we assume pGc Rc = 1, i.e., final
goods are transformed one-to-one into capital goods in the aggregate in equilibrium.
3Capital goods producers differ in their end-of-period wealth and are indexed by j ∈ [0, 1].
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After the final goods have been produced in period t, the total wealth of capital
goods producer j consists of his wage income and the gross return on his inter-
period deposit made in period t − 1. In equilibrium, he uses own funds, ncj,t =
rt−1dcj,t−1 + w
c
t and intra-period loans z
c
j,t to invests i
c
j,t = n
c
j,t + z
c
j,t units of final
goods in either project “Good” or project “Bad”. Thus, ncj,t is the net worth of
the capital goods producer. The loan contract specifies a promise to repay Rbc,ti
c
j,t
units of final goods if the project succeeds; if the project fails, both parties get zero
return. In order to motivate the capital goods producer to choose project “Good”,
financial intermediaries must provide him with enough incentives,
pGc (Rcqt −Rbc,t)icj,t + bGc ici,t ≥ pBc (Rcqt −Rbc,t)icj,t + bBc ici,t.
The left (right) hand side denotes the expected utility of the capital goods producer
if he chooses project “Good” (“Bad”). As he prefers to borrow to the limit, the
incentive constraint is binding around the steady state and is simplified to be
Rbc,t = Rcqt − bc, where bc ≡
bBc − bGc
pGc − pBc
> 0. (3.13)
Any promise to repay more than Rbc,t is not credible, because he would deliberately
choose project “Bad”. The expected external unit value and full unit value of the
final goods invested in project “Good” are pGc R
b
c,t and p
G
c Rcqt, respectively. The
difference between the two values, pGc bc, is used to motivate him to choose project
“Good” despite lower private benefits it promises, bGc < b
B
c .
Financial intermediaries are expected to break even in lending to the capital
goods producer in period t, zcj,t = p
G
c R
b
c,ti
c
j,t. This implies a credit constraint for the
capital goods producer,
zcj,t = Γ
c
tn
c
j,t, where Γ
c
t ≡
pGc R
b
c,t
1− pGc Rbc,t
is the credit multiplier. As Γct is independent of n
c
j,t, loans are proportional to the
net worth of the capital goods producer. Our calibration guarantees pGc R
b
c,t < 1
around the steady state and so Γct > 0. Note that the credit multiplier varies with
qt. A rise in the current price of capital raises the expected external unit value of
the project of the capital goods producer and he can borrow more to invest. In the
aggregate, more funds flow into the production of capital goods and more capital
goods are produced.
Each unit of the net worth of the capital goods producer enables him to acquire
Γct units of intra-period loans and so, he invests 1+Γ
c
t units of final goods in project
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“Good”. The expected gross rate of return on his net worth is
ξct = p
G
c (Rcqt −Rbc,t)(1 + Γct) =
pGc bc
pGc bc − (qt − 1)
. (3.14)
The expected one-to-one transformation of final goods into capital goods, pGc Rc = 1,
implies that the price of capital must be no less than unity. Otherwise, the project
would make a loss, ξct < 1. If the price of capital is at unity, qt = 1, the project
breaks even by expectation, ξct = 1, so that producers of capital goods do not invest
own funds in the project. If the price of capital exceeds unity, qt > 1, the project
is profitable, ξct > 1, so that producers of capital goods put all own funds in the
project and borrow to the limit.
Capital goods producer j maximizes his expected utility (3.12), subject to his
credit constraints and period budget constraints,
zcj,t = Γ
c
tn
c
j,t, where n
c
j,t = rt−1d
c
j,t−1 + w
c
t (3.15)
dcj,t + c
c
j,t = N cj,t, (3.16)
where N cj,t is his end-of-period wealth. Capital goods producers differ in their end-
of-period wealth, an issued discussed in appendix B.2. N cj,t = (Rcqt−Rbc,t)icj,t, where
icj,t = (1 + Γ
c
t)n
c
j,t, if the project succeeds; if the project fails, N cj,t = 0. Due to
the linear nature of the project technologies and the preferences of capital goods
producers, loans and the project investment is proportional to his net worth. As a
result, only the first moment of the distribution of the net worth of capital goods
producers matters for the aggregate capital investment. See appendix B.2. We use
lower-case letters without the index j to denote per capita variables of the capital
goods production sector. Period budget constraint, per capita net worth nct , and
per capita credit constraints are,
dct + c
c
t = ξ
c
tn
c
t , (3.17)
nct = rt−1d
c
t−1 + w
c
t , (3.18)
zct = i
c
t − nct = pGc Rbc,tict , (3.19)
where cct and d
c
t are per capita consumption and deposit; i
c
t and z
c
t are per capita
project investment and intra-period loans. Given linear preferences, their marginal
utility of consuming a unit of final goods is one. If they deposit a unit of final goods
at the financial intermediaries at the end of period t, they can get a safe rate of
return, rt, in period t + 1. They then invest the deposit return in project “Good”
for the expected return of Etrtξ
c
t+1. The optimization between consumption and
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deposit at the end of period t gives the equilibrium condition,
1 = Etγβrtξt+1. (3.20)
For a better understanding of the model dynamics, we introduce two auxiliary
variables. The first is the leverage ratio, defined as the ratio of total investment over
the net worth of capital goods producers, Ωct ≡
icj,t
ncj,t
= 1 + Γct ; the second is the unit
down payment of capital goods producers, defined as the amount of own funds the
capital goods producer pays for each unit of final goods invested in project “Good”,
uct ≡ n
c
t
ict
= 1− pGc Rbc,t. As capital goods are one-to-one transformed from final goods
in the aggregate, pGc Rc = 1, the aggregate capital stock Kt evolves as follows,
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + ict . (3.21)
3.2.6 Financial Intermediaries
Financial intermediaries conduct intra-period and inter-period business separately
in equilibrium. On the one hand, they accept intra-period deposits from households
and make intra-period loans to producers of capital goods after final goods are
produced. At the end of the same period, the producers of capital goods with
successful projects repay their debts and households get the return on their deposits.
On the other hand, the intermediaries accept inter-period deposits from households
and producers of capital goods and make inter-period loans to entrepreneurs at the
end of the period; at the beginning of the next period, successful entrepreneurs repay
their debts and households and producers of capital goods get the return on their
deposits. A deposit contract is a claim on the financial position of the intermediary.
Consider the intra-period business of the financial intermediaries. There is no
aggregate uncertainty during the production of capital goods. By perfectly diversi-
fying the portfolios of intra-period loans, the intermediaries pool the idiosyncratic
project risk of capital goods producers and pay a safe rate of return on intra-period
deposits at unity. Therefore, we do not have to specify the household decision
on intra-period deposit explicitly. Due to perfect competition, the intermediaries
transfer all of the debt repayments to depositors and make zero profit.
Consider now the inter-period business of the financial intermediaries. Suppose,
first, that the project choice of entrepreneurs is perfectly observable so that they
can pledge all of the project outcomes to the intermediaries for external funds. Due
to the presence of the aggregate risk related to TFP shocks, the period-t prices of
capital and intermediate goods may differ from their expected values, i.e., qt 6= Et−1qt
and vt 6= Et−1vt, and so may the values of the project outcomes of entrepreneurs,
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pGe [Revt + (1 − δ′)qt]ket−1 6= pGe [ReEt−1vt + (1 − δ′)Et−1qt]ket−1. As a result, the rate
of return on inter-period deposits is contingent on productivity shocks.
In contrast, in the case of unobservable project choices of the entrepreneurs, the
loan contract described in subsection 3.2.4 implicitly provides entrepreneurs with a
net unit return on capital, with a positive expected value, pGe be > 0, in period t− 1.
The ex post net unit return on capital to the successful entrepreneurs in period t is
Revt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbe,t−1 = be +Re(vt − Et−1vt) + (1− δ′)(qt − Et−1qt).
As long as the aggregate productivity shocks are larger than some threshold
value, the ex post values of the project outcomes of successful entrepreneurs are
larger than the promised repayments, [Revt + (1 − δ′)qt]ket−1 > Rbe,t−1ket−1, and the
successful entrepreneurs repay their liabilities, Rbe,t−1k
e
t−1, to the intermediaries. Let
Ket−1 and Z
e
t−1 denote the aggregate capital stock held by entrepreneurs and the
aggregate lending to entrepreneurs at the end of period t − 1, respectively. The
aggregate break-even condition of the financial sector is rt−1Zet−1 = p
G
e R
b
e,t−1K
e
t−1.
At the beginning of period t, entrepreneurs of mass pGe have successful projects
and their total repayments, pGe R
b
e,t−1K
e
t−1, coincide with the expected value. In
this sense, the positive expected net return to entrepreneurs, pGe beK
e
t−1, absorbs
the aggregate risk and the financial intermediaries pay a safe rate of return on
deposits in equilibrium. For aggregate productivity shocks below this threshold,
the prices of capital and intermediate goods are so low that the ex post value of
the project outcomes of successful entrepreneurs is less than their debt obligations,
[Revt + (1 − δ′)qt]ket−1 < Rbe,t−1ket−1. Even the successful entrepreneurs have to
announce bankruptcy and transfer all the project outcomes to the intermediaries.
Thus, in the case of moral hazard in the production of intermediate goods, the ex
post rate of return on inter-period deposits is contingent on the productivity shock
only for very large, negative shocks.
As a consequence, if productivity shocks are unbounded, the ex post rate of
return on inter-period deposits as a function of productivity shocks could have a kink
at the point where Revt + (1 − δ′)qt = Rbe,t−1. The first-order approximations used
below to analyze the dynamics of our model require that the endogenous variables
should be continuous and differentiable functions of the state variables. For the
purpose of the the approximations, we assume that TFP shocks are distributed with
mean zero and a negative lower bound guaranteeing that successful entrepreneurs
are always able to repay the promised amount. See subsection 3.2.7 for details.
3.3. FINANCIAL CONTRACTING IN OTHER SCENARIOS 51
3.2.7 Final Goods Production and Market Equilibrium
Final goods are produced from intermediate goods and labor,
Yt = AtM
α
t (L
h
t )
(1−α−α′)(Lct)
α′ , (3.22)
logAt = ρ logAt−1 + t, (3.23)
where Mt, L
h
t , and L
c
t denote the aggregate inputs of intermediate goods, the labor
of households, and the labor of capital goods producers4. Total factor productivity,
At, is positively autocorrelated in logarithms, where ρ ∈ (0, 1). The productivity
shock has mean zero, Ett+1 = 0, and is distributed above a lower bound, (−τ,∞),
where τ > 0 is small enough that the successful entrepreneurs are always able to
repay their liabilities. The production of final goods takes place at the efficient level,
vtMt = αYt, (3.24)
wht L
h
t = (1− α− α′)Yt, (3.25)
wctL
c
t = α
′Yt. (3.26)
Markets for intermediate goods, final goods, capital, labor, and loans clear,
Mt = G(k
h
t−1) + p
G
e Rek
e
t−1, (3.27)
Yt + (1− pi)e = cht + cct + cet + ict , (3.28)
Kt = k
h
t + k
e
t , (3.29)
zet = d
c
t + d
h
t , (3.30)
Lht = l
h
t , (3.31)
Lct = l
c
t = 1. (3.32)
Definition 3.1. Market equilibrium is a set of allocations of households,
{kht , lht , cht , dht }, entrepreneurs, {ket , net , cet , zet }, and capital goods producers,
{nct , ict , cct , dct}, together with aggregate variables {Mt, Yt, Kt} given a set of prices
{vt, qt, wht , wct , rt, ξct , Rbe,t, Rbc,t} and the exogenous process {At} satisfying equations
(3.1)-(3.3), (3.5), (3.8)-(3.11), (3.13)-(3.14), (3.17)-(3.30).
3.3 Financial Contracting in Other Scenarios
As shown in subsection 3.2.6, the financial intermediaries accept inter-period and
intra-period deposits and make inter-period and intra-period loans in the model with
4As each type of agents is of unit mass, aggregate variables coincide with per capita variables.
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dual financial frictions (Model DF ). In order to understand macroeconomic fluctu-
ations in the setting with dual financial frictions, we briefly discuss three alternative
scenarios for the dynamic analysis in section 3.4.
3.3.1 Model SFE
In this subsection, we assume that the project choice of capital goods producers is
observable but that of entrepreneurs is not. Thus, capital goods producers can cred-
ibly choose project “Good” and financial frictions exist only in the entrepreneurial
sector. This scenario captures the basic amplification and propagation mechanism
and we call it model SFE.
Since producers of capital goods can pledge all the expected project outcomes
for external funding, zct = qtp
G
c Rci
c
t , they do not have to put down own funds in
their projects, nct = 0. Capital goods are priced at qt = 1. Because the deposit
rate is less than their time preference rate around the steady state, rt <
1
γβ
, they
do not deposit, dct = 0. They consume their wage income each period, c
c
t = w
c
t . For
simplicity, we focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which all producers of capital
goods invest the same amount of final goods ict in project “Good” and enjoy private
benefits, bGc i
c
t . Other sectors are same as in the setting with dual financial frictions.
3.3.2 Model SFC
In this subsection, we assume that the project choice of entrepreneurs is observable
but that of capital goods producers is not. Thus, entrepreneurs can credibly choose
project “Good” and financial frictions exist only in the capital goods production
sector. We call it model SFC.
Since entrepreneurs can pledge all of the expected project outcomes for external
funding, zei,t =
pGe [Revt+1+(1−δ′)qt+1]kei,t
rt
, they do not have to put down own funds in
their projects, nei,t = 0. As the expected rate of return on project “Good” is higher
than that on the household project, all capital is allocated to the entrepreneurial
projects and intermediate goods are produced by entrepreneurs only. We focus on
a symmetric equilibrium in which all entrepreneurs use external funds to invest the
same amount of capital goods ket in their projects and enjoy private benefits, b
G
e k
e
t
in period t+ 1. Newcomers consume their endowment each period, cet = (1− pi)e.
The rates of return on inter-period deposits are different in the settings with and
without the unobservable project choice of entrepreneurs. As shown in subsection
3.2.6, the positive expected stake of entrepreneurs in the project outcomes, pGe bek
e
t >
0, absorbs the aggregate risk due to TFP shocks in the setting with financial frictions
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in the entrepreneur sector. This enables the financial sector to guarantee a safe rate
of return on inter-period deposits, rt. In this sense, the intermediaries take the form
of banks. Without moral hazard, no incentive is required for entrepreneurs to engage
in project “Good”. The intermediaries can only diversify the idiosyncratic project
risk of entrepreneurs but not the aggregate risk. Given that the intermediaries
do not accumulate reserves in our model, inter-period depositors have to bear this
aggregate risk. In this sense, the intermediaries take the form of mutual funds and
the rate of return on deposit is contingent on the productivity shock.
Households and capital goods producers, respectively, put dht−1 and d
c
t−1 units
of final goods at the intermediaries at the end of period t − 1 for the claim of the
financial position of the intermediaries in period t. The intermediaries fully finance
the project investments of entrepreneurs, qt−1ket−1 = z
e
t−1 = d
h
t−1 + d
c
t−1. After the
project completion in period t, the intermediaries collect all the project outcomes,
pGe [Revt + (1 − δ′)qt]ket−1, and transfer to depositors pro rata. The ex post rate of
return on deposits,
r˜t =
pGe [Revt + (1− δ′)qt]ket−1
zet−1
=
pGe [Revt + (1− δ′)qt]
qt−1
,
differs from its expected value by r˜t − Et−1r˜t = pGe [Re(vt−Et−1vt)+(1−δ′)(qt−Et−1qt)]qt−1 due
to the unexpected changes in the prices of capital and intermediate goods. For
uniformity, we use rt to denote the expected rate of return on deposits, rt ≡ Etr˜t+1.
Other sectors remain the same as in the setting with dual financial frictions.
3.3.3 Model RBC
In this subsection, we assume that the project choices of entrepreneurs and capital
goods producers are observable. Thus, both entrepreneurs and capital goods pro-
ducers can credibly choose project “Good” and pledge all the expected outcomes of
their projects for external funding. They can use external funds to fully financed
their project investments, qtk
e
t = z
e
t and i
c
t = z
c
t and do not have to put down own
funds in their projects, net = n
c
t = 0. The price of capital is constant at unity, qt = 1
and the projects of capital goods producers earn zero profits, ξct = 1. Capital is all
allocated to entrepreneurs and only entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods.
The model economy is equivalent to a RBC model with a representative agent
who has three production technologies: a linear technology to produce intermedi-
ate goods using capital, a Cobb-Douglas technology to produce final goods using
intermediate goods and labor, and a linear technology to transform final goods
into capital goods. So, we call it model RBC. The market equilibrium can
54 CHAPTER 3. DUAL FINANCIAL FRICTIONS
be defined as the set of two state variables {ket , At} and nine control variables
{cht , lht , wht , cct , ict , wct , vt,Mt, Yt} satisfying equations from (3.33) to (3.43),
1 = βEt
(
cht+1
cht
)−σ
pGe [(1− δ′) +Revt+1], (3.33)
wht = χ(1− lht )ψ(cht )σ, (3.34)
Mt = p
G
e Rek
e
t−1, (3.35)
Yt = AtM
α
t (l
h
t )
1−α−α′ , (3.36)
vtMt = αYt, (3.37)
wht l
h
t = (1− α− α′)Yt, (3.38)
wct = α
′Yt, (3.39)
logAt = ρ logAt−1 + t, (3.40)
cht + c
c
t + i
c
t = Yt, (3.41)
cct = w
c
t , (3.42)
ket = p
G
e (1− δ′)ket−1 + ict . (3.43)
3.4 Dynamic Analysis
3.4.1 Calibration
For convenience of aggregation, we assume that the household project is linear,
G(kht ) =
1
2
(
1 +
ket
Kt
)
kht , (3.44)
and the marginal product is G′(kht ) =
1
2
(
1 +
ket
Kt
)
. This functional form implies
that the entrepreneurial sector has positive production externality on the household
project. The quarterly discount factor is set at β = 0.99, corresponding to an
annual interest rate of 4%, while the relative impatience of capital goods producers
versus households is set at γ = 0.95, as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998) and
Kato (forthcoming). By convention, households have logarithmic preferences in
consumption (σ = 1) and in leisure (ψ = −1). We set χ = 1.95 so that households
work eight hours a day in the final goods production sector in the steady state,
lh = 1
3
. We set α′ = 0.001 and α = 0.36 so that capital goods producers always
have positive wealth to start the projects and the household wage income accounts
for 63.9% of aggregate output of final goods.
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Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998), we choose ρ = 0.95 for the auto-
correlation coefficient of TFP. Capital invested in the household project depreciates
at a quarterly rate of δ = 2.5% and capital invested in the entrepreneurs’ projects
that become successful depreciates at the rate of δ′ = 1.52%. As in Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1997), a quarterly rate of business failure at 1% implies pGe = p
G
c = 0.99.
Thus, the aggregate capital stock depreciates at the rate of δ = 2.5% in equilibrium.
By assumption, Rc =
1
pGc
= 1.01.
The expected profitability of the projects of capital goods producers is ξ = 1
γ
> 1
in the steady state so that they invest all own funds in their projects and borrow
to the limit. We set bc = 0.55 so that the leverage ratio is Ω
c = 2, implying that
capital goods producers finance half of their project investments using intra-period
loans, as in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999).
The surviving probability of the entrepreneurs with successful projects is set at
p˜i = 2
3
, implying that around 34% of entrepreneurs have to exit from the economy
each period, pi = pGe p˜i = 0.66. We set Re = 6.04 so that the expected marginal
product of the entrepreneurial project in terms of intermediate goods always exceeds
that of the household project, pGe Re > G
′(0). It guarantees that capital is allocated
to the entrepreneurial sector if their project choice is observable. Together with the
calibration of pi and Re, we set be = 0.78 to satisfy the following conditions in the
steady state: entrepreneurs hold half of the aggregate capital stock, k
e
K
= 0.5; the
leverage ratio, Ωe = 2, implies that entrepreneurs finance half of the their project
investments using external funds; the entrepreneurs with successful projects can
keep 60% of the project outcomes for themselves, R
b
e
(1−δ′)q+vRe = 40%.
3.4.2 Impulse Responses to Productivity Shocks
We log-linearize the equations describing the market equilibria of the four models
(DF , SFE, SFC, and RBC) around their respective steady states and adopt the
approach to the first-order approximations provided by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2004). The endogenous variables are represented as the linear functions of the state
variables. We analyze the impulse responses of endogenous variables with respect to
a transitory TFP shock in period 0, given that relevant models are in their steady
states before period 0. Subsections 3.4.2.1 and 3.4.2.2 discuss, respectively, how
financial frictions in the entrepreneurial sector and in the capital goods produc-
tion sector can change the dynamic responses of macroeconomic aggregates to TFP
shocks. Then, subsections 3.4.2.3 and 3.4.2.4 investigate the interactions between
time-varying prices of capital and dual financial frictions.
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3.4.2.1 Financial Frictions in the Capital Goods Production
Figure 3.2 shows the impulse responses of model RBC (dash line) and model SFC
(solid line) to a TFP shock, where EN , HH, and CGP denote households, en-
trepreneurs, and capital goods producers, respectively.
Consider model RBC. As capital is the only endogenous state variable in model
RBC, its dynamic structure is essentially ARMA(1, 1) and fails to generate the
hump-shaped output dynamics. A 1% TFP shock raises the aggregate demand for
labor and intermediate goods in period 0. On the one hand, the rise in the marginal
product of labor pushes up the household wage rate by 0.73% contemporaneously.
Given the autocorrelation in TFP, as households prefer to smooth consumption over
time and optimize between consumption and labor, they increase labor supply by
0.75%. Given that the aggregate supply of intermediate goods is determined by the
project investments of entrepreneurs made in period −1, aggregate output of final
goods rises by 1.48% in period 0. Meanwhile, the price of intermediate goods jumps
by 1.48% to clear the market.
Due to the autocorrelation in TFP, the marginal product of intermediate goods
stays above its steady state value in period 1, so does the price of intermediate
goods. It improves the expected external unit value of capital invested in the en-
trepreneurial projects in period 0, pGe R
b
e,0 = p
G
e E0[Rev1 + (1 − δ′)], by 0.05%. En-
trepreneurs can then raise more external funds and expand their project investments.
On the one hand, their excess demand for external funds pushes up the expected
rate of return on deposits by 0.046% contemporaneously and induces households to
raise their inter-period deposits by 0.12%; on the other hand, producers of capital
goods increase their investment expenditure by 4.62% to fully accommodate the
entrepreneurs’ extra demand for capital goods. In equilibrium, household consump-
tion rises by 0.4% in period 0 and producers of capital goods simply consume their
wage income. Essentially, the model dynamics are driven by the fact that house-
holds smooth consumption over time by saving in the form of capital goods, as in
the standard RBC model.
Consider model SFC. There are three endogenous state variables, {ket , dct , zet }
and the dynamic interactions between the price of capital and financial frictions in
the production of capital goods help generate the hump-shaped output responses
to productivity shocks. Similar as in model RBC, a 1% TFP shock leads to the
entrepreneurs’ excess demand for capital. As the production of capital goods is con-
strained by the aggregate net worth of capital goods producers, the entrepreneurs’
excess demand for capital cannot be fully accommodated and the price of capi-
tal goods rises by 0.63% in equilibrium. On the one hand, the project of capital
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goods producers becomes more profitable so that the credit multiplier rises; on the
other hand, the realized rate of return on deposits exceeds its expected value by the
amount of r˜0 − E−1r˜0 = pGe [(1−δ′)(q0−E−1q0)+Rc(v0−E−1v0)]q−1 > 0 so that the net worth of
capital goods producers5, nc0 = r˜0d
c
−1+w
c
0, rises by 0.65%. As a result, capital goods
producers can expand their project investments, ic0 = (1 + Γ
c
0)n
c
0, by 1.94%. Com-
pared with the rise in aggregate output of capital goods by 4.6% in model RBC, the
output of capital goods is much less price-elastic and more depressed due to credit
constraints. It then justifies the rise in the price of capital goods.
The rise in the ex post rate of return on deposits increases the return on house-
hold deposits r˜0d
h
−1 by 0.65%. The wealth effect induces households to increase
inter-period deposits and consumption by 0.64% and 0.96%, more than the 0.12%
and the 0.4% in model RBC, respectively. Although the wage rate rises by 0.99%,
households increase their labor supply only by 0.04%, because of the intratemporal
substitution between labor and consumption. Thus, aggregate output of final goods
rises by 1.03% in period 0, much less than the 1.48% in model RBC.
Given that the price of capital stays above its steady state value in period 1,
the projects are still more profitable for capital goods producers than in the steady
state. In order to expand their production in period 1, they reduce consumption by
nearly 20% and increase inter-period deposits by 3.5% in period 0. Excess deposits
of households and capital goods producers reduce the expected rate of return on
deposits by 0.4%. The net worth of capital goods producers increases by 3.1% in
period 1. As the price of capital is still above the steady state value by 0.19%
in period 1, the project profitability of capital goods producers is 0.4% above the
steady state value. They expand their investments by 3.49% and partially mitigates
the entrepreneurs’ excess demand for capital. As their aggregate net worth is still
insufficient in period 1, the constrained capital goods production justifies the fact
that the price of capital is around 0.19% above the steady state level in period 1.
Due to the financially-constrained production of capital goods, the aggregate
capital stock rises only by 0.05% in period 0, less than the 0.12% in model RBC;
so is aggregate output of intermediate goods in period 1. Meanwhile, the household
wage rate is 0.79% above the steady state value in period 1. As the deposit return
improves household wealth in period 1, households raise their consumption and labor
supply by 0.57% and 0.5%, respectively. As intermediate goods and labor are the
two inputs needed for the final goods production, aggregate output is around 1.28%
above the steady state value, still lower than the 1.43% in model RBC.
5As the wage income accounts for only 0.8% of the net worth of capital goods producers, the
change in their wage income has a negligible effect on their net worth.
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It takes two periods before capital goods producers can accumulate sufficient
net worth and accommodate the excess demand for capital. The price of capital
converges very close to the steady state value from period 2 on. The interaction
between the price of capital and the accumulation of the net worth of capital goods
producers in model SFC constitutes a dampened propagation mechanism through
which output peaks by 1.34% in period 2, later and smaller than in model RBC.
3.4.2.2 Financial Frictions in the Entrepreneurial Sector
Figure 3.3 shows the impulse responses of model SFE (solid line) and model RBC
(dash line). There are three endogenous state variables, {ket , kht , Rbe,t} in model SFE.
Different from the dampened propagation mechanism in model SFC, it is now the
reallocation of capital between entrepreneurs and households that generates the
amplified and hump-shaped output responses to TFP shocks. Given that capital
goods are one-to-one transformed from final goods in the aggregate, the price of
capital is constant at unity, qt = 1.
Consider model SFE. A 1% TFP shock in period 0 raises the aggregate demand
for intermediate goods and the price rises to clear the market. Extra sales revenues
improve per capita post-repayment wealth of entrepreneurs,
N e0 = pGe [be +Re(vt − E−1v0)] ke−1 > pGe beke−1 = E−1N e0 .
Entrepreneurial net worth rises by 0.42%, as ne0 − E−1ne0 = p˜i(N e0 − E−1N e0 ).
Meanwhile, given that the price of intermediate goods is 0.77% above the steady
state value in period 1, the expected external unit value of capital invested in the
projects of entrepreneurs in period 0, pGe R
b
e,0 = p
G
e E0[(1− δ′) +Rev1− be], is around
0.44% above the steady state value. Entrepreneurs then demand more loans, which
pushes up the loan rate by 0.033%. Thus, the entrepreneur’s unit down payment,
ue0 = 1− p
G
e R
b
e,0
r0
, falls by 0.39% below the steady state value in period 0. Altogether,
entrepreneurs increase their project investments, ke0 =
ne0
ue0
, by 0.81%.
The rise in the loan rate induces households to increase inter-period deposits
by 1.22% and to reduce their project investments by 0.33% in period 0. Extra sales
revenues of intermediate goods have the wealth effect on the household consumption
and leisure decision. Although the household wage rate rises by 0.92% in period 0,
they increase their labor supply only by 0.21%, much less than the 0.75% in model
RBC. As the aggregate supply of intermediate goods is predetermined, output of
final goods increases only by 1.13% in period 0, less than the 1.48% in model RBC.
Given that the price of intermediate goods stays above the steady state value
for six periods after the shock, the entrepreneur’s unit down payment of capital,
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uet = 1 − p
G
e [(1−δ′)+ReEtvt+1]
rt
, stays below the steady state value for five periods after
the shock, and entrepreneurs can invest more capital in their projects than in the
steady state. Meanwhile, entrepreneurial net worth is positively correlated with
their capital investment in the previous period, net = p˜ip
G
e bek
e
t−1, where t = 1, 2, 3, ....
Thus, their capital investments peak in period 5,
ket
ket−1
= p˜ip
G
e be
uet
. As intermediate
goods produced by the projects of entrepreneurs account for 87% of the aggregate
output, the dynamics of the aggregate supply of intermediate goods in the current
period follow the dynamics of the entrepreneurs’ capital investment in the previous
period. This justifies the fact that the aggregate supply of intermediate goods peaks
in period 6 and the price falls below the steady state value since period 7. Although
the household wage rate peaks in period 4, the household labor supply peaks in
period 3. As a result, aggregate output of final goods peaks in period 4 by 1.58%
above the steady state value, more than the maximum value of the output responses,
1.48%, in period 0 in model RBC.
Altogether, the accumulation of entrepreneurial net worth and the reallocation
of capital between agents with different production technologies constitute the am-
plified propagation mechanism. Aggregate output of final goods peaks in period 4
by 1.58% above the steady state value in model SFE, while aggregate output of
final goods peaks in period 2 by only 1.34% above the steady state value in the
model SFC. In this sense, model SFE dominates model SFC in generating more
amplified and delayed responses of aggregate output to TFP shocks.
3.4.2.3 Dual Financial Frictions: Model DF vs. Model SFE
Figure 3.4 shows the impulse responses of model DF (solid line) and model
SFE (dash-dot line). Both the demand and the supply of capital goods are
subject to financial constraints and there are six endogenous state variables,
{kht , ket , zet , Rbe,t, rt, dct} in modelDF . The dynamic interactions between time-varying
prices of capital and dual financial frictions in model DF reinforce the amplifica-
tion mechanism and preserve the propagation mechanism of model SFE shown in
subsection 3.4.2.2.
Consider model DF . A 1% TFP shock in period 0 pushes up the aggregate
demand for intermediate goods and the price rises to clear the market. Extra sales
revenues improve entrepreneurial net worth and they can make more leveraged in-
vestment. Due to the constrained production of capital goods, the excess demand of
entrepreneurs for capital pushes up the price of capital, q0 > E−1q0. Capital gains,
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absent in model SFE, further improves entrepreneurial net worth by,
ne0 − E−1ne0 = p˜ipGe [(1− δ′)(q0 − E−1q0) +Re(v0 − E−1v0)] ke−1,
which enables them to expand their leveraged investments to a larger extent. In
equilibrium, the price of capital rises by 0.43%. Entrepreneurial net worth rises
by 0.88% in period 0, much higher than the 0.42% in model SFE. Given that
the prices of capital and intermediate goods are above their steady state values in
period 1, the expected external unit value of capital in the entrepreneurial projects,
peGR
b
e,0 = p
e
GE0[(1−δ′)q1+Rev1−be], rises to a large magnitude than in model SFE.
Extra sales revenues and capital gains have the wealth effect on the optimiza-
tion decisions of households in period 0. They increase consumption and deposits
by 1.21% and 1.4%, larger than the 0.82% and the 1.22% in model SFE, respec-
tively. Meanwhile, the rise in the price of capital depresses the households’ capital
investment by 0.87%, more dramatically than the 0.33% in model SFE. Although
the household wage rate rises by 1.09% in period 0, due to the consumption-leisure
substitution, they reduce labor supply by 0.24%. Thus, aggregate output of final
goods rises by 0.85%, even less than the magnitude of the TFP shock.
As the rise in the price of capital improves the expected external unit value
of the project of capital goods producers, they can borrow more and expand their
investments in period 0. Given that the price of capital is 0.13% above the steady
state value in period 1, the project of capital goods producers is still more profitable
than in the steady state. As a result, capital goods producers reduce consumption
by 91% and raise their deposits by 10.4% in period 0 in order to have more net worth
and expand the project investments in period 1. The rise in inter-period deposits of
households and capital goods producers reduces the gross deposit rate by 0.27%.
Due to the rise in the price of capital and the expected external unit value of
capital and the fall in the deposit rate, the entrepreneur’s unit down payment of
capital, ue0 = q0− p
e
GR
b
e,0
rd0
, falls only by 0.04%, smaller than the 0.39% in model SFE.
Thus, they increase their capital investment by 0.91%, slightly more than the 0.81%
in model SFE. Altogether, due to the constrained capital goods production, the
excess demand for capital pushes up the price of capital and the resulting capital
gains speed up the reallocation of capital towards entrepreneurs in period 0.
Capital goods producers increase their inter-period deposits in period 0 so that
their net worth rises by 9.8% in period 1 and they can expand their project in-
vestments by 10%. It partially accommodates the entrepreneurs’ excess demand for
capital and the price of capital is only 0.13% above the steady state value. As the
price of capital is still 0.03% above the steady state value in period 2, the project of
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capital goods producers is still more profitable than in the steady state. Therefore,
they increase deposits by 11.4% and reduce consumption by 2.8% in period 1.
The deposit return improves household wealth in period 1. On the one hand,
household consumption is above the steady state value by 0.94%, more than the
0.85% in model SFE; on the other hand, the gross rate of return on inter-period
loans stays below the steady state value by 0.07% in period 1 and household deposits
stay above the steady state value by 1.08%, less than the 1.4% in model SFE. The
household wage rate is above the steady state value by 1.1% in period 1. The
consumption-leisure substitution induces households to increase labor supply by
0.33%, still lower than the 0.4% in model SFE.
In contrast to the full model of chapter 2,the price of capital converges toward
the steady state value much fast in model DF . From period 3 on, the price of capital
deviates from its steady state value by at most 0.01%. In this sense, the period-
0 price of capital is not much affected by future prices of capital and the initial
capital gains in period 0 have only limited effects on entrepreneurial net worth. As
a result, the pattern and magnitude of the capital stock held by entrepreneurs do
not differ much from those in model SFE from period 3 on. Aggregate output of
final goods peaks by 1.591% in period 4, slightly higher than the 1.578% in model
SFE. Here, we allow time-varying prices of capital in the case of the financially-
constrained capital goods production and we find a balance between amplification
and propagation.
3.4.2.4 Dual Financial Frictions: Model DF vs. Model SFC
This subsection shows that financial frictions in the entrepreneurial sector limit their
demand for capital so that the price of capital responds to shocks in a dampened
magnitude in model DF in comparison with model SFC. Figure 3.5 shows the
impulse responses of model DF (solid line) and model SFC (dash-dot line).
Consider model DF . A 1% TFP shock in period 0 raises the sales revenues of
entrepreneurs and improves their net worth. The excess demand of entrepreneurs
for capital goods pushes up the price of capital. The resulting capital gains further
improves entrepreneurial net worth. Thus, the price of capital rises by 0.43% in
period 0. However, as entrepreneurs are subject to credit constraints and cannot
raise sufficient external funds to fully exploit the project profitability, their demand
for capital is constrained in period 0, too. As a result, the price of capital responds
to shocks less than in model SFC. The smaller increase in the price of capital only
raises the expected external unit value of the investment of capital goods producers,
pGc R
b
c,0 = p
G
c (Rcq0 − bc), by 0.88%, less than the 1.29% in model SFC. Given the
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66 CHAPTER 3. DUAL FINANCIAL FRICTIONS
predetermined deposit return and net worth in period 0, capital goods producers
increase their project investments by 0.9%, less than the 1.94% in model SFC.
Anticipating the accumulation of entrepreneurial net worth and the resulting
dramatic increase in the demand of entrepreneurs for capital goods in period 1,
producers of capital goods increase their inter-period deposits in period 0 in order
to accumulate more net worth and expand their project investments in period 1.
The joint effects of the demand for and the supply of capital goods make the price
of capital stay above its steady state value by 0.13% in period 1, less than the 0.19%
in model SFC. Altogether, due to the constrained demand of entrepreneurs for
capital goods, the price of capital responds to shocks in a dampened fashion.
3.5 Final Remarks
This chapter introduces financial frictions on the demand and the supply of capital
goods in a dynamic general equilibrium model. The dynamic interactions between
dual financial frictions and time-varying prices of capital constitute a robust mecha-
nism through which aggregate output responds to productivity shocks in an ampli-
fied and hump-shaped fashion, in line with the empirical evidence in the literature.
We also address a methodological question: Is the widely adopted costly capital
adjustment a proper modeling approach to an upward-sloping capital supply curve?
As an inherent feature of this approach, the price of capital converges rather slowly
towards the steady state value after exogenous shocks. In the full model of chapter
2,the resulting capital gains reinforce capital reallocation among agents with different
production technologies. It enhances the amplification mechanism but weakens the
propagation mechanism discussed in our basic model (model SFE).
The production of capital goods is subject to financial frictions in the full model.
It captures the empirical feature that the supply of capital goods is relatively in-
elastic in the short run but is elastic in the medium run. The price of capital stays
away from the steady state for only a few periods after the shock. Capital gains are
rather limited so that we achieve a balance between amplification and propagation.
In this sense, we argue that the effects of capital gains can be exaggerated if
one adopts the approach of costly capital adjustment. Similar arguments also apply
to the assumption that durable assets, e.g., land, have a fixed stock and do not
depreciate.
Chapter 4
Domestic and Foreign Borrowing
in a Small Open Economy
4.1 Introduction
This chapter analyzes how better protection of foreign investors can affect produc-
tion efficiency, social welfare, and macroeconomic fluctuations in a small, open, real
economy. More specifically, it addresses two questions: Who benefits from better
protection of foreign investor in the long run? Are macroeconomic aggregates less
volatile in countries with better protection of foreign investors?
According to neoclassical models, the economic benefits of financial opening are
significant. Investors are able to share risk globally and capital can flow to the
countries with the highest productivity (Stulz 2005). In the past two decades, many
countries have deregulated financial markets and reduced explicit barriers to foreign
investors. In addition to financial regulations, the differences in the legal system
and market efficiency may affect the ex post repayment to foreign investors and
thus their ex ante lending behaviors. In countries with better protection of foreign
investors, domestic agents are able to borrow ex ante more abroad. In this sense,
institutional differences in the protections of foreign investors can affect the actual
financial openness. However, the increase in foreign borrowing might have uneven
welfare implications for domestic agents with different production technologies. This
issue cannot be addressed in the conventional representative agent models.
Theory predicts that financial opening should lower consumption volatility while
raising investment volatility, if most shocks are country-specific and transitory. How-
ever, the empirical literature cannot provide statistically significant evidence on
the relationship between financial openness and macroeconomic volatility (Razin
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and Rose 1994). Using a panel dataset for OECD countries for the past 40 years,
Buch, Doepke, and Pierdzioch (2005) find that the implications of financial open-
ness for business cycle volatility depend on the nature of the shocks and the link
between macroeconomic policy, financial openness, and business cycle volatility ac-
tually changes over time.
There is a huge literature concerning foreign borrowing and its macroeconomic
implications. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2003) investigate the dynamic
interactions between domestic and international collateral constraints and show that
limited financial development reduces the incentives for foreign lenders to enter
emerging markets. Aoki, Benigno, and Kiyotaki (2005) analyze the medium-run
adjustment process after capital account liberalization and show that the allocation
of domestic assets and production efficiency depends on the degree of capital account
liberalization. Alessandria and Qian (2005) examine the impact of foreign borrowing
on both welfare and the structure of lending contracts. The entry of foreign investors
to the domestic financial market may improve or worsen the efficiency of financial
intermediaries, leading to an improvement or worsening of the aggregate composition
of investment projects.
We address the two questions mentioned above in a real dynamic general equi-
librium model of a small open economy. In our basic setting, two types of domestic
agents, entrepreneurs and households, use durable assets, e.g., land, to produce do-
mestic goods. Entrepreneurs are more productive than households and households
lend to entrepreneurs via mutual funds. Due to the unobservable project choices,
the entrepreneurs are subject to credit constraints. Thus, some of the durable pro-
ductive assets are allocated to the less productive households. The degree of moral
hazard determines the severity of the credit constraints and the efficiency of domes-
tic production. Entrepreneurial net worth helps mitigate moral hazard and changes
in entrepreneurial net worth can amplify macroeconomic fluctuations. Foreign trade
is perfectly liberalized and the terms of trade are exogenously determined. Due to
financial regulation or very bad protection of foreign investors, domestic agents can-
not borrow abroad, although the foreign interest rate is lower than the domestic
interest rate. Therefore, foreign trade must balance each period.
Consider a positive transitory shock to total factor productivity or the terms of
trade. Extra sales revenues improve entrepreneurial net worth and the rise in the
entrepreneurs’ demand for assets pushes up asset prices. Capital gains improve their
net worth further and the spiral process continues. As a result, output and asset
prices respond to shock more strongly than in the setting without moral hazard.
In the full model, we introduce foreign investors. We assume that domestic
mutual funds can perfectly verify the output of domestic borrowers, while foreign
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investors cannot. Thus, domestic productive assets, e.g., land, must be pledged to
the foreign investors as collateral to mitigate the debt enforcement problem. In
comparison to domestic agents, the foreign investors are normally less familiar with
the domestic asset market, or they have the inferior liquidation technology, or the
domestic legal system is biased against them. Thus, foreign borrowing has to be
overcollateralized in the sense that domestic agents can pledge only a fraction of
the value of their assets to the foreign investors. We call this fraction the degree
of collateralization. Domestic financial regulations can also affect this degree to
some extent. The difference between the market value and the pledgeable value of
assets can be regarded as the premium the foreign investors have to pay when they
liquidate the assets handed over by the bankrupted borrowers.
In countries with better protection of foreign investors, domestic agents can
pledge their assets for more foreign funds. The demand for land is higher and so is the
land price in these countries. Households can pledge their assets only to the foreign
investors and deposit at the mutual funds, while entrepreneurs can pledge some
of their project revenues to the mutual funds as well as their assets to the foreign
investors. Thus, higher asset prices enable entrepreneurs to invest more assets into
their projects and thus domestic production is more efficient in countries with better
protection of foreign investors. However, this has uneven welfare implications for
domestic agents in the long run. Entrepreneurs own a larger share of the aggregate
asset stock and are wealthier in these countries. Suppose that the consumption
of domestic agents is proportional to their wealth. Thus, entrepreneurs have more
consumption in these countries and their welfare is higher. In contrast, households
own fewer productive assets and their deposits are lower due to the substitution
effect. Thus, households are less wealthy in these countries; their consumption and
welfare are lower. Whether the long-run social welfare is higher in these countries
depends on the weights the social planner assigns to households and entrepreneurs.
The fact that households lose and entrepreneurs benefit in the long run in countries
with better protection of foreign investors results mainly from the substitution effect,
given that the foreign interest rate is smaller than the domestic interest rate. This
assumption is justified in many small developing economies.
Better protection of foreign investors also has ambiguous implications for
macroeconomic volatility. We investigate the dynamics of the model with and with-
out domestic financial frictions to shocks to total factor productivity, to the terms
of trade, and to the foreign interest rate. The volatility of major macroeconomic
aggregates are non-monotonic (U-shaped) in the degree of collateralization for each
type of shocks. Thus, if we pool the empirical data of countries with different de-
grees of openness, we might not find a clear relationship between financial openness
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and macroeconomic volatility in a simple OLS regression, because the “underlying”
relationship is highly nonlinear. Furthermore, this U-shaped volatility patterns of
macroeconomic aggregates, e.g., output, consumption, labor, foreign trade, are flat-
ter in the model with domestic financial frictions than without. In other words, for
countries with domestic financial frictions, it is even more difficult to find a clear
relationship between financial openness and macroeconomic volatility from the em-
pirical data than for countries without domestic financial frictions. In this sense,
our model helps explain the empirical evidence provided by Buch, Doepke, and
Pierdzioch (2005) and domestic financial frictions may reinforce our arguments.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 lays out the ba-
sic model and domestic financial frictions arise from unobservable project choices
of the entrepreneurs. Asset reallocation between households and entrepreneurs ex-
plains the amplified responses of macroeconomic aggregates to exogenous shocks.
Section 4.3 introduces foreign investors and specifies the financial contracts between
foreign investors and domestic agents. We analyze the implications of changes in
the degree of collateralization for the long-run welfare of domestic agents and to
macroeconomic volatility. Section 4.4 summarizes the main findings. Appendix
collects some derivations.
4.2 The Basic Model
4.2.1 Overview
Consider a discreet-time, small, open, real economy. There is a domestic durable
asset (land) with a fixed supply, K. There are three perishable goods: a domestic
intermediate good, a domestic final good, and a foreign final good. There are two
types of domestic agents, households and entrepreneurs. The population of each
type is normalized to unity. Households and entrepreneurs have projects for the
production of domestic intermediate goods using land and it takes one period for
them to complete their projects. Domestic intermediate goods and labor are then
employed to produce domestic final goods contemporaneously. Domestic final goods
can be consumed, invested, or exported. Foreign trade is perfectly liberalized.
Domestic and foreign final goods are imperfect substitutes for the consumption
of domestic agents. We choose the consumption composite of domestic agents as the
numeraire. See subsection 4.2.2.1 for the definition of consumption composite. Let vt
and pt denote the prices of domestic intermediate and final goods, respectively. For
simplicity of notation, let st denote the inverse of the terms of trade, i.e., the relative
price of foreign final goods with respect to domestic final goods. The domestic
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economy is small enough that the terms of trade are exogenously determined abroad.
Thus, the domestic price of foreign final goods is ptst. Let qt and wt denote the land
price and the wage rate, respectively. A continuum of competitive domestic mutual
funds accept deposits and provide loans. A deposit contract is a claim on the
financial position of the mutual funds. Let the domestic interest rate, rt, denote the
expected rate of return on mutual funds. Foreign borrowing and lending are not
allowed in our basic model. Thus, foreign trade must balance each period.
Households are risk averse and infinitely lived. They have a safe production
project for intermediate goods. They have labor endowments each period and work
for the production of domestic final goods. At the end of the period, they invest
land in their projects, make deposits at the mutual funds, and consume the rest.
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral. As shown in subsection 4.2.2.2, they finance their
projects using own funds and loans from the mutual funds at the end of each period,
subject to credit constraints. Entrepreneurial net worth is defined as the amount of
own funds they invest in their projects. Debt repayment is contingent on project
outcomes. Entrepreneurs whose projects fail hand over their land stock to the mu-
tual funds and exit from the economy without consuming anything; entrepreneurs
whose projects succeed repay their liabilities to the mutual funds. Successful en-
trepreneurs have a constant probability of death. 5In equilibrium, entrepreneurs of
mass (1− pi) exit from the economy each period and new entrepreneurs of the same
mass are born with a tiny endowment, e, in terms of domestic final goods, keeping
the population size of entrepreneurs constant. Our calibration guarantees that the
expected rate of return on entrepreneurial net worth exceeds the domestic interest
rate around the steady state. Surviving and newly-born entrepreneurs put all own
funds into their projects and borrow to the limit. Entrepreneurs with successful
projects who die sell off their land stock, consume all proceeds.
There is no moral hazard in the financial sector. The mutual funds can perfectly
pool the idiosyncratic project risk of the entrepreneurs.Due to perfect competition,
the mutual funds transfer all proceeds to their depositors and make no profit.
Figure 4.1 summarizes the time sequence of events in equilibrium, where DIG,
DFG, and FFG denote domestic intermediate goods, domestic final goods, and for-
eign final goods, respectively. We focus on exogenous shocks to the production of
domestic final goods (TFP shocks) and to the terms of trade (ToT shocks). Note
that all exogenous shocks are realized at the beginning of every period.
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Figure 4.1: Time Sequence of Events
4.2.2 Efficiency Conditions
4.2.2.1 Households
Households have identical preferences over consumption and leisure. Their expected
utility function takes the following form,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
(cht )
1−σ
1− σ + χ
(1− lt)1+ψ
1 + ψ
]
, (4.1)
where Et is the expectation operator based on information available in period t.
β ∈ (0, 1) denotes the time discount factor and lt denotes the household labor
supply, as a fraction of their total time endowment. Households have composite
consumption,
cht ≡ (chD,t)γ(chF,t)1−γ (4.2)
where chD,t and c
h
F,t denote their consumption of domestic and foreign final goods,
respectively. See Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002). Given that kht−1 units of land
were invested in the household project at the end of period t − 1, G(kht−1) units of
domestic intermediate goods are produced at the beginning of period t. Household
sales revenues amount to vtG(k
h
t−1) and their wage income is wtlt. In addition, they
receive r˜tdt−1 from the mutual funds, where dt−1 is the household deposit made
at the end of period t − 1 and r˜t is the ex post rate of return on mutual funds
in period t. Due to the aggregate risk related to TFP shocks and ToT shocks, r˜t
could differ from its expected value, an issue discussed in subsection 4.2.2.3. By
definition, rt = Etr˜t+1. At the end of period t, households invest k
h
t units of land
in their projects, deposit dt at the mutual funds, and consume c
h
t . Accordingly, the
flow-budget constraint is,
qt(k
h
t − kht−1) + dt + cht = vtG(kht−1) + wtlt + r˜tdt−1,
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The optimization over {cht , chD,t, chF,t, lt, dt, kht } gives the equilibrium conditions,
ptc
h
D,t = γc
h
t , (4.3)
ptstc
h
F,t = (1− γ)cht , (4.4)
wt = χ(1− lt)ψ(cht )σ, (4.5)
1 = βrt
(
Etc
h
t+1
cht
)−σ
, (4.6)
qt = βEt
(
cht+1
cht
)−σ
[qt+1 + vt+1G
′(kht )]. (4.7)
Equations (4.2), (4.3), and (4.4) imply that the price of domestic final goods (foreign
final goods) is positively (negatively) related to the terms of trade. See appendix
C.1 for details. Recall that st denotes the inverse of the terms of trade.
pt = γ
γ
(
1− γ
st
)1−γ
, (4.8)
ptst = (γst)
γ(1− γ)1−γ. (4.9)
4.2.2.2 Entrepreneurs
Each entrepreneur can choose one of two projects: “Good” or “Bad”. The projects
have a Leontief technology, i.e., a units of domestic final goods are required for each
unit of land investment at the end of the period. At the beginning of the next
period, the project generates R units of domestic intermediate goods per unit of
land invested, if the project succeeds. Otherwise, there is no output. Land does
not depreciate, while the invested domestic final goods fully depreciate. Project
choices are irreversible and the mutual funds can perfectly verify project outcomes
at no costs. Entrepreneurs also enjoy safe, nonpecuniary private benefits during the
project process. For convenience of aggregation, we assume that private benefits are
proportional to land investment. The projects differ in the probability of success
and unit private benefits. See Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Projects with Idiosyncratic Risk
Project Good Bad
Probability of Success pG pB
Unit Private Benefits bG bB
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where 0 < pB < pG < 1 and bB > bG > 0 imply that project “Good” is safer than
projects “Bad”, but project “Bad” yields larger unit private benefits.
An entrepreneur1 i who stays in the economy to the next period has linear
preferences over consumption and private benefits. His expected utility function is,
E0
T˜∑
t=0
βt
[
cei,t + Bkei,t−1
]
, (4.10)
where T˜ is the stochastic time of death and B ∈ {bG, bB} denotes private benefits
per unit of the land invested in project “Good” or project “Bad”. cei,t denotes his
composite consumption in period t and kei,t−1 denotes his land investment at the end
of period t− 1. Our calibration guarantees that only project “Good” has a positive
expected net present value around the steady state,
Et(p
GRvt+1 + qt+1) + b
G
rt
− (qt + apt) > 0 > Et(p
BRvt+1 + qt+1) + b
B
rt
− (qt + apt).
Therefore, project “Bad” should not be financed in equilibrium. Project “Good”
also has a larger expected marginal return than the household project.
At the end of period t, entrepreneur i invest kei,t units of land and ak
e
i,t units
of domestic final goods into either project “Good” or project “Bad”, using his own
funds, ni,t, and loans from the mutual funds, z
e,m
i,t , i.e., (qt + apt)k
e
i,t = ni,t + z
e,m
i,t .
Thus, ni,t is the entrepreneur’s net worth in the project. The loan contract specifies
a promise to repay Rmt k
e
i,t units of the consumption composite in period t+ 1 if the
project succeeds. If the project fails, the entrepreneur hands over his land stock
to the mutual funds. There is no debt enforcement problem between entrepreneurs
and mutual funds, i.e., entrepreneurs always repay their liabilities if they are able
to do so. In order to motivate entrepreneur i to choose project “Good”, the mutual
funds must provide him with enough incentives,[
pGEt(Rvt+1 + qt+1 −Rmt ) + bG
]
kei,t ≥
[
pBEt(Rvt+1 + qt+1 −Rmt ) + bB
]
kei,t.
The left (right) hand side denotes the expected utility of the entrepreneur if he
chooses project “Good” (“Bad”). As he prefers to borrow to the limit, the incentive
constraint is binding around the steady state and is simplified to,
Rmt = Et(Rvt+1 + qt+1)− b˜, where b˜ ≡
bB − bG
pG − pB > 0. (4.11)
1Entrepreneurs differ in the end-of-period wealth and are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].
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Each unit of the land invested in project “Good” has an expected value of
Et(p
GRvt+1+qt+1) in period t. Any promise to repay more than R
m
t k
e
i,t in the case of
success is not credible, because the entrepreneur would choose project “Bad” in the
first place. Thus, the entrepreneur can only pledge pGRmt + (1− pG)Etqt+1 per unit
of land invested to the mutual funds in period t. We define Et(p
GRvt+1 + qt+1) and
pGRmt +(1−pG)Etqt+1 as the expected full unit value and the expected external unit
value of the land invested in project “Good”, respectively. The difference between
the two values, pGb˜, is used to motivate the entrepreneur to choose project “Good”
despite the lower private benefits it promises, bG < bB.
The mutual funds are expected to break even in their lending to the entrepreneur
in period t, rtz
e,m
i,t = [p
GRmt + (1− pG)Etqt+1]kei,t. This implies a credit constraint,
ze,mi,t = Γtni,t, where Γt ≡
pG(REtvt+1 − b˜) + Etqt+1
(qt + apt)rt − [pG(REtvt+1 − b˜) + Etqt+1]
. (4.12)
Γt is the credit multiplier. Our calibration guarantees (qt+apt)rt > p
G(REtvt+1−b˜)+
Etqt+1 around the steady state and so Γt > 0. As Γt is independent of ni,t, loans are
proportional to the entrepreneur’s net worth. Note that the credit multiplier varies
with qt, pt, rt, Etqt+1, and Etvt+1. Ceteris paribus, a rise in the current prices of
land or domestic final goods, qt or pt, makes the project investment more expensive;
similarly, a rise in the domestic interest rate, rt, makes loans more expensive for
entrepreneurs. In both cases, the credit multiplier Γt falls so that the entrepreneur
can get fewer loans and less land is allocated to the entrepreneurial sector. Ceteris
paribus, a rise in the expected prices of land or domestic intermediate goods in
period t + 1, Etqt+1 or Etvt+1, improves the expected external unit value of the
land invested in their projects, pGRmt . Thus, the credit multiplier is larger and
entrepreneurs can expand their land investment.
In equilibrium, entrepreneurs of mass (1−pG) have failed projects and exit from
the economy. Entrepreneurs whose projects succeed have a constant probability p˜i of
surviving. In the aggregate, entrepreneurs of mass pG(1− p˜i) have successful projects
and exit from the economy, and entrepreneurs of mass pGp˜i have successful projects
and live on to the next period. New entrepreneurs of mass (1 − pi) are born. We
assume pi = pGp˜i to keep the population size of entrepreneurs constant.
At the end of period t, entrepreneur i maximizes his expected utility (4.10),
subject to his period budget constraints and credit constraints,
(qt + apt)k
e
i,t − ze,mi,t = ni,t, where ni,t ≡ Ni,t − cei,t, (4.13)
ze,mi,t = Γtni,t (4.14)
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where Ni,t denotes his end-of-period wealth. Entrepreneurs differ in their end-of-
period wealth, an issue discussed in appendix C.2. Due to the linear nature of the
project technologies and the preferences of entrepreneurs, the loan and the project
investment of entrepreneur i are proportional to his net worth. In this sense, only
the first moment of the distribution of entrepreneurial net worth matters for the
aggregate land stock in the entrepreneurial sector. See appendix C.2. Let lower-
case letters without the index i denote per capita variables of the entrepreneurial
sector. Per capita consumption cet , net worth nt, loans z
e,m
t , and land holding k
e
t are,
cet = (1− p˜i)pG[Rvt + qt −Rmt−1]ket−1, (4.15)
nt = p˜ip
G[Rvt + qt −Rmt−1]ket−1 + (1− pi)pte, (4.16)
ze,mt = Γtnt =
pG(REtvt+1 − b˜) + Etqt+1
(qt + apt)rt − [pG(REtvt+1 − b˜) + Etqt+1]
nt, (4.17)
ket =
nt + z
e,m
t
qt + apt
. (4.18)
Per capita consumption of domestic and foreign final goods of entrepreneurs are
ceD,t =
γcet
pt
, (4.19)
ceF,t =
(1− γ)cet
ptst
. (4.20)
We introduce three auxiliary variables. The first is the leverage ratio, defined
as the ratio of total investment over the entrepreneur’s net worth, Ωt ≡ (qt+apt)k
e
i,t
ni,t
=
1+Γt. The second is the entrepreneur’s unit down payment, defined as the amount
of own funds the entrepreneur pays for each unit of land and the required investment
of domestic final goods, uet ≡ (qt+apt)−
ze,mi,t
kei,t
= qt+apt
Ωt
. The third is the expected prof-
itability of the entrepreneurs’ project, defined as the expected gross rate of return
on the entrepreneur’s net worth, ξt ≡ p
GEt[Rvt+1+qt+1−Rmt ]kei,t
ni,t
= p
Gb˜
uet
. Our calibration
guarantees that the expected profitability of entrepreneurs’ project exceeds the do-
mestic interest rate around the steady state, ξt > rt. Thus, entrepreneurs postpone
consumption and borrow to the limit.
4.2.2.3 Mutual Funds
Mutual funds accept deposits from households and make loans to entrepreneurs in
equilibrium. The loan contract described in subsection 4.2.2.2 implicitly provides
entrepreneurs with a net unit return, with a positive expected value, pGb˜ > 0, in
period t− 1. The net unit return to the successful entrepreneurs in period t is
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Rvt + qt −Rmt−1 = b˜+R(vt − Et−1vt) + (qt − Et−1qt).
In equilibrium, the prices of land and domestic intermediate goods are positively
correlated to exogenous TFP or ToT shocks, as shown in subsection 4.2.5. As long
as exogenous shocks are larger than some negative threshold values, the ex post
value of the project outcomes of successful entrepreneurs is larger than the promised
repayment, (Rvt+qt)k
e
t−1 > R
m
t−1k
e
t−1. Then, the successful entrepreneurs repay their
liabilities, Rmt−1k
e
t−1, to the mutual funds. Let K
e
t−1 and Zt−1 denote the aggregate
land stock held by entrepreneurs and the aggregate lending to entrepreneurs at the
end of period t − 1, respectively. The aggregate expected break-even condition of
the financial sector is rt−1Zt−1 = [pGRmt−1+(1−pG)Et−1qt]Ket−1. At the beginning of
period t, entrepreneurs of mass pG have successful projects and their total repayment
is pGRmt−1K
e
t−1; entrepreneurs of mass (1 − pG) have failed projects and hand over
their land stock with the market value of (1 − pG)qtKet−1 to the mutual funds. In
this sense, the positive expected net return to entrepreneurs, pGb˜Ket−1, helps absorb
aggregate risk partially. The ex post rate of return on mutual funds is
r˜t =
[pGRmt−1 + (1− pG)qt]Ket−1
Zt−1
= rt−1
[
1 +
(1− pG)(qt − Et−1qt)
pG(REt−1vt − b˜) + Et−1qt
]
. (4.21)
which differs from its expected value due to capital gains or capital losses on the land
stock of failed entrepreneurs. For the TFP or ToT shocks below these thresholds, the
prices of land and intermediate goods are so low that the ex post values of the project
outcomes of successful entrepreneurs are less than their liabilities, (Rvt + qt)k
e
t−1 <
Rmt−1k
e
t−1. Thus, even the successful entrepreneurs have to announce bankruptcy
and transfer all the project outcomes to the mutual funds. As a consequence, if
aggregate shocks are unbounded, the ex post rate of return on mutual funds as a
function of aggregate shocks could have a kink at the point where Rvt + qt = R
m
t−1.
The first-order approximations used below to analyze the model dynamics re-
quires that the endogenous variables should be continuous and differentiable func-
tions of the state variables. For the purpose of the approximations, we assume that
the aggregate shocks are distributed with mean zero and negative lower bounds
guaranteeing that the successful entrepreneurs are always able to repay their debts.
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4.2.2.4 Domestic Final Goods Production and Foreign Trade
Domestic final goods are produced from domestic intermediate goods and labor,
Yt = AtM
α
t L
(1−α)
t , (4.22)
logAt = ρ
a logAt−1 + at , (4.23)
whereMt and Lt denote aggregate inputs of domestic intermediate goods and labor;
total factor productivity, At, is an AR(1) in logarithms with the autocorrelation
coefficient ρa ∈ (0, 1). The TFP shock, at , has mean zero, Etat+1 = 0, and is
distributed above a lower bound, (−τa,∞), where τa > 0 is small enough that
successful entrepreneurs are always able to repay their liabilities. Domestic final
goods are produced efficiently and the inputs are priced by their marginal products,
vtMt = αptYt, (4.24)
wtLt = (1− α)ptYt. (4.25)
Let Xt and It denote the exports in terms of domestic final goods and the
imports in terms of foreign final goods in period t, respectively. As foreign borrowing
or lending is not allowed, foreign trade must balance each period,
stIt = Xt, (4.26)
log
1
st
= ρs log
1
st−1
+ st , (4.27)
where the terms of trade, 1
st
, is an AR(1) in logarithms with the autocorrelation
coefficient ρs ∈ (0, 1). The ToT shock, st , has mean zero, Etst+1 = 0, and is
distributed above a lower bound, (−τ s,∞), where τ s > 0 is small enough that
successful entrepreneurs are always able to repay. ToT shocks can be interpreted as
changes in the foreign demand for domestic final goods, i.e., preference shocks.
Assumption 4.1. lims→∞Et(r−st+sqt+s) = 0.
Assumption 4.1 helps rule out exploding bubbles and the economy converges
to its steady state along a locally unique equilibrium path after it is hit by small
shocks.
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4.2.2.5 Market Equilibrium
The markets of domestic intermediate goods, domestic final goods, foreign final
goods, land, labor, and domestic lending clear each period,
Mt = G(k
h
t−1) + p
GRket−1, (4.28)
Yt + (1− pi)e = chD,t + ceD,t + aket +Xt, (4.29)
It = c
h
F,t + c
e
F,t, (4.30)
K = kht + k
e
t , (4.31)
Lt = lt, (4.32)
ze,mt = dt. (4.33)
Definition 4.1. Market equilibrium is a set of allocations of households, {kht , lt, cht ,
chD,t, c
h
F,t}, and entrepreneurs, {ket , nt, ze,mt , cet , ceD,t, ceF,t}, together with the aggregate
variables {Mt, Yt, It, Xt} given a set of prices {vt, pt, qt, wt, rt, Rmt } and the exogenous
process {At, st} satisfying equations (4.2)- (4.7), (4.11), (4.15)-(4.20), (4.22)-(4.31).
4.2.3 Calibration
The household project takes the following form,
G(kht ) =
K
1 + λ
[
1−
(
1− k
h
t
K
)1+λ]
, (4.34)
and the marginal product, G′(kht ) = K
(
1− kht
K
)λ
, is decreasing in the household
land holding, where λ = 8. The quarterly discount factor is set at β = 0.98,
corresponding to an annual interest rate of 8%. By convention, we set σ = 2 and
ψ = −5. We set χ = 0.15 so as to keep l = 1
3
in the steady state, i.e., households
work eight hours a day in the production of domestic final goods. We set α = 0.36 so
that the household wage income accounts for 64% of aggregate output of domestic
final goods. By convention, we set the autocorrelation coefficient of total factor
productivity at ρa = 0.9. For simplicity, we set γ = 0.5 and s = 1 in the steady
state so that the price of domestic final goods is p = 0.5 and domestic agents consume
the equal amounts of domestic and foreign final goods. Following Devereux, Lane,
and Xu (forthcoming), we set the autocorrelation coefficient of the terms of trade
at ρs = 0.77.
The surviving probability of the entrepreneurs with successful projects is set at
p˜i = 2
3
, implying that around 34% of entrepreneurs have to exit from the economy
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each period, pi = pGp˜i = 0.66. {R = 3084, b˜ = 1.75,  = 326, a = 2.61} are calibrated
jointly to satisfy the following conditions in the steady state: the aggregate land
stock is unity, K = 1; the land price is q = 1; entrepreneurs hold half of the
aggregate land stock, k
e
K
= 0.5; the leverage ratio, Ω = 2, implies that entrepreneurs
finance half of the their project investments using loans, as in Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999). In the steady state, the successful entrepreneurs keep 60% of
the project outcomes for themselves, R
m
Rv+q
= 40%. We normalize e = 0.
4.2.4 The Degree of Moral Hazard and the Frictionless
Model
Let model MH denote the model with moral hazard. The degree of moral hazard
can be measured by the entrepreneurs’ expected unit return on land, pGb˜. In the first
half of this subsection, we assume away aggregate risk and study how the degree of
moral hazard can affect the steady state values of macroeconomic aggregates. Let
Υ = p
Gb˜
pGRv+q
denote the entrepreneurs’ expected share of the project outcomes in
the steady state. Let Ψh ≡ q+vG′(kh)
q
and Ψe ≡ q+pGRv
q+ap
denote, respectively, the
expected marginal returns on the projects of households and entrepreneurs in the
steady state. Take our calibration of b˜ = 1.75 as the baseline value. Ceteris paribus,
figure 4.2 shows the steady state values of relevant variables with respect to various
degrees of moral hazard, ∆pGb˜. The horizontal axis denotes ∆ ∈ [0.01, 1.15]. EN
and HH denote entrepreneur and household, respectively.
The moral hazard problem becomes less severe, as ∆ decreases from unity to
zero. The pledgeable value per unit of the land invested in the projects that be-
come successful, Rm, rises. Entrepreneurs can ex ante acquire more loans from the
mutual funds and expand their project investments. Given the fixed aggregate land
stock, the rise in the entrepreneurs’ demand for land pushes up the land price, which
further raises Rm. As the land investment becomes more expensive for households,
they reduce their project investment and increase deposits at the mutual funds. In
contrast, it is the unit down payment, ue, that matters for the project investment of
entrepreneurs. The fall in the degree of moral hazard increases the leverage ratio and
reduces the unit down payment of entrepreneurs. As a result, entrepreneurs expand
their land investment. As project “Good” of entrepreneurs has a larger expected
marginal rate of return than the household project, Ψe > Ψh, more domestic in-
termediate goods are produced. Given that domestic intermediate goods and labor
are two imperfect substitutes for the production of domestic final goods, the price
of domestic intermediate goods falls and the wage rate rises. Aggregate output
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Figure 4.2: The Steady State Effect of Moral Hazard
of domestic final goods rises. As the moral hazard problem becomes less severe, a
smaller share of the project outcomes is required to motivate entrepreneurs to choose
project “Good” and the successful entrepreneurs have less post-repayment wealth.
The consumption and net worth of entrepreneurs are proportional to their post re-
payment wealth. The investment in terms of domestic final goods ake required in
project “Good” of entrepreneurs rises proportionally to the land investment of en-
trepreneurs. Altogether, household consumption ch = p(Y −ake)−ce rises, given the
constant price of domestic final goods. Due to the consumption-leisure substitution,
households reduce their labor supply.
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) assume that the human capital of entrepreneurs
is essential for the project outcomes and is inalienable. Thus, entrepreneurs can
always renegotiate their liabilities ex post to the value of physical assets. As a
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result, the total liabilities of entrepreneurs are then limited by the expected value
of their physical assets in the due period. In contrast, it is unobservable project
choice of the entrepreneurs that gives rise to financial frictions in our model and
entrepreneurs always repay if they are able to do so. Thus, entrepreneurs repay
more in the case of project success than in the case of project failure, Rm > q. In
this sense, the moral hazard problem in our model is less severe than in models with
collateral constraints. We will revisit this issue in subsection 4.3.1.
Note that if ∆→ 0 or the project choice of entrepreneurs is perfectly observable
at the time of contracting, entrepreneurs can credibly choose project “Good” and
pledge all of the project outcomes for loans. Therefore, they do not have to put
down own funds in the project, nt = 0. As the expected marginal return on project
“Good” is higher than that on the household project, all land is allocated into the
entrepreneurs’ projects, ke = K, and domestic intermediate goods are produced
only by entrepreneurs, M = pGRK. In period t, the entrepreneurs who invest in
project “Good” in period t − 1 enjoy the private benefits, bGke, and transfer all
the project outcomes to the mutual funds. Newcomers consume the endowment,
cet = (1− pi)pte. The entrepreneurs who stay in the economy to period t + 1 invest
ke units of land using loans from the mutual funds, i.e., ze,mt = (qt + apt)k
e.
In the case of aggregate risk related to TFP or ToT shocks, the ex post rate
of return on mutual funds is different in the models with and without financial
frictions. As shown in subsection 4.2.2.3, the entrepreneurs’ expected stake in the
project outcomes, pGb˜ket > 0, absorbs part of aggregate risk in the model with
financial frictions. Without moral hazard, no incentive is required for entrepreneurs
to engage in project “Good”. The mutual funds can only diversify the idiosyncratic
project risk of entrepreneurs but not aggregate risk. Given that the mutual funds do
not accumulate reserves, depositors have to bear all aggregate risk. In both cases,
the ex post rate of return on mutual funds is contingent on the aggregate shocks.
Consider the model without moral hazard. Households put dt−1 units of con-
sumption composites at the mutual funds at the end of period t − 1 for the claim
on the financial position of the mutual funds in period t. The mutual funds use
deposits to finance the project investment of entrepreneurs, ze,mt−1 = (qt−1+ apt−1)k
e.
After the project completion in period t, the mutual funds collect all the project
outcomes, [pGRvt+qt]k
e, and transfer them to depositors. The ex post rate of return
on mutual funds is
r˜t =
(pGRvt + qt)k
e
dt−1
= rt−1
[
1 +
pGR(vt − Et−1vt) + (qt − Et−1qt)
pGREt−1vt + Et−1qt
]
. (4.35)
Thus, depositors have to bear the risk of unexpected changes in the prices of domestic
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intermediate goods and land.
Aggregate input for and output of the production of domestic intermediate
goods are proportional to the aggregate land stock, aK andM = pGRK. In essence,
the model without moral hazard is equivalent to a standard RBC model with a
representative agent who has two production technologies: the linear technology
to produce intermediate goods employing land K and domestic final goods aK,
and the Cobb-Douglas technology to produce domestic final goods using domestic
intermediate goodsM and labor Lt. In this sense, aggregate output of domestic final
goods, Yt = AtM
αL
(1−α)
t , depends on the aggregate labor supply and total factor
productivity. Let model RBC denote the model without moral hazard. Appendix
C.3 shows the equations describing the market equilibrium of model RBC.
4.2.5 Dynamic Analysis
We log-linearize the equations describing the market equilibria of model MH and
model RBC around their respective steady states. The endogenous variables are
approximated to the first order as the linear functions of the state variables, which we
solve using the MATLAB codes provided by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004). We
analyze the impulse responses of endogenous variables with respect to a transitory
TFP shock and a transitory ToT shock in period 0, respectively, given that models
are in the steady state before period 0.
4.2.5.1 Impulse Responses to Transitory TFP Shocks
Figure 4.3 shows the impulse responses of model MH (solid line) and model RBC
(dashed line) to a transitory TFP shock in period 0. For simplicity, we set the
inverse of the terms of trade constant at st = 1. Thus, the prices of domestic and
foreign final goods are constant at pt = ptst = 0.5.
Consider model RBC first. As there is no endogenous state variable in model
RBC, the dynamic structure is essentially AR(1). The distinction between house-
holds and entrepreneurs does not matter substantially for economic allocation. A
1% positive TFP shock raises the marginal products of domestic intermediate goods
and labor in period 0. The price of domestic intermediate goods rises by 0.73%
to clear the market, given that aggregate output of domestic intermediate goods
is fixed at M = pGRK. Meanwhile, the wage rate rises by 1.15%. In addition,
given the autocorrelation in TFP, the marginal product of domestic intermediate
goods stays above its steady state value in period 1 and so does the price of do-
mestic intermediate goods. It improves the expected unit value of the land invested
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Figure 4.3: Impulse Responses to a TFP Shock: Model MH vs Model RBC
in the entrepreneurs’ projects in period 0, E0(p
GRv1 + q1), and entrepreneurs are
able to demand more loans and expand their project investment. Given the fixed
aggregate land stock, the price of land rises by 2.84% to clear the market. Thus,
the positive responses of the prices of land and domestic intermediate goods to the
TFP shock in period 0 improves the ex post rate of return on mutual funds. See
equation (4.35). Thus, the positive TFP shock improves household wealth in period
0. As households prefer to smooth consumption over time and optimize between
consumption and labor, they reduce labor supply by 0.42% in period 0 and increase
their deposits at the mutual funds by 2.52%. The decline in household labor supply
partially offset the rise in TFP and thus aggregate output of domestic final goods
rises only by 0.73%. The rise in the deposits reduces the expected rate of return on
mutual funds by 0.21%.
As the amount of domestic final goods invested in the projects of entrepreneurs
4.2. THE BASIC MODEL 85
is fixe at aK, the domestic final goods used for exports and consumption amount
to Yt − aK. Given γ = 0.5 and pt = ptst = 0.5, households consume equal amounts
of domestic and foreign final goods, chF,t = It = Xt = 0.5(Yt − ak) = chD,t. Thus,
household consumption rises by 1.05% in period 0 and so do imports and exports.
Consider now model MH. There are two endogenous state variables, {ket , Rmt },
in model MH. A 1% positive TFP shock raises the marginal products of domes-
tic intermediate goods and labor in period 0. Given that the aggregate supply of
domestic intermediate goods has been predetermined by the project investments of
households and entrepreneurs at the end of period −1, M0 = pGRk−1 + G(kh−1),
the price of domestic intermediate goods rises by 0.99% in equilibrium to clear the
market. Extra sales revenues improve the post-repayment wealth of entrepreneurs,
N0 − E−1N0 = pG[R(v0 − E−1v0) + (q0 − E−1q0)]ke−1. (4.36)
The rise in entrepreneurial net worth enables entrepreneurs to borrow more from
the mutual funds and expand their project investment. Given the fixed aggregate
land stock, the rise in their demand for land pushes up the land price in period
0. The capital gains further improves their net worth, as shown in equation (4.36).
Altogether, the land price rises by 2.32%. Benefiting from the positive responses
of the prices of both domestic intermediate goods and land, entrepreneurial net
worth rises by 2.41%. Meanwhile, given that the period-1 land price is above the
steady state value by 3.46%, Rm0 rises by 2.47%. Thus, the entrepreneurs’ unit
down payment rises only by 0.85%, less than the rise in the period-0 land price.
Altogether, the land holding of entrepreneurs, ke0 =
n0
ue0
, rises by 1.56%.
As entrepreneurs bear most of the aggregate risk related to TFP shocks in model
MH, the ex post return on mutual funds exceeds its expected value by a smaller
amount than in model RBC; compare equations (4.21) and (4.35). In addition to
extra ex post return on deposits, the capital gains and extra sales revenues improve
household wealth by the amount of (q0 − E−1q0)kh−1 + (v0 − E−1v0)G(kh−1) > 0 in
period 0. Due to the rise in the entrepreneurs’ demand for loans, the domestic
interest rate rises by 1.32% and it induces households to increase their deposits by
2.72% and reduce their land holding in period 0. Due to the consumption-leisure
substitution, households raise their consumption by 0.53% and reduce labor supply
by 0.02%, less dramatically than in model RBC. Thus, aggregate output of domestic
final goods rises by 0.99%, more than the 0.73% in model RBC. Note that the
distinction between entrepreneurs and households matters for aggregate output in
modelMH. The capital gains on the entrepreneurs’ land stock which are transferred
to households in model RBC are now enjoyed by entrepreneurs. Thus, household
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wealth increases in a smaller magnitude in model MH than in model RBC. The
wealth effect explains the dynamics of household labor supply and aggregate output.
Given that entrepreneurs produce more than 98% of domestic intermediate
goods in the steady state, the dynamics of aggregate output of domestic intermedi-
ate goods approximately follow the dynamics of the land holding of entrepreneurs
with a one-period lag. Thus, aggregate output of domestic intermediate goods rises
by 1.52% in period 1. So, the price of domestic intermediate goods falls below the
steady state value by 0.28%, and meanwhile, the wage rate rises by 1.57%. As the
deposits made in period 0 improve household wealth significantly in period 1, the
wealth effects induce households to increase their period-1 consumption by 1.19%,
larger than in period 0. They also increase period-1 deposits by 3.87% for the con-
sumption smoothing. The rise in the supply of deposits reduces the domestic interest
rate by 0.31%. In the meantime, households reduce labor supply by 0.33% due to
the consumption-leisure substitution. Altogether, aggregate output of domestic fi-
nal goods rises by 1.24% above its steady state value in period 1, much more than
the 0.73% in period 0 in model RBC. The hump-shaped patterns of consumption,
labor, and aggregate output are common in models with financial frictions.
Given that the prices of land and domestic intermediate goods are 3% above
and 0.14% below their respective steady state values in period 2, Rm1 is 2.34% above
the steady state value. As entrepreneurial net worth is proportional to their land
holding in the previous period from period 1 on, nt = p˜ip
Gb˜ket−1, where t = 1, 2, 3, ...,
their period-1 net worth is 1.56% above the steady state value. Since the wealth
of both households and entrepreneurs gets improved in period 1, the rise in their
demand for land further pushes up the land price by 3.46% in period 1. Altogether,
the entrepreneurs’ unit down payment rises by 0.35%. Thus, their period-1 land
holding is 1.22% above the steady state value, less than the 1.56% in period 0.
As loan contracts specify a non-contingent liabilities for successful entrepreneurs,
entrepreneurs bear unexpected price changes. Thus, the reallocation of land be-
tween households and entrepreneurs is further enhanced. It constitutes a mechanism
through which the effects of a transitory TFP shock are amplified.
4.2.5.2 Impulse Responses to Transitory ToT Shocks
Figure 4.4 shows the impulse responses of model MH (solid line) and model RBC
(dashed line) to a transitory ToT shock in period 0. For simplicity, we set total
factor productivity constant at At = 1.
Consider model RBC. A 1% negative ToT shock raises the relative price of
foreign final goods with respect to domestic final goods in period 0. According to
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Figure 4.4: Impulse Responses to a ToT Shock: Model MH vs Model RBC
equations (4.8) and (4.9), the price of domestic final goods falls by 0.5% and the
price of foreign final goods rises by 0.5% in period 0. The fall in the price of domestic
final goods reduces the marginal products of labor and domestic intermediate goods.
Therefore, the wage rate and the price of domestic intermediate goods fall by 0.54%
and 0.43%, respectively. In this sense, a negative ToT shock has similar effect as a
negative TFP shock. Due to the decline in the value of all the project outcomes, the
ex post rate of return on mutual funds falls below its expected value and so does
the household wealth. As a result, households increase their labor supply by 0.11%
and reduce their composite consumption and deposits by 0.4% and 0.75% in period
0. The increase in household labor supply pushes up aggregate output of domestic
final goods by 0.07%. The fall in household deposits raises the domestic interest
rate by 0.18%. With less loans available for the project investment, entrepreneurs
reduce their demand for land. In equilibrium, the land price falls by 0.78%.
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The fall in the price of domestic final goods induces households to raise their
consumption of domestic final goods by 0.1% and the rise in the price of foreign
final goods induces households to reduce their consumption of foreign final goods
by 0.9%. Thus, imports fall by 0.9%. As foreign trade must balance, X0 = s0I0,
exports rises by 0.1%.
Consider model MH. A 1% negative ToT shock reduces the price of domestic
final goods and raises the price of foreign final goods. As entrepreneurs bear most
of the aggregate uncertainty using their net worth, the ex post rate of return on
mutual funds does not fall as much as in model RBC; compare equations (4.21)
and (4.35). Thus, despite the fall in the wage rate by 0.51% in period 0, households
increase their labor supply only by 0.02%, much less than the 0.11% in model RBC.
Thus, aggregate output of domestic final goods rises only by 0.013%.
The fall in the price of domestic intermediate goods reduces the sales revenues of
entrepreneurs. Due to the decline in entrepreneurial net worth, entrepreneurs cannot
borrow as much as before and have to reduce their land holding. The fall in the
demand for land leads to the fall in the land price. This capital loss further reduces
entrepreneurial net worth. In equilibrium, the net worth and the land holding of
entrepreneurs fall by 0.89% and 0.37%, respectively. Due to the fall in the demand
of entrepreneurs for loans, the domestic interest rate falls by 0.28%.
The fall in household wealth forces households to reduce their consumption
by 0.28%. Entrepreneur consumption and entrepreneurial net worth are both pro-
portional to their post-repayment wealth. Given that household consumption is
around 6 times as much as entrepreneur consumption in the steady state, im-
ports, I0 =
(1−γ)(ch0+ce0)
p0s0
, fall by 0.86%. As foreign trade must balance each period,
s0I0 = X0, exports rise by 0.14%.
Due to the fall in the entrepreneurs’ period-0 land stock, aggregate output of
domestic intermediate goods falls by 0.36% in period 1. As the land price is still
below the steady state value in period 1, household wealth is below its steady state
value. Thus, households reduce their consumption and deposits by 0.42% and 1.13%,
respectively. The fall in the supply of deposits pushes up the domestic interest rate
by 0.24%. Due to the consumption-leisure substitution, households raise their labor
supply by 0.11%. Altogether, aggregate output of domestic final goods falls by
0.058% in period 1, in contrast to the rise by 0.055% in model RBC.
From period 1 on, the consumption and the net worth of entrepreneurs are
proportional to their land holding in the previous period, cet = (1 − p˜i)pGb˜ket−1 and
nt = p˜ip
Gb˜ket−1, where t = 1, 2, 3, .... Thus, the consumption and net worth of
entrepreneurs are both below their respective steady state values by 0.37% in period
1. Aggregate demand for foreign final goods falls by 0.79% and so do imports. Due
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to autocorrelation in the terms of trade, the inverse of the period-1 terms of trade, s1,
is above its steady state value by 0.77%. Thus, the balanced foreign trade requires
that exports, X1 = s1I1, be below the steady state value by 0.02%.
The distinction between households and entrepreneurs matters for business
volatility. A deterioration in the terms of trade (a rise in st) reduces the price
of domestic final goods. As domestic loans are written in terms of the domestic con-
sumption composite, the fall in the price of domestic final goods essentially raises the
liabilities of entrepreneurs to the mutual funds. Thus, entrepreneurs with successful
projects have to pay even more in terms of domestic intermediate goods. Therefore,
entrepreneurs bear the aggregate risk related to ToT shocks via domestic loan con-
tracts. In comparison with the case of a transitory TFP shock, the asset reallocation
in the case of a transitory ToT shock actually results from debt deflation.
4.3 The Full Model
The economy described by the basic model in section 4.2 is actually under interna-
tional financial autarky. This section considers the case where the economy opens
up to foreign investors.
4.3.1 Financial Frictions on Foreign Borrowing
A continuum of risk-neutral foreign investors supply funds in terms of foreign final
goods inelastically at the expected rate of return, r∗t . Let the foreign interest rate
denote the expected rate of return on foreign funds. The domestic economy is small
enough that the foreign interest rate is exogenously determined abroad. The foreign
interest rate is an AR(1) in logarithms,
log r∗t = (1− ρ∗) log r¯∗ + ρ∗ log r∗t−1 + ∗t , (4.37)
where ρ∗ denotes the autocorrelation coefficient of the foreign interest rate and the r¯∗
denotes the non-stochastic steady state value of the foreign interest rate. Following
Devereux, Lane, and Xu (forthcoming), we set ρ∗ = 0.46. The shock to the foreign
interest rate (FIR shock), ∗t , has mean zero, Et
∗
t+1 = 0, and is distributed within an
interval, (−τ ∗, τ ∗), where τ ∗ > 0 is small enough that successful entrepreneurs are
always able to repay their liabilities and r∗t always exceeds unity. In the meantime,
the foreign interest rate is always smaller than the domestic interest rate around the
steady state, r∗t < rt.
A unit of foreign final goods borrowed abroad has the domestic value of ptst
and its required repayment is expected to be r∗tEtpt+1st+1 in terms of the domestic
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consumption composite. For convenience of notation, let
rft =
r∗tEt(pt+1st+1)
ptst
, (4.38)
denote the effective foreign interest rate in terms of the domestic consumption com-
posite, which, according to our calibration, is smaller than the domestic interest rate
around the steady state, rft <
1
β
.
The mutual funds have the exclusive technology to perfectly verify the ex post
project outcomes of entrepreneurs and they can liquidate at no discount the land
handed over by the entrepreneurs whose projects failed. The foreign investors do not
have the required verification technology. Therefore, entrepreneurs cannot credibly
commit any project output against a loan from foreign investors. However, they
can use part of their land stock as collateral for foreign borrowing. We assume that
the foreign investors are less familiar with the domestic land market than domestic
mutual funds, or have the inferior liquidation technology for collateral handed over
by the entrepreneurs with failed projects, or the domestic legal system is biased
against the foreign investors. Either way, foreign borrowing is overcollateralized in
the sense that each unit of land has an expected domestic value of Etqt+1 in period
t and entrepreneurs can only pledge θEtqt+1 to the foreign investors for
Etθqt+1
r∗tEtpt+1st+1
units of foreign final goods, where θ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the degree of collateralization
and r∗tEtpt+1st+1 denotes the foreign interest rate adjusted by the expected price of
foreign final goods at the time of repayment, i.e., period t+1. (1−θ) can be regarded
as a premium the foreign investors have to pay to the domestic land buyers when
they liquidate the land handed over by failed entrepreneurs ex post.2 For simplicity,
we assume that θ is constant. Our basic model in section 4.2 can be regarded as a
special case of the full model with θ = 0.
The mutual funds do not have any physical assets pledgable to foreign investors
as collateral. Thus, the foreign investors do not make deposits directly at the mutual
funds. By the same logic, the households cannot use their deposit certificates as
collateral for foreign funds.
4.3.1.1 Foreign and Domestic Borrowing of Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs can pledge their land stock to the foreign investors and their collateral
constraints are
r∗t z
e,∗
t Et(pt+1st+1) ≤ θEtqt+1ket , (4.39)
2This premium may change along the business cycle and so does θ. See Iacoviello and Minetti
(forthcoming) for a detailed discussion.
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where ze,∗t denotes the land-backed foreign borrowing of entrepreneurs. As the ef-
fective foreign interest rate specified in equation (4.38) is smaller than the domestic
interest rate around the steady state, entrepreneurs borrow first from the foreign
investors to the limit and then borrow from the mutual funds. Thus, the collateral
constraints are binding in equilibrium. As entrepreneurs and the foreign investors
are both risk neutral, the financial contract is a contract sharing aggregate risk be-
tween them. The ex post repayment to foreign investors in period t + 1 is θqt+1k
e
t
and thus, the ex post rate of return to foreign investors is
re,∗t+1 = r
∗
t
[
qt+1Et(pt+1st+1)
pt+1st+1Etqt+1
]
, (4.40)
which differs from its expected value r∗t due to unexpected changes in the prices of
land and foreign final goods. For the project investment of each unit of land and a
units of domestic final goods, entrepreneurs can borrow
ze,mt
ket
units of domestic funds
in terms of the domestic consumption composite and
ze,∗t
ket
units of foreign funds in
terms of foreign final goods. Thus, entrepreneurs have to use own funds to fill in
the gap between total investment and external funds. Their unit down payment is
uet = (qt + apt)−
ze,mt
ket
− ptstz
e,∗
t
ket
. (4.41)
Given that the entrepreneurs have pledged the fraction θ of their land stock
to the foreign investors, the financial contract between the entrepreneurs and the
mutual funds in period t specifies a fixed repayment of
Rmt = Et[Rvt+1 + (1− θ)qt+1]− b˜, (4.42)
if the projects succeed in period t + 1; if the projects fail, the entrepreneurs first
hand over θket units of land to foreign investors and transfer the remaining (1− θ)ket
to the mutual funds. The expected break-even condition of the mutual funds in
period t is
rtz
e,m
t = [p
GRmt + (1− pG)(1− θ)Etqt+1]ket . (4.43)
The ex post rate of return on mutual funds in period t+ 1 is
r˜t+1 = rt
{
1 +
(1− pG)(1− θ)(qt+1 − Etqt+1)
Et[pG(Rvt+1 − b˜) + (1− θ)qt+1]
}
, (4.44)
which differs from its expected value rt due to unexpected changes in the land
price. In other words, the mutual funds have to bear capital gains or losses of the
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land handed over by the failed entrepreneurs ex post. According to our calibration,
1− pG = 0.01 and thus, the ex post return on mutual funds and household deposits
does not differ much from its expected value. Furthermore, as the foreign investors
also bear a fraction of capital gains or losses, the difference between the ex post
rate of return on deposits and its expected value is decreasing in the degree of
collateralization.
Per capita consumption cet , net worth nt, and the land holding k
e
t of the en-
trepreneurs are as follows,
cet = (1− p˜i)pG[Rvt + (1− θ)qt −Rmt−1]ket−1, (4.45)
nt = p˜ip
G[Rvt + (1− θ)qt −Rmt−1]ket−1 + (1− pi)pte, (4.46)
uetk
e
t = nt, (4.47)
4.3.1.2 Foreign Borrowing of Households
As the effective foreign interest rate is smaller than the domestic interest rate around
the steady state, households borrow abroad and deposit at the mutual funds to take
advantage of the interest rate differentials. Thus, households pledge their land stock
to foreign investors and their collateral constraints are
r∗t z
h,∗
t Etpt+1st+1 ≤ θEtqt+1kht , (4.48)
where zh,∗t denotes the land-backed foreign borrowing of households. For each unit of
land invested in their projects, households can acquire θEtqt+1
r∗tEt(pt+1st+1)
units of foreign
funds in terms of foreign final goods in period t. We define the household unit down
payment as the amount of own funds they pay for each unit of land,
uht = qt −
θEtqt+1
rft
. (4.49)
The household expected marginal rate of return on land is Et[(1−θ)qt+1+vt+1G′(kht )].
Households optimize between their project investment and deposits,
uht =
Et[(1− θ)qt+1 + vt+1G′(kht )]
rt
. (4.50)
As households are risk averse and foreign investors are risk neutral, the financial con-
tract between them provides households with perfect insurance against unexpected
changes in the land price. Suppose that households invest kht units of land in their
project and pledge the fraction θ of the land stock to the foreign investors in period
t. The ex post returns to households and the foreign investors are (1 − θ)Etqt+1kht
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and qt+1k
h
t − (1− θ)Etqt+1kht in period t+1. Thus, the ex post rate of return to the
foreign investors in period t+ 1 is
rh,∗t+1 = r
∗
t
[
Et(pt+1st+1)
pt+1st+1
] [
1 +
qt+1 − Etqt+1
θEtqt+1
]
, (4.51)
which differs from its expected value r∗t due to the unexpected changes in the prices
of land and foreign final goods. Household period-by-period budget constraints are,
uht k
h
t + c
h
t + dt = (1− θ)Et−1qtkht−1 + vtG′(kht−1) + r˜tdt−1 + wtlt. (4.52)
4.3.2 Balance of Payment
The aggregate collateral constraints of the domestic economy are
r∗tZ
∗
tEt(pt+1st+1) = θEtqt+1K, (4.53)
where Z∗t = z
h,∗
t +z
e,∗
t denote the aggregate foreign borrowing in terms of foreign final
goods. Foreign funds are overcollateralized by the aggregate land stock. Thus, the
aggregate foreign borrowing in the current period depends on the current foreign
interest rate and the expected prices of land and foreign final goods in the next
period. The interest payment of foreign borrowing is covered by the trade surplus,
NXt + Z
∗
t = r
h,∗
t z
h,∗
t−1 + r
e,∗
t z
e,∗
t−1, (4.54)
NXt =
Xt
st
− It, (4.55)
where NXt denotes net exports in terms of foreign final goods. As we rule out
exploding bubbles in the land price, the foreign borrowing backed by the domestic
land is sustainable. In this sense, the domestic economy, as a whole, is solvent and
does not run into the problem of Ponzi games.
4.3.3 Market Equilibrium
Definition 4.2. Market equilibrium in the model with domestic and foreign finan-
cial frictions is a set of allocations of households, {kht , lt, zh,∗t , cht , chD,t, chF,t}, and en-
trepreneurs, {ket , nt, ze,mt , ze,∗t , cet , ceD,t, ceF,t}, together with aggregate variables {Mt, Yt,
It, Xt, NXt, Z
∗
t } given a set of prices {vt, pt, qt, wt, rt, r˜t, rh,∗t , re,∗t , uht , uet , Rmt } and
the exogenous processes {At, st, r∗t } satisfying equations (4.2)- (4.6), (4.19)-(4.20),
(4.22)-(4.25), (4.27)-(4.31), (4.37), (4.39)-(4.51), (4.53)-(4.55),
Model MH in section 4.2 is a special case of θ = 0 here. For consistency, we
still call our full model model MH.
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4.3.4 The Benchmark: Foreign Financial Frictions Only
This chapter focuses on the macroeconomic implications of domestic financial fric-
tions. Thus, the benchmark model is defined as the model with foreign financial
frictions only: project choices of the entrepreneurs are perfectly observable to the
mutual funds but foreign borrowing must be backed by land. As model RBC dis-
cussed in subsection 4.2.4, all land is allocated to entrepreneurs, ket = K; domestic
final goods are produced by entrepreneurs only, Mt = p
GRK. In fact, model RBC
in subsection 4.2.4 is a special case (θ = 0) of the benchmark model here. For
consistency, we still call the benchmark model model RBC. As the foreign interest
rate is smaller than the domestic interest rate, entrepreneurs first borrow abroad to
the limit and then pledge the rest of their project outcomes to the mutual funds.
Entrepreneurs use domestic and foreign borrowing to finance all of their project in-
vestment; they do not have to provide own funds. Appendix C.3 shows the equations
describing the market equilibrium in the benchmark model.
4.3.5 Long-Run Effects of Foreign Financial Frictions
This subsection analyzes how the degree of collateralization can affect macroeco-
nomic aggregates, production efficiency, and social welfare in the long run. To this
end, we assume away aggregate uncertainty. Figure 4.5 shows the steady state values
of endogenous variables of model MH with respect to θ, in the cases of r∗ = 1.01
(solid line) and r∗ = 1.0025 (dashed line), corresponding to the annual interest rates
of 4% and 1%, respectively. The horizontal axis denotes θ ∈ [0, 1].
Consider first the case of r∗ = 1.01. The domestic interest rate, r = 1
β
, is
unaffected by θ. In comparison with the case of θ = 0, households and entrepreneurs
now can borrow cheap foreign funds and expand their project investment. The
rise in their demand for land pushes up the land price. As show in subsection
4.2.2.2, households can only pledge a fraction of the value of their land stock for
foreign funds, while entrepreneurs can pledge not only their land stock to foreign
investors but also some revenues of their projects to the mutual funds. Thus, the land
holding of entrepreneurs rises in θ and so does their consumption, ce = (1− p˜i)N =
(1− p˜i)pGb˜ke. The welfare of entrepreneurs, defined as the discounted sum of their
consumption and private benefits, is linear in their land stock. Thus, entrepreneurs
benefit strictly from borrowing abroad. The rise in the land stock of entrepreneurs
increases aggregate output of domestic intermediate goods.
As foreign funds are cheaper than domestic loans, entrepreneurs borrow first
from foreign investors to the limit. Due to the substitution effect, the domestic
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Figure 4.5: Long-Run Effects of the Degree of Collateralization to Model MH
lending to entrepreneurs falls in θ and so does the deposit return to households.
Household wealth consists of their net land holding (1 − θ)qkh, deposit return, rd,
sales revenues, vG(kh), and wage income, wl, as shown in equation (4.52). The first
three components fall in θ. As a result, households increase their labor supply to
partially offset the fall in their wealth. The rise in the supply of household labor
reduces the wage rate. Altogether, household wealth and consumption fall in θ; so
does household welfare defined as the discounted sum of their period utility from
consumption and leisure.
Thus, entrepreneurs benefit strictly and households lose strictly from land-
backed foreign borrowing. Whether or not cheap foreign funds improve the long-run
social welfare depends on the relative weights the social planner puts on households
and entrepreneurs. Due to the rise in domestic intermediate goods and labor, ag-
gregate output of domestic final goods rises in the degree of collateralization and
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so does the efficiency of domestic production. However, aggregate output is not a
good indicator for social welfare in our model with heterogenous agents. At a first
glance, household consumption falls by 0.004 while entrepreneurs’ consumption rises
by 0.0005 as θ rises from 0 to 0.5. It seems that cheap foreign funds reduce social
welfare in the long run. Our preliminary investigation shows that, due to the wealth
effect, households benefit strictly during the transition from international financial
autarky to financial opening. Thus, cheap foreign funds may improve social welfare
in the short run.
Consider now the case of r∗ = 1.0025. As foreign funds are cheaper than in the
case of r∗ = 1.01, the demand of domestic agents for land is more enhanced given
the same degree of land-backed foreign borrowing. As a result, the land price rises
more dramatically than in the case of r∗ = 1.01.
Figure 4.6 shows the steady state values of endogenous variables of model RBC
with respect to the degree of collateralization, given r∗ = 1.01 (solid line) and
r∗ = 1.0025 (dashed line). The horizontal axis denotes θ ∈ [0, 1].
Consider first the case of r∗ = 1.01. As θ rises from 0 to 1, entrepreneurs can
borrow more abroad and the substitution effect reduces the deposit returns to house-
holds. As discussed above in model MH, households increase labor supply in order
to partially offset the fall in their wealth. Household consumption falls in the long
run and so does their welfare. Meanwhile, entrepreneurs only consume their tiny en-
dowment and their welfare depends mainly on private benefits from running project
“Good”, bGK, which is independent of the degree of collateralization. Altogether,
social welfare falls strictly in θ in the long run. Thus, in the case of a positive inter-
est rate differential between domestic and foreign funds, foreign borrowing reduces
the long-run social welfare of the domestic economy strictly in model RBC.
In the case of r∗ = 1.0025, changes in θ result in the similar patterns of macroe-
conomic aggregates in model RBC as in model MH. We exclude explosive bubble
in the land price in subsection 4.2.2.4 and foreign borrowing is backed by the ag-
gregate land stock. Thus, although the value of aggregate foreign borrowing may
exceed aggregate output of domestic final goods in the domestic economy, e.g., in
the case of θ = 1, the domestic economy is still solvent and use the trade surplus to
pay the interest on foreign borrowing.
Note that changes in the degree of collateralization have rather tiny effects on
macroeconomic aggregates, compared to changes in the degree of moral hazard in
subsection 4.2.4. It results from the fact that changes in the degree of collateral-
ization (θ) affect only the average cost of external funds for entrepreneurs but not
the moral hazard problem between mutual funds and entrepreneurs in the domestic
economy. The incentive for entrepreneurs to invest a unit land in project “Good” is
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Figure 4.6: Long-Run Effects of the Degree of Collateralization to Model RBC
independent of the degree of collateralization and constant at pGb˜ by expectation.
As a result, the entrepreneurs’ total capacity of external financing does not change
much in θ and so is their land holding. In other words, changes in θ only result in
substitution between domestic and foreign lending to entrepreneurs.
Iacoviello and Minetti (forthcoming) explain the comovement of output across
countries in a model with domestic and foreign borrowing similar as in our model. In
their model, only entrepreneurs borrow from abroad in equilibrium, while households
do not. We can also exclude households from borrowing abroad by assuming other
information frictions. If so, the household unit down payment of land is simply
qt instead of u
h
t = qt − θEtqt+1rft in the case of the positive foreign borrowing of
households. As a result, a rise in θ makes the overall cost of external funds cheaper
for entrepreneurs only and their excess demand for land pushes up the land price.
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As land is more expensive for households, the household land holding declines more
strongly than in the case of the positive foreign borrowing of households. While, the
qualitative results in this subsection do not change. As we prefer to keep the model
simple and do not introduce more restrictions on households, we allow households
to borrow abroad for analytical completeness.
4.3.6 Dynamic Analysis
This subsection analyzes how the degree of collateralization can affect macroeco-
nomic volatility via foreign borrowing in the domestic economy. As in subsection
4.2.5, we log-linearize the equations describing the market equilibria of relevant mod-
els around their respective steady states and use the first-order approximations. In
comparison with subsection 4.2.5, we analyze the model dynamics with respect to
transitory TFP and ToT shocks in the case of θ ∈ (0, 1] in subsections 4.3.6.1 and
4.3.6.2, respectively. As foreign borrowing is not allowed in the economy described in
section 4.2, changes in the foreign interest rate do not affect the domestic economy.
In the case of θ ∈ (0, 1], changes in the foreign interest rate can affect the domestic
economy via foreign borrowing. We analyze the model dynamics with respect to
transitory FIR shocks in the case of θ ∈ (0, 1] in subsection 4.3.6.3.
4.3.6.1 Impulse Responses to Transitory TFP Shocks
As specified in equation (4.23), total factor productivity, At, is an AR(1) in loga-
rithms. Figure 4.7 shows the impulse responses of model RBC in the case of θ = 0.5
(solid line) and in the case of θ = 0 (dashed line) to a transitory TFP shock. For
simplicity, we set the foreign interest rate and the inverse of the terms of trade con-
stant at r∗t = 1.01 and st = 1. Thus, the prices of domestic and foreign final goods
are constant at pt = ptst = 0.5. The impulse responses of model RBC in the case
of θ = 0 have been discussed in subsection 4.2.5.1.
Consider model RBC in the case of θ = 0.5. As there is no endogenous state
variable in model RBC for θ ∈ [0, 1], the dynamic structure is essentially AR(1, 1).
A 1% positive TFP shock pushes up the prices of domestic intermediate goods and
land in period 0. Meanwhile, the wage rate rises by 1.09%. Due to autocorrelation in
TFP, the marginal product of domestic intermediate goods is above its steady state
value in period 1 and so does the price of domestic intermediate goods. The expected
unit value of entrepreneurs’ projects, E0(p
GRv1 + q1), rises and entrepreneurs can
demand more external funds from domestic and foreign lenders. As the aggregate
land stock is fixed, the price of land rises by 1.57% to clear the market in period
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Figure 4.7: Impulse Responses to a TFP shock: Model RBC
0, much less than the 2.84% in the case of θ = 0. This can be understood as
follows. Household wealth consists of their deposit return and wage income. In the
case of θ = 0.5, entrepreneurs and foreign investors jointly share capital gains or
capital losses related to aggregate risk, according to the financial contract specified
in subsection 4.3.1.1. Due to the leakage of capital gains to the foreign investors, the
entrepreneurs’ ex post repayment to the mutual funds, pGRv0+(1−θ)q0, exceed the
expected value by a smaller amount in the case of θ = 0.5 than in the case of θ = 0,
so does the ex post rate of return on household deposits. See equation (4.44). Due
to the wealth effect, households raise their deposits and consumption only by 1.46%
and 0.82% in the case of θ = 0.5, less than the 2.52% and the 1.05% in the case
of θ = 0. The weaker rise in the supply of deposits reduces the domestic interest
rate by 0.16% in period 0 and the land price rises in a smaller magnitude than in
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the case of θ = 0. The land price in period 1 is expected to be above its steady
state value by 1.42% and so is the aggregate foreign borrowing, Z∗0 =
θE0q1K
r∗ , in
period 0. As foreign investors benefit from capital gains, net exports rise by 17.3%
in period 0. See equation (C.19). Given that imports follow the pattern of household
consumption, exports rise by 1.59%. See equation (C.17).
Due to the wealth effect, households reduce their labor supply only by 0.24%,
less than the 0.42% in the case of θ = 0. Given fixed aggregate supply of domestic
intermediate goods, aggregate output of domestic final goods rises by 0.85%, larger
than the 0.73% in the case of θ = 0.5.
Schmitt-Grohe (2005) use first-order approximations and show that the uncondi-
tional standard deviations of endogenous variables are proportional to the standard
deviations of exogenous shocks. Figure 4.8 shows the unconditional standard devi-
ations of some endogenous variables in model MH (solid line) and in model RBC
(dashed line) normalized by the standard deviation of TFP shocks. The horizontal
axis denotes θ ∈ [0, 1].
As the degree of collateralization rises from 0 to 0.8, the foreign investors bear
more and more capital gains (losses) in the case of positive (negative) TFP shocks.
Thus, the difference between the ex post repayment of entrepreneurs to the mutual
funds and its expected value becomes smaller. Due to the wealth effect, house-
hold consumption and labor supply respond to TFP shocks in a smaller magnitude.
As a result, imports respond less while aggregate output of domestic final goods
responds more to TFP shocks. Meanwhile, the weaker responses of household de-
posits to TFP shocks result in the weaker responses of the domestic interest rate
and the land price, and so does the foreign borrowing. Aggregate output of do-
mestic final goods are either consumed by households, or invested in the projects
of entrepreneurs, or exported. Given that investment of domestic final goods in the
projects of entrepreneurs is constant, aK, the rise in the volatility of aggregate out-
put of domestic final goods and the fall in the volatility of household consumption
jointly imply that exports respond more to TFP shocks. As shown in figure 4.6,
the rise in θ leads to the decline in the domestic lending due to the substitution of
foreign borrowing. Thus, the share of household deposits in household wealth falls
in θ, too. As long as θ is below 0.8, the wealth effects still dominate. However, if
θ exceeds 0.8, household deposits account for a less significant share of household
wealth. Thus, the wealth effects related to deposit returns have less impacts on
household consumption and labor decision. As a result, the rise in the degree of
collateralization can have opposite effects on some macroeconomic aggregate.
Consider model MH now. Figure 4.9 shows the impulse responses of model
MH in the case of θ = 0.5 (solid line) and in the case of θ = 0 (dashed line) to
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Figure 4.8: Foreign Borrowing and Macroeconomic Volatility: TFP shocks
a transitory TFP shock, given θ = 0.5. For simplicity, we set the foreign interest
rate and the inverse of the terms of trade constant at r∗t = 1.01 and st = 1. Thus,
the prices of domestic and foreign final goods are constant at pt = ptst = 0.5.
The impulse responses of model MH in the case of θ = 0 have been discussed in
subsection 4.2.5.1.
Consider model MH in the case of θ = 0.5. Domestic agents pledge half of
the expected value of their land stock to the foreign investors. Additionally, en-
trepreneurs can pledge part of the expected value of their output for domestic loans
from the mutual funds. A 1% positive TFP shock leads to the rise in the wage
rate and the price of domestic intermediate goods in period 0. Extra sales revenues
improve entrepreneurial net worth and entrepreneurs are able to demand more exter-
nal funds and land. The entrepreneurs’ excess demand for land pushes up the land
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price. According to the financial contracts specified in subsection 4.3.1.1, foreign
investors and entrepreneurs share the capital gains on the entrepreneurs’ land stock
on a pro rata basis. Thus, capital gains improve entrepreneurial net worth further
and enhance the entrepreneurs’ demand for land and loans. In all, the land price
rises by 1.74%, less than the 2.32% in the case of θ = 0, due to the leakage of the
capital gains to the foreign investors. Meanwhile, the entrepreneurs’ excess demand
for the domestic loans from the mutual funds pushes up the domestic interest rate
by 0.9%, less than the 1.32% in the case of θ = 0.
According to the financial contracts between households and foreign investors
specified in subsection 4.3.1.2, the foreign investors take all of the capital gains on
the land stock of households. Household unit down payment for land rises by 1.41%,
larger than the rise in the entrepreneurs’ unit down payment by 0.43%. Thus, the
entrepreneurs’ land stock rises by 1.27%.
According to equation (4.52), household wealth consists of the value of their
net land stock, sales revenues, deposit returns, and wage income. The first compo-
nent is unaffected by TFP shocks. The second and the third components exceed
their expected values in period 0, due to the ex post rise in the price of domestic
intermediate goods and the rate of return on deposits. The rise in the domestic
interest rate induces households to increase their deposits by 1.82%. However, as
the rise in the domestic interest rate is smaller than in the case of θ = 0, the rise
in household deposits is also smaller. The wealth effects and the weaker rise in the
domestic interest rate induce households to increase consumption by 0.65%, larger
than the 0.53% in the case of θ = 0. Due to the consumption-leisure substitution,
households reduce labor supply by 0.11%, larger than the 0.023% in the case of
θ = 0. Thus, aggregate output of domestic final goods rises by 0.93% in period 0,
less than the 0.99% in the case of θ = 0. According to equation (4.53), the responses
of the aggregate foreign borrowing has a one-period lead to those of the land price.
As in the case of θ = 0, the responses of entrepreneurial net worth has a one-
period lag to those of the land stock of entrepreneurs from period 1 on. Thus,
the period-1 entrepreneurial net worth is above its steady state value by 1.27%.
The return on household deposits improve household wealth in period 1. As both
households and entrepreneurs increase their demand for land, the land price is above
its steady state value by 2.07%. Given that the entrepreneurs’ unit down payment
is still above its steady state value by 0.18%, the entrepreneurs’ land stock is above
its steady state value by 1.08%. Meanwhile, households increase their period-1
consumption by 1.1%, less than the 1.19% in the case of θ = 0. Note that the rise
in the degree of collateralization enhances the responses of household consumption
and labor in the shock period but weakens their responses in the following periods.
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Let us look at how the degree of collateralization can affect macroeconomic
volatility to TFP shocks via foreign borrowing in model MH. See figure 4.8. Due
to the leakage of capital gains (losses) to the foreign investors, the entrepreneurs’
demand for land and loans responds less to TFP shocks as θ rises from 0 to 1.
It has three effects. First, the land price becomes less volatile and so does the
aggregate foreign borrowing; second, aggregate output of domestic intermediate
goods responds less to TFP shocks; third, the domestic interest rate also responds
less to TFP shocks in the shock period. Thus, household consumption responds more
in the shock period but less in the following periods. The overall effects of θ on the
volatility of household consumption can be non-monotonic. Similarly, due to the
consumption-leisure substitution, household labor supply responds more strongly to
TFP shocks in the shock period and less in the following periods. The volatility of
household labor supply is also non-monotonic in the degree of collateralization. As
a result, aggregate output of domestic final goods becomes less volatile and so does
the wage rate.
4.3.6.2 Impulse Responses to Transitory ToT Shocks
As specified in equation (4.27), the terms of trade, 1
st
, is an AR(1) in logarithms.
Figure 4.10 shows the impulse responses of model RBC in the case of θ = 0.5 (solid
line) and in the case of θ = 0 (dashed line) to a transitory ToT shock. For simplicity,
we set the foreign interest rate and total factor productivity constant at r∗t = 1.01
and At = 1. The impulse responses of model RBC in the case of θ = 0 have been
discussed in subsection 4.2.5.2.
Consider model RBC in the case of θ = 0.5. As in the case of θ = 0, a 1% nega-
tive ToT shock leads to the fall in the price of domestic final goods by 0.5% and the
rise in the price of foreign final goods by 0.5%. On the one hand, the wage rate and
the price of domestic intermediate goods fall by 0.50% and 0.51%, respectively; on
the other hand, the effective foreign interest rate falls by 0.12%, according to equa-
tion (4.38), which is absent in the case of θ = 0. Thus, entrepreneurs can get cheaper
foreign funds. Despite of the fall in the entrepreneurs’ land-backed foreign borrow-
ing by 0.4%, the effective foreign borrowing in terms of the domestic consumption
composite, p0s0Z
∗
0 , actually rises by 0.1%. Meanwhile, the domestic lending falls
by 0.19% and the required investment of domestic final goods in the entrepreneurs’
project, aptK, falls by 0.5%. In all, the land price, qt =
ze,m0 +p0s0Z
∗
0
K
− ap0, falls only
by 0.01%, much less than the 0.78% in the case of θ = 0. Intuitively, in the case
of a negative ToT shock, the foreign investors not only share the capital losses but
also provide cheaper funds in terms of the domestic consumption composite. The
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Figure 4.10: Impulse Responses to a ToT shock: Model RBC
two factors weaken the fall in the land price.
Household wealth consists of their deposit returns and the wage income. Due to
the fall in the prices of land and domestic intermediate goods, the period-0 return
on household deposits is below its expected value. Thus, households reduce their
consumption by 0.24% and thus, the period-0 imports, I0 =
(1−γ)ch0
p0s0
, falls by 0.74%.
Due to the consumption-leisure substitution, household labor supply falls by 0.01%
and thus, aggregate output of domestic final goods falls by 0.007%. Although the
domestic value of the ex post repayment of foreign liabilities, θq0K, falls only by
0.01%, its value in terms of foreign final goods falls by 0.51%. Thus, according to
the balance of payment specified in equations (C.19) and (C.17), trade surplus falls
by 12.3% and exports falls by 0.27%. In all, changes in the effective foreign interest
rate and the leakage of the capital losses to the foreign investors partially offset the
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effects of negative ToT shocks.
Figure 4.11 shows the unconditional standard deviations of some endogenous
variables in model MH (solid line) and in model RBC (dashed line) normalized by
the standard deviation of ToT shocks. The horizontal axis denotes θ ∈ [0, 1].
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Figure 4.11: Foreign Borrowing and Macroeconomic Volatility: ToT shocks
Let us look at how the degree of collateralization can affect macroeconomic
volatility to ToT shocks via foreign borrowing in model RBC. As the degree of
collateralization rises from 0 to 1, entrepreneurs finance their project investment
using more and more cheap foreign funds. Meanwhile, foreign investors bear a
larger faction of capital gains or losses. As the effects of ToT shocks are partially
offset by changes in the effective foreign interest rate, household consumption, labor,
aggregate output, and the land price become less volatile as θ rises from 0 to 0.4.
As θ rises from 0.4 to 0.6, the volatility of household consumption becomes further
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smaller. Due to the substitution between consumption and leisure, household labor
supply responds in the same direction as ToT shocks and it becomes more volatile.
Note that as θ exceeds 0.55, entrepreneurs have more foreign borrowing than
domestic borrowing, ptstZ
∗
t > z
e,m
t . Thus, the overall cost of external funds become
smaller in the case of negative ToT shocks. Thus, entrepreneurs increase their
project investment and the land price responds in the opposite direction to that in
the case of θ ∈ [0, 0.55). Therefore, the land price becomes more volatile as θ rises
from 0.55 to 1.
As θ rises from 0.6 to 1, more land is pledged to foreign investors. The mutual
funds benefit less from capital gains in the case of negative ToT shocks. Thus,
household wealth falls more strongly in the case of negative ToT shocks. As a
result, households reduce consumption in the shock period more strongly. As long as
θ ∈ (0.6, 0.8), the consumption-leisure substitution effect dominates and households
still reduce their labor supply in the shock period in the case of negative ToT shocks.
As θ rises from 0.8 to 1, the wealth effect dominates and households increase their
labor supply more and more so as to partially offset the fall in their wealth. Thus,
household labor supply becomes more volatile in θ.
Figure 4.12 shows the impulse responses of model MH in the case of θ = 0.5
(solid line) and in the case of θ = 0 (dashed line) to a transitory ToT shock, given
θ = 0.5. For simplicity, we set the foreign interest rate and total factor productivity
constant at r∗t = 1.01 and At = 1. The impulse responses of model MH in the case
of θ = 0 have been discussed in subsection 4.2.5.2.
Consider model MH in the case of θ = 0.5. A 1% negative ToT shock reduces
the price of domestic final goods and raises the price of foreign final goods by 0.5%
in period 0. Thus, the wage rate and the price of domestic intermediate goods fall by
0.52% and 0.47%, respectively. The fall in the sales revenues reduces entrepreneurial
net worth. Due to debt deflation mentioned in subsection 4.2.5.2, entrepreneurs have
to reduce their project investment. The decline in their land demand results in the
fall in the land price. As foreign investors share the capital losses with entrepreneurs,
entrepreneurial net worth falls in a smaller magnitude than in the case of θ = 0 and
so does the land price. In all, entrepreneurial net worth falls only by 0.57%. Due to
the decline in the effective foreign interest rate, entrepreneurs can get cheaper foreign
funds than in the steady state. Given that the entrepreneurs’ unit down payment
falls by 0.33%, the land stock of entrepreneurs falls only by 0.24% in period 0, less
than the 0.37% in the case of θ = 0. Accordingly, their demand for domestic lending
falls only by 0.72% and then the domestic interest rate falls by 0.08%, both are
smaller than in the case of θ = 0.
As foreign investors bear all capital losses in the land stock of households, house-
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hold wealth does not fall as much as in the case of θ = 0. Meanwhile, households
also benefit from the fall in the effective foreign interest rate in period 0 and thus
they increase their land investment. As the domestic interest rate falls less than
in the case of θ = 0, households reduce their deposits also in a smaller magnitude.
Meanwhile, they increase their labor supply and reduce consumption by 0.05% and
0.33%, larger than the 0.02% and 0.28% in the case of θ = 0. As a result, aggregate
output of domestic final goods rises by 0.034% in period 0.
As aggregate output of domestic intermediate goods is mainly determined by
the project investment of entrepreneurs in the previous period, aggregate output of
domestic intermediate goods falls by 0.23% in period 1, less than the 0.36% in the
case of θ = 0. As a result, aggregate output of domestic final goods is below its
steady state value by 0.024% in period 1, less than the 0.058% in the case of θ = 0.
Let us look at how the degree of collateralization can affect macroeconomic
volatility to ToT shocks via foreign borrowing in model MH. See figure 4.11. The
sharing of capital gains or losses by foreign investors and the effective foreign interest
rate partially offset the effects of ToT shocks. As θ rises from 0 to 0.7, household
labor supply responds to ToT shocks more strongly in the shock period but less
strongly in the following periods. The overall volatility of household labor supply
falls in θ and so does the volatility of household consumption.
As the rise in θ enables both households and entrepreneurs to borrow more
abroad. On the one hand, the steady state value of the household net land holding,
(1− θ)Et−1qtkht−1, falls in θ; on the other hand, entrepreneurs borrow less from the
mutual funds and thus household deposits fall in θ. Household net land holding
and household deposits are mainly unaffected by ToT shocks. As θ exceeds 0.7,
the weights of these two components in household wealth are so low that households
increase their labor supply both in and after the shock periods to a larger magnitude
in the case of negative ToT shocks in order to partially offset the fall in their wealth.
As a result, household labor supply becomes more volatile.
As θ rises from 0 to 1, foreign investors share more capital gains or losses with
entrepreneurs, the land stock of entrepreneurs becomes less volatile monotonically in
θ and so does aggregate output of domestic intermediate goods. Thus, as θ rises from
0 to 0.65, the effect of households labor supply dominates so that aggregate output
becomes more volatile in θ; as θ rises from 0.65 to 1, the effect of the entrepreneurs’
land stock dominates so that aggregate output becomes less volatile in θ.
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4.3.6.3 Impulse Responses to Transitory FIR Shocks
Figure 4.13 shows the impulse responses of model MH (solid line) and model RBC
(dashed line) to a transitory FIR shock in the case of θ = 0.5. For simplicity,
we set the inverse of the terms of trade and total factor productivity constant at
st = 1 and At = 1. The prices of domestic and foreign final goods are constant at
pt = ptst = 0.5.
Consider first model RBC in the case of θ = 0.5. A 1% positive FIR shock
increases the foreign interest rate by 1% and foreign borrowing is more expensive
than in the steady state. The actual foreign borrowing of entrepreneurs in terms
of the domestic consumption composite, p0s0Z
∗
0 =
θE0q1K
r∗0
, is less than its steady
state value in period 0 and so is the entrepreneurs’ demand for land. Thus, the
land price falls by 1.34%. Given that the period-1 land price is below the steady
state value by 0.61%, the entrepreneurs’ foreign borrowing falls 1.61%. Although
the capital losses are shared by entrepreneurs and foreign investors, the period-0
return on household deposits is less than its expected value. Households increase
their labor supply by 0.28% to partially offset the decline in their wealth. Thus,
aggregate output of domestic final goods rises by 0.18% and so does the price of
domestic intermediate goods. The wage rate falls by 0.1% in period 0. Note that
extra sales revenues of entrepreneurs partially offset the fall in the ex post return on
household deposits. Meanwhile, due to the wealth effect, households reduce their
consumption and deposits by 0.38% and 0.9%, respectively. The fall in the supply
of household deposits pushes up the domestic interest rate by 0.41%.
Figure 4.14 shows the unconditional standard deviations of some endogenous
variables in model MH (solid line) and in model RBC (dashed line) normalized by
the standard deviation of FIR shocks. The horizontal axis denotes θ ∈ [0, 1].
Let us look at how the degree of collateralization can affect macroeconomic
volatility to FIR shocks via foreign borrowing in model RBC. As θ rises from
0 to 1, entrepreneurs finance their project investment more by foreign funds and
changes in the foreign interest rate have larger effects on the entrepreneurs’ demand
for land. Thus, the land price responds more strongly to FIR shocks and so does
the land-backed foreign borrowing. As long as θ is below 0.55, the deposit return
accounts for a significant share of household wealth. The resulting capital gains
or losses then have larger effect on household deposits and households adjust their
labor supply to an larger extent to partially offset changes. When θ is above 0.55,
the deposits account for only a smaller fraction of household wealth. Therefore,
the household labor supply responds to FIR shocks to an smaller extent. The
volatilities of aggregate output, imports, exports, wage, and consumption have the
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Figure 4.14: Foreign Borrowing and Macroeconomic Volatility: FIR shocks
similar hump-shaped patterns with respect to the degree of collateralization.
Consider the impulse responses of model MH in the case of θ = 0.5. See figure
4.13. A 1% positive FIR shock makes foreign funds more expensive for households
and entrepreneurs. The decline in the land demand reduces the land price. Although
foreign investors share the capital losses with entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial net
worth still falls by 0.36%. Given that entrepreneurs’ unit down payment falls by
0.21%, the entrepreneurs’ land stock falls by 0.15%. The fall in the entrepreneurs’
demand for domestic loans reduces the domestic interest rate by 0.15%, in contrast
to the rise in the domestic interest rate by 0.41% in model RBC.
According to equation (4.52), household wealth has four components, the value
of their net land stock, their sales revenues, their deposit returns, and their wage
income. The first three components are mainly unaffected by the FIR shock. Given
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that the household unit down payment falls by 0.35%, households increase their
land stock. Due to the fall in the domestic interest rate, households reduce their
deposits by 0.14% in period 0. Altogether, households increase their consumption by
0.018% and reduce their labor supply by 0.013%. Thus, aggregate output of domestic
final goods falls by 0.008% and so does the price of domestic intermediate goods,
given the predetermined aggregate output of domestic intermediate goods. As the
consumption of households is five times more than that of entrepreneurs, the increase
in household consumption by 0.018% and the fall in entrepreneur consumption by
0.36% jointly result in the fall in imports by 0.036%.
Due to the fall in the entrepreneurs’ land stock in period 0, the period-1 aggre-
gate output of domestic intermediate goods falls by 0.15%. As the domestic interest
rate is above its steady state value by 0.062% in period 1, households reduce their
consumption by 0.058% and increase their labor supply by 0.022% so as to take
advantage of it. As a result, aggregate output of domestic final goods is below its
steady state value by 0.038% in period 1 and the price of domestic intermediate
good is above its steady state value by 0.11%.
Let us look at how the degree of collateralization can affect macroeconomic
volatility to FIR shocks via foreign borrowing in model MH. See figure 4.14. As
θ rises from 0 to 1, entrepreneurs and households finance their project investment
using more foreign funds. However, the value of the net land stock of entrepreneurs,
pG(1− θ)qtket−1 is affected by FIR shocks in a non-monotonic way as θ rises from 0
to 1 and so is entrepreneurial net worth, pG[Rvt+(1− θ)qt−Rmt−1]ket−1. As long as θ
is below 0.55, changes in FIR have more and more effects on the project investment
of entrepreneurs in the sense that the land stock of entrepreneurs falls more strongly
to a rise in the foreign interest rate as θ rises. However, if θ exceeds 0.55, capital
gains or losses are born more by foreign investors and thus changes in the land price
related to FIR shocks have smaller and smaller effects on entrepreneurial net worth
and their land stock. Aggregate output of domestic intermediate and final goods
has a similar volatility pattern with respect to FIR shocks.
4.4 Final Remarks
This chapter analyzes the macroeconomic implications of foreign borrowing in a
small, open, real economy. Due to debt enforcement problem, foreign borrowing
must be collateralized by domestic assets and the degree of collateralization may
differ in countries with different legal system or liquidation costs. Foreign investors
are better protected in countries with efficient legal systems and market structures.
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Thus, a larger fraction of asset value can be pledged for foreign funds in these
countries. In addition, domestic agents with high productivity can pledge some of
their project outcomes for domestic borrowing from other domestic agents. In this
sense, the moral hazard problem at the root of domestic financial constraints is less
severe than that at the root of foreign financial constraints.
Better protection of foreign investors may have uneven welfare implications
for domestic agents with different production technologies. Given that the foreign
interest rate is below the domestic interest rate, domestic agents can borrow more
cheap foreign funds in countries with better protection of foreign investors. As
domestic agents with high productivity can borrow additional funds from other
domestic agents, they invest more productive assets into their projects and thus,
domestic production becomes more efficient. Domestic agents with high productivity
benefit strictly, while, due to the substitution of foreign lending for domestic lending,
domestic agents with low productivity lose in the long run from better protection of
foreign investors. Thus, aggregate output might not be a good indicator for social
welfare in models with heterogenous agents.
Better protection of foreign investors may have ambiguous implications for
macroeconomic volatility. We look at three types of exogenous shocks. The standard
deviations of major macroeconomic aggregates with respect to each type of shocks
are non-monotonic in the degree of foreign investor protection, which are consistent
with the empirical evidence.
Some of our assumptions deserve further attention. The fact that better pro-
tection of foreign investors have uneven long-run welfare implications for domestic
households and entrepreneurs actually results from the leakage of the interest pay-
ment to foreign investors. In addition to our analysis in a small-open-economy
framework, we may conduct similar analysis in a closed-economy model. The wel-
fare implications of better protection of domestic investors might be different from
our conclusion here.
For simplicity, we assume in this chapter that the economy is small enough so
that the terms of trade and the foreign interest rate are exogenously determined
abroad. Meanwhile, the foreign interest rate is assumed to be lower than the do-
mestic interest rate such that domestic agents prefer to borrow abroad. In addition,
foreign investors are assumed to be risk neutral and they share capital gains or
losses with domestic agents. We can endogenize the terms of trade and the foreign
interest rate in a two-country general equilibrium framework in which the foreign
lenders could be risk averse. Whether our results still hold remains the subject of
future research.
Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
5.1 Main Results
This dissertation contains a theoretical study on financial frictions and macroeco-
nomic fluctuations in a closed economy and in a small open economy. Our main
results can be summarized as follows.
First, we analyze how financial frictions and time-varying prices of capital can
serve to amplify and propagate the shock effects on macroeconomic aggregates.
Due to moral hazard in the production of intermediate goods, entrepreneurs are
subject to credit constraints. The accumulation of entrepreneurial net worth and the
reallocation of capital goods between agents with different production technologies
explain the amplified and hump-shaped output responses to productivity shocks. We
adopt the conventional approach of costly capital adjustment to model time-varying
prices of capital. In the event of a positive productivity shock, due to adjustment
costs, the supply of capital goods cannot adapt to the boom in the demand for
capital goods and the price of capital goods rises to clear the market. In addition
to extra revenues, the capital gains improve entrepreneurial net worth further and
capital goods are reallocated from agents with low productivity to agents with high
productivity more quickly. As a result, the output responses are more amplified
but less delayed, in comparison with the case of costless capital adjustment. In
this sense, the tradeoff between amplification and propagation in our model can be
significantly affected if we model time-varying prices of capital in the approach of
costly capital adjustment.
Second, we propose an alternative approach to the modeling of time-varying
prices of capital, in contrast to the approach of costly capital adjustment commonly
used in the literature. Besides financial frictions in the production of intermediate
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goods, we assume that financial frictions also exist in the production of capital
goods. This assumption helps capture the empirical fact that the supply of durable
capital goods is relatively price-inelastic in the short run but accommodates the
boom in the demand for capital in the medium run. Thus, in a model with dual
financial frictions, this assumption helps balance the tradeoff between amplification
and propagation. The dynamic interactions between the price of capital and dual
financial frictions constitute a robust mechanism through which aggregate output
responds to productivity shocks in an amplified and hump-shaped fashion, in line
with the empirical evidence.
Third, we addresses two questions concerning foreign borrowing in a small open
economy: Who benefits from better protection of foreign investors in the long run?
How can better protection of foreign investors change macroeconomic volatility?
Private foreign borrowing depends on the efficiency of the domestic legal system,
market structure, financial regulations, etc. Ex post better protection of foreign in-
vestors raises the ex ante willingness of foreign investors to lend to domestic agents.
Given that the foreign interest rate is smaller than the domestic interest rate, domes-
tic agents with high productivity borrow more from foreign investors and less from
domestic lenders in countries with better protection of foreign investors. Domestic
production is more efficient and the welfare of domestic borrowers is also higher.
However, the welfare of domestic lenders is lower due to the substitution of foreign
lending for domestic lending and the reallocation of productive assets from domestic
lenders to domestic borrowers. In this sense, better protection of foreign investors
may have uneven welfare implications for different agents. Meanwhile, better pro-
tection of foreign investors may have ambiguous implications for macroeconomic
volatility. More specifically, the volatilities of major macroeconomic aggregates are
non-monotonic in the degree of foreign investor protection. It helps explain why the
empirical literature cannot find a significant relationship between financial openness
and macroeconomic volatility.
5.2 Directions for Further Research
We can extend our future research into the following directions.
First, we may analyze how the interactions among different aspects of finan-
cial liberalization can affect production efficiency in the long run. Private foreign
borrowing depends on the domestic financial regulation as well as the efficiency of
domestic legal system and market structure. In many developing economies, public
financial regulators, in consideration of financial security and stability, normally set
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upper limits for the fraction of domestic physical assets (e.g., land) or financial assets
(e.g., deposits) that is allowed to be pledged to foreign investors as collateral. Thus,
financial liberalization can be modeled as the increase in these upper limits. Our pre-
liminary investigation shows that productive assets are allocated to domestic agents
with high productivity and thus domestic production becomes strictly more efficient
if only land-backed foreign borrowing or only deposit-backed foreign borrowing is
deregulated. However, if the deposit-backed foreign borrowing is already deregu-
lated to a high degree, an increase in the degree of land-backed foreign borrowing
may reduce production efficiency in the long run. While, if the land-backed foreign
borrowing is already deregulated to a high degree, increasing the degree of deposit-
backed foreign borrowing strictly improve production efficiency in the long run. In
this sense, different aspects of financial liberalization may have countervailing ef-
fects. Thus, policy coordination and proper sequencing have profound implications
for production efficiency.
Second, we may analyze how financial liberalization should be implemented in
a small open economy. News on future productivity is immediately embedded in
the current asset prices. If there are domestic financial frictions, changes in asset
prices can lead to asset reallocation among heterogenous agents and the current
aggregate production is affected, even if current technologies are actually unchanged.
Thus, asset prices are more volatile in the economies with financial frictions than in
the economies without financial frictions, due to the inherent two-way interactions
between prices and quantities. Furthermore, asset prices can overshoot in the short
run, similar as in Dornbusch (1976). Note that the internal mechanism has its root in
financial frictions instead of price rigidity. Similarly, in the economy with domestic
financial frictions, financial liberalization, e.g., the increase in the degree of asset-
backed foreign borrowing, should be implemented gradually in order to avoid huge
macroeconomic fluctuations and welfare loss. Furthermore, to let everyone know
the whole path of future liberalization policy helps achieve a smooth transition.
Third, we may analyze how financial liberalization and asset prices can affect
macroeconomic fluctuations in a two-country general equilibrium model. As the
foreign interest rate and the terms of trade are endogenously determined in the two-
country model, exogenous shocks to domestic and foreign total factor productivity
may result in different model dynamics through the channels of the terms of trade
and the foreign interest rate which are absent in the model of small open economy.
Whether the results of chapter four still hold in the two-country framework deserves
further research.
Fourth, we may analyze optimal monetary policy in the two-country general
equilibrium model with financial frictions. As shown in Blanchard and Gali (2005),
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the standard new Keynesian framework implies no trade-off between stabilizing in-
flation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. This feature results from the
an inherent property of new Keynesian framework: the absence of nontrivial real
imperfections. Blanchard and Gali (2005) introduce real wage rigidities and show
that central banks indeed face a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabi-
lizing output gap. In contrast, we analyze whether domestic and foreign financial
frictions can help justify the active management of central banks over aggregate
demand via counter-cyclical monetary policy. Meanwhile, the policy coordination
between domestic and foreign central banks is an important issue to be analyzed in
such a framework.
Appendix A
Financial Frictions and
Macroeconomic Fluctuations
A.1 Heterogenous Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are heterogenous in equilibrium and can be categorized into four
groups: group F of mass (1 − pG) includes those with failed projects; group X of
mass pG(1−p˜i) includes those with successful projects but exiting from the economy;
group N of mass (1−pi) includes the newcomers; group V of mass pGp˜i include those
who have successful projects and can survive to the next period.1 We analyze the
economic behaviors of the entrepreneurs in each group.
The entrepreneurs in group F get zero pecuniary return from the failed projects
and simply exit from the economy without consumption, cef,t = 0.
After repaying the debts, the entrepreneurs in group X liquidate their capital
stock and consume all their wealth, cex,t = [Rvt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbt−1]kex,t.
The entrepreneurs in group N is born with a tiny endowment e. They maximizes
their expected utility (2.4), subject to their period budget constraints and credit
constraints (equations 2.6 and 2.7). They invest their endowment in project “Good”
nen,t = e and borrows to the limit. They do not consume, c
e
n,t = 0.
After repaying the debts, the entrepreneurs in group V maximizes their ex-
pected utility (2.4), subject to their period budget constraints and credit con-
straints (equations 2.6 and 2.7). They invest all own funds in the project, nev,t =
[Rvt + (1 − δ′)qt − Rbt−1]kev,t−1, and borrows to the limit. They do not consume,
cev,t = 0.
Let Ket−1 denote the aggregate capital stock in the entrepreneurial sector in
1The entrepreneurs in group V are heterogenous in net worth, so are those in group X.
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period t− 1. In the aggregate, the consumption, the net worth, the loans, and the
capital holding of the entrepreneurial sector in period t are
Cet = (1− p˜i)pG[Rvt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbt−1]Ket−1,
Nt = p˜ip
G[Rvt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbt−1]Ket−1 + (1− pi)e,
Zt = ΓtNt,
Ket =
Nt + Zt
qt
=
1 + Γt
qt
Nt.
A.2 Decentralizing the Capital Goods Produc-
tion
There are m homogeneous firms which produce capital goods and are owned by
households. They behave identically in a symmetric equilibrium. They invest it
units of final goods to produce ykt units of capital goods and the production function
is, ykt = it−mφ2 i
2
t
Jt
, where φ ≥ 0 denotes the degree of costly adjustment. Asm→∞,
there is perfect competition in the capital goods production sector and each firm
takes the price of capital as given.
If φ = 0, final goods are one-to-one transformed into capital goods. The price
of capital is constant at unity, qt = 1. Firms earn zero profits, pit ≡ qtykt − it = 0.
If φ > 0, the capital goods production function includes the term of quadratic
adjustment costs. Let It ≡ mit and Y kt ≡ mykt denote the aggregate investment
expenditure and the aggregate newly-produced capital goods. The aggregate capital
stock evolves as follows
Kt − Jt = Y kt = It −
φ
2
I2t
Jt
.
Taking the price of capital as given, each firm maximizes the profit with respect to
its investment expenditure,
max
{it}
pit ≡ qtykt − it = qt
(
it −mφ
2
i2t
Jt
)
− it.
The optimization condition gives 1
qt
= 1−mφ it
Jt
, which justifies the equilibrium price
of capital, qt =
1
1−φ It
Jt
.
The profit of each firm is, pit = qtm
φ
2
i2t
Jt
≥ 0. The aggregate profit of the capital
goods production sector, Πt = mpit = qt
φ
2
I2t
Jt
, is lump-sum transferred to households.
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Given φ > 0, a rise in the price of capital makes the production of capital goods
more profitable so that firms increase their investment expenditure and more capital
goods are produced. The aggregate supply curve of capital goods is
Y kt =
Jt
2φ
(
1− 1
q2t
)
,
which has a positive slope,
dY kt
dqt
= Jt
φq3t
> 0. More costly the capital adjustment is,
i.e., a larger φ, more strongly the price of capital responds to excess demand.
A.3 Market Equilibrium in the Frictionless
Model
Given that the project choice of entrepreneurs are perfectly observable, the market
equilibrium is the set of two state variables {Kt, At} and nine control variables
{cht , lt,Mt, Yt, It, Jt, qt, wt, vt} satisfying equations (2.1), (2.14)-(2.19), (A.1)-(A.4),
qt = βEt
(
cht+1
cht
)−σ
pG[(1− δ′)qt+1 +Rvt+1], (A.1)
Mt = p
GRKt−1, (A.2)
cht + It = Yt, (A.3)
Jt = p
G(1− δ′)Kt−1, (A.4)
zt = qtk
e
t , (A.5)
rt =
1
β
Et
(
cht+1
cht
)σ
, (A.6)
Rbt = Et[(1− δ′)qt+1 +Rvt+1]. (A.7)
The variables {zt, rt, Rbt} are inessential to the market equilibrium and can be de-
termined separately by equations (A.5)-(A.7).
Appendix B
Dual Financial Frictions and
Macroeconomic Fluctuations
B.1 Heterogenous Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are heterogenous in equilibrium and can be categorized into four
groups: group F of mass (1 − pGe ) includes those with failed projects; group X of
mass pGe (1−p˜i) includes those with successful projects but exiting from the economy;
group N of mass (1−pi) includes the newcomers; group V of mass pGe p˜i include those
who have successful projects and can survive to the next period.1 We analyze the
economic behaviors of the entrepreneurs in each group.
The entrepreneurs in group F get no pecuniary return from the failed projects
and simply exit from the economy without consumption, cef,t = 0.
After repaying the debts, the entrepreneurs in group X liquidate their capital
stock and consume all their wealth, cex,t = [Revt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbe,t−1]kex,t.
The entrepreneurs in group N is born with a tiny endowment e. They maximizes
their expected utility (3.4), subject to their period budget constraints and credit
constraints (equations 3.6 and 3.7). They invest their endowment in project “Good”
nen,t = e and borrows to the limit. They do not consume, c
e
n,t = 0.
After repaying the debts, the entrepreneurs in group V maximizes their ex-
pected utility (3.4), subject to their period budget constraints and credit con-
straints (equations 3.6 and 3.7). They invest all own funds in the project, nev,t =
[Revt + (1 − δ′)qt − Rbe,t−1]kev,t−1, and borrows to the limit. They do not consume,
cev,t = 0.
Let Ket−1 denote the aggregate capital stock in the entrepreneurial sector in
1The entrepreneurs in group V are heterogenous in net worth, so are those in group X.
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period t− 1. In the aggregate, the consumption, the net worth, the loans, and the
capital holding of the entrepreneurial sector in period t are
Cet = (1− p˜i)pGe [Revt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbe,t−1]Ket−1,
N et = p˜ip
G
e [Revt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbe,t−1]Ket−1 + (1− pi)e,
Zet = Γ
e
tN
e
t ,
Ket =
N et + Z
e
t
qt
=
1 + Γet
qt
N et .
B.2 Heterogenous Capital Good Producers
In equilibrium, producers of capital goods are heterogenous in their end-of-period
wealth and can be categorized into two groups: group F of mass (1 − pGc ) include
those with failed projects; group V of mass pGc include those with successful projects
2.
We analyze the economic behaviors of capital goods producers in each group.
Capital goods producers in group F get zero pecuniary return and have no
consumption, ccf,t = 0. They have to wait until period t+ 1 and supply labor to the
production of final goods. They then invest their wage income in project “Good”.
After repaying their liabilities, the capital goods producers in group V have net
return N cv,t = (Rcqt − Rbc,t)icv,t. At the end of period t, they allocate their wealth
between consumption and inter-period deposit, ccv,t + d
c
v,t = N cv,t.
The aggregate net worth, N ct , deposit D
c
t , investment I
c
t , and consumption C
c
t
of the capital goods production sector in period t are determined as follows,
N ct = r
d
t−1D
c
t−1 + w
c
t ,
Dct = Z
e
t −Dht ,
Ict = (1 + Γ
c
t)(r
d
t−1D
c
t−1 + w
c
t ),
Cct = ξ
c
tN
c
t −Dct ,
where Zet and D
h
t denote the aggregate inter-period lending to the entrepreneurial
sector and the aggregate inter-period deposits of the household sector.
2The capital goods producers in group V are heterogenous among themselves.
Appendix C
Domestic and Foreign Borrowing
in a Small Open Economy
C.1 Price Index of Composite Consumption
We now choose domestic final goods as the numeraire. The price of foreign final
goods is st. Suppose, households have Wt units of domestic final goods and they
consume chD,t and c
h
F,t units of domestic and final consumption goods, respectively.
Given the definition of household consumption (4.2), households maximize their
composite consumption with respect to the budget constraints,
max
{chD,t,chF,t}
(chD,t)
γ(chF,t)
1−γ, s.t. chD,t + stc
h
F,t = Wt. (C.1)
The solution is
chD,t = γWt, (C.2)
chF,t =
(1− γ)Wt
st
, (C.3)
cht = (γWt)
γ
[
(1− γ)Wt
st
]1−γ
= (γ)γ
(
1− γ
st
)1−γ
Wt. (C.4)
Let Pt denote the price index of composite consumption in terms of domestic final
goods, i.e., Ptc
h
t = Wt. It is positively related to the inverse of the terms of trade,
Pt =
(
1
γ
)γ (
st
1− γ
)1−γ
. (C.5)
A rise in the terms of trade (a fall in st) means that foreign final goods become
cheaper than before. Given that household wealth Wt is unchanged, households can
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consume more foreign final goods and the same amount of domestic final goods.
Thus, their composite consumption rises and the price index falls accordingly.
Domestic agents eventually care about their composite consumption. It is rea-
sonable to choose the consumption composite as the numeraire. If so, the price of
domestic final goods is simply the inverse of Pt, i.e., pt =
1
Pt
. The choice of the
numeraire does not affect agents’ intratemporal decisions but can have significant
effects on agents’ intertemporal decisions, e.g., inter-period borrowing and lending
(Zhang 2003).
C.2 Heterogenous Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are heterogenous in equilibrium and can be categorized into four
groups: group F of mass (1 − pG) includes those with failed projects; group X of
mass pG(1−p˜i) includes those with successful projects but exiting from the economy;
group N of mass (1−pi) includes the newcomers; group V of mass pGp˜i include those
who have successful projects and can survive to the next period.1 We analyze the
economic behaviors of the entrepreneurs in each group.
The entrepreneurs in group F get no pecuniary return from the failed projects
and simply exit from the economy without consumption, cef,t = 0.
After repaying the debts, the entrepreneurs in group X liquidate their land stock
and consume all their wealth, cex,t = [Rvt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbt−1]kex,t.
The entrepreneurs in group N is born with a tiny endowment e. They maxi-
mizes their expected utility (4.10), subject to their period budget constraints and
credit constraints (equations 4.13 and 4.14). They invest their endowment in project
“Good” nen,t = e and borrows to the limit. They do not consume, c
e
n,t = 0.
After repaying the debts, the entrepreneurs in group V maximizes their ex-
pected utility (4.10), subject to their period budget constraints and credit con-
straints (equations 4.13 and 4.14). They invest all own funds in the project,
nev,t = [Rvt+(1−δ′)qt−Rbt−1]kev,t−1, and borrows to the limit. They do not consume,
cev,t = 0.
Let Ket−1 denote the aggregate land stock in the entrepreneurial sector in period
t − 1. In the aggregate, the consumption, the net worth, the loans, and the land
holding of the entrepreneurial sector in period t are
1The entrepreneurs in group V are heterogenous in net worth, so are those in group X.
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Cet = (1− p˜i)pG[Rvt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbt−1]Ket−1, (C.6)
Nt = p˜ip
G[Rvt + (1− δ′)qt −Rbt−1]Ket−1 + (1− pi)e, (C.7)
Zt = ΓtNt, (C.8)
Ket =
Nt + Zt
qt
=
1 + Γt
qt
Nt. (C.9)
C.3 Market Equilibrium in Model RBC
Consider the case in which the mutual funds can observe project choices of en-
trepreneurs and domestic agents can borrow foreign funds against their land stock.
Given that the foreign interest rate is smaller than the domestic interest rate, en-
trepreneurs prefer to borrow abroad to the limit and pledge the rest of their project
outcomes to the mutual funds to finance their project investment. Our calibra-
tion guarantees that the expected marginal rate of return on project “Good” of
entrepreneurs exceeds that on the household project. Thus, all land is allocated to
entrepreneurs and domestic final goods are produced by entrepreneurs only. Model
RBC in section 4.2 is a special case of θ = 0.
The market equilibrium is defined as the set of three ex-
ogenous state variables {At, st, r∗t } and thirteen control variables
{rt, cht , ze,mt , lt, wt, Z∗t , vt, pt, qt, Yt, It, Xt, NXt} satisfying equations (4.5)-(4.6),
(4.8), (4.23), (4.27), (4.37), and (C.10)-(C.19),
rtz
e,m
t = Et[p
GRvt+1 + (1− θ)qt+1]K, (C.10)
(qt + apt)K = z
e,m
t + ptstZ
∗
t , (C.11)
Yt = At(p
GRK)αl1−αt , (C.12)
pGRKvt = αptYt, (C.13)
ltwt = (1− α)ptYt, (C.14)
ptXt = pt(Yt − aK)− γcht , (C.15)
ptstIt = (1− γ)cht , (C.16)
Xt = st(NXt + It), (C.17)
r∗tZ
∗
tEt(pt+1st+1) = θEtqt+1K, (C.18)
ptst(NXt + Z
∗
t ) = θqtK. (C.19)
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